OPTIMAL STACKELBERG STRATEGIES FOR CLOSED-LOOP SUPPLY CHAIN WITH THIRD-PARTY REVERSE LOGISTICS

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (05) ◽  
pp. 1250026 ◽  
Author(s):  
NI-NA YAN ◽  
BAO-WEN SUN
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Reverse Logistics ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized System ◽  
Stackelberg Strategies ◽  
Scrap Recycling

Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), especially the reverse logistics system with the third-party reverse logistics providers (3PRLP) is very important for materials return, remanufacturing, repair, recovery, recycling, and reusing. In this paper, based on a one-leader and multi-follower Stackelberg game with the manufacturer being the leader, we model a multi-echelon CLSC with 3PRLP under the consideration of impacts of environmental legislation on scrap recycling. Furthermore, in order to encourage the 3PRLP to exert him to return activities we design a target rebate-punish contract between the manufacturer and the 3PRLP under both stochastic price-dependent demands and stochastic effort-dependent returns. We analyze the closed-form analytic expressions for both united optimization strategies in centralized closed-loop system and the Stackelberg strategies in decentralized system, and conclude that the wholesale price contract may not coordinate the forward supply chain and the target rebate-punish may coordinate the reverse chain under certain conditions. Finally, according to the practice of Chinese steel enterprises we carry out some simulation experiments to validate our theoretical analyses and gain some insights into the impacts of reverse logistics activities on the practitioners operations and decisions.

Product Resynthesis as a Reverse Logistics Strategy for an Optimal Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chinmay Sane ◽  
Conrad S. Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Reverse Logistics ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Manufacturing Firms ◽  
Third Party ◽  
High Tech ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Strategy ◽  
Logistics Strategy ◽  
Original Product

With continued emphasis on sustainability-driven design, reverse logistics is emerging as a vital competitive supply chain strategy for many of the global high-tech manufacturing firms. Various original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and multi-product manufacturing firms are enhancing their reverse logistics strategies in order to establish an optimal closed-loop supply chain through which they can introduce refurbished variants of their products back into the market. While a refurbished product strategy helps to mitigate environmental impact challenges as well as provide additional economic benefits, it is limited to an existing product market, possibly a subset of the existing market, and fails to commercialize/target new markets. In addition to refurbishing, the alternatives available for utilizing End-Of-Life (EOL) products are currently restricted to recycling and permanent disposal. In this work, the authors propose employing a new EOL option called “resynthesis” that utilizes existing waste from EOL products in a novel way. This is achieved through the synthesis of assemblies/subassemblies across multiple domains. The “newly” synthesized product can then be incorporated into the dynamics of a closed-loop supply chain. The proposed methodology enables OEMs to not only offer refurbished products as part of their reverse logistics strategy, but also provide them with resynthesized product concepts that can be used to expand to new/emerging markets. The proposed methodology provides a general framework that includes OEMs (manufacturers of the original product), retailers (distributors of the original product and collectors of the EOL products) and third-party firms (managers of the EOL products) as part of a closed-loop supply chain strategy. The proposed methodology is compared with the existing methodologies in the literature wherein a third-party supplies the OEM only with refurbished products and supplies products unsuitable for refurbishing to another firm(s) for recycling/disposal. A case study involving a multi-product electronics manufacturer is presented to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed methodology.

scholarly journals An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 3433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Arshad ◽  
Qazi Khalid ◽  
Jaime Lloret ◽  
Antonio Leon
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
The Impact

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain composed of dual-channel retailers and manufacturers, a dynamic game model under the direct recovery, and an entrusted third-party recycling mode of the manufacturer is constructed. The impact of horizontal fairness concern behavior is introduced on the pricing strategies and utility of decision makers under different recycling models. The equilibrium strategy at fair neutrality is used as a reference to compare offline retails sales. Research shows that in the closed-loop supply chain of dual-channel sales, whether in the case of fair neutrality or horizontal fairness concerns, the manufacturer’s direct recycling model is superior to the entrusted third-party recycling, and the third-party recycling model is transferred by the manufacturer. In the direct recycling model, the horizontal fairness concern of offline retailers makes two retailers in the positive supply chain compete to lower the retail price in order to increase market share. Manufacturers will lower the wholesale price to encourage competition, and the price will be the horizontal fairness concern coefficient, which is negatively correlated. In the reverse supply chain, manufacturers increase the recycling rate of used products. This pricing strategy increases the utility of manufacturers and the entire supply chain system compared to fair neutral conditions, while two retailers receive diminished returns. Manufacturers, as channel managers to encourage retailers to compete for price cuts, can be coordinated through a three-way revenue sharing contract to achieve Pareto optimality.

scholarly journals The value of information sharing in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yanting Huang ◽  
Benrong Zheng ◽  
Zongjun Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Value Of Information ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Model C

