Economic Dependence and Reputation Concern for the Audit Firm, Audit Groups, and Individual Auditors — The Case of Taiwan

2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (02) ◽  
pp. 1350012
Author(s):  
Pei-Gi Shu ◽  
Tsung-Kang Chen ◽  
Wen-Jye Hung ◽  
Tsui-Lin Chiang
Keyword(s):  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Economic Dependence ◽  
Accounting Firm ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Auditor Quality ◽  
Client Relationship ◽  
Reputation Concern ◽  
The Individual

Using a sample of 3,274 firm-year data from an internationally renowned accounting firm, we investigate the effects of auditor–client relationship on auditor quality (measured by absolute discretionary accruals (ABSDA)) from the perspectives of audit firm, audit group, and individual auditor, respectively. Our empirical results show that after taking account of the client size effect, the client's fee contribution to audit firm and to audit group is positively related to the client firm's ABSDA. The finding that audit firms and audit groups allow their important clients a higher level of ABSDA supports the economic-dependence hypothesis. Moreover, the economic dependence effect is more saliently found prior to the enactment of 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Furthermore, the other finding that senior individual auditors require their clients a lower level of ABSDA holds the reputation-concern hypothesis. A synopsis of the overall findings indicates that the argument of economic dependence prevails in the analysis of the audit firm and audit group, while the reputation concern prevails in the analysis of the individual auditor.

Does Increased Audit Partner Tenure Reduce Audit Quality?

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
David L. Manry ◽  
Theodore J. Mock ◽  
Jerry L. Turner
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Risk Level ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Using Data ◽  
International Audit

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires the lead audit or coordinating partner and the reviewing partner to rotate off the audit every five years so the