This paper considers a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and a collector in which the retailer possesses private demand information and determines whether to share his private information with other chain members. Specifically, we develop four information sharing models, namely no information sharing (Model C-R), the retailer sharing information with the manufacturer (Model C-R-M), the retailer revealing information to the collector (Model C-R-C), and the retailer disclosing information to both the manufacturer and the collector (Model C-R-T). We adopt the Stackelberg game to acquire the equilibrium strategies and examine the value of information sharing on chain members’ decisions. We find that, chain members will set the largest wholesale price, retail prices of direct and indirect channels when the retailer only shares information with the manufacturer and the highest return rate can be obtained in the case of the retailer only revealing information to the collector. We can also find that, information sharing is profitable to the manufacturer and the collector, while is detrimental to the retailer. The manufacturer, the collector and the retailer can reach the largest profits in Model C-R-T, Model C-R-C and Model C-R-M, respectively.

scholarly journals Pricing, carbon emission reduction and recycling decisions in a closed-loop supply chain under uncertain environment

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Guangzhou Yan ◽  
Qinyu Song ◽  
Yaodong Ni ◽  
Xiangfeng Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Reduction Rate ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Total Carbon ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper studies the pricing and recycling decision problems in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) containing a manufacturer, a downstream retailer, and a third-party recycling left. The manufacturer is subjected to the cap-and-trade regulation and determines the wholesale price of products and carbon emission reduction rate. The retailer determines its resale price to meet customer demands. The third-party recycling left determines the collection rate of recycling and remanufacturing used products. The new product demands, total carbon emissions, and recovery of these products are characterized as uncertain variables due to lack of historical data or insufficient data collected for research. By constructing three decentralized game models, we explore the equilibrium solutions under the corresponding decision-making situation and the corresponding analytical solutions. Finally, numerical experiments are performed to show the total profit of supply chain members for each structure and some special insights are drawn.</p>

scholarly journals Optimal Alliance Strategy and Its Impact in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain by considering Greenness and Service Effort

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Wei Shi ◽  
Haoran Chen ◽  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
Chenhao Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Operation Efficiency ◽  
The Third

This paper handles Stackelberg game models in light of different alliance strategies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a third-party recycler. In this CLSC, four scenarios are examined: the decentralized case, the manufacturer and the retailer forming an alliance, the manufacturer and the third-party recycler forming an alliance, and the centralized case. And in these Stackelberg game models, a comparison between four alliance strategies is analyzed by considering greenness and service effort. The effect of alliance strategy on the decisions of the CLSC system, consumer, environment, and society is also investigated. The main objective is to find out the optimal price, greenness level, and service effort to maximize the CLSC members’ profits and give the optimal alliance strategy by using theoretical analysis. It is found that the alliance strategy improves the operation efficiency of the CLSC, and it also benefits consumers, the environment, and society. The MR alliance strategy is more effective than the MT alliance strategy, but it cannot achieve the efficiency of a centralized scenario. Finally, numerical examples are illustrated to justify the feasibility and practicability of the proposed models in reality.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

scholarly journals Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. 2274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dooho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Innovation Strategies ◽  
Market Leadership

As awareness of environmental protection increases worldwide, enterprises have been building their supply chains in ways that conserve natural resources and minimize the creation of pollutants. One of the practical ways to make supply chains more sustainable is for enterprises to utilize green innovation strategies and to increase resource reuse. In this work, we focus on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector. In the investigated CLSC, the manufacturer and the retailer drive the green innovation strategy either individually or simultaneously to boost market demand. In the reverse flow of the CLSC, the collector is responsible for collecting consumers’ used products and transferring them to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. By combining two types of the market leadership and three types of green innovation strategies, we establish six different Stackelberg game models and solve them analytically. Through an extensive comparative analysis, we show who should have market leadership and who should drive the green innovation strategy in the CLSC. Various numerical examples are also given to support our major findings. One of our key findings suggests that the supply chain members must participate in green innovation activities at the same time to achieve a win-win scenario in the CLSC.

scholarly journals Controlling Waste and Carbon Emission for a Sustainable Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management under a Cap-and-Trade Strategy

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mowmita Mishra ◽  
Soumya Kanti Hota ◽  
Santanu Kumar Ghosh ◽  
Biswajit Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
End Of Life ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Carbon Emission Trading

Considering the increasing number of end-of-life goods in the context of improving the ambience and health of a population and their destructive impacts, recycling strategies are important for industries and organizations. In this article, a closed-loop supply chain management containing a single manufacturer, a single retailer, and a third party is introduced in which the manufacturer first propagates newly finished goods and then dispatches some of the finished goods to the retailer considering a single-setup multi-delivery policy. Due to shipping, carbon emission is taken into account as well as a carbon emission trading mechanism to curb the amount of carbon emissions by the retailer. For recycling through collection, inspection, remanufacturing, and landfill, the third party collects the end-of-life goods from its customers and ships perfect products to the manufacturer after a two-stage inspection. In this model, major sources of emissions such as shipping, replenishment orders, and inventory have been taken care of. The minimizing of the total cost relating to the container capacity, shipment numbers, and replenishment cycle length is the main objective of the closed-loop supply chain management for making the system more profitable. Expository numerical explorations, analysis, and graphic representations are conferred to elucidate this model, and it is observed that this model saves some percentage of the cost compared to the existing literature.

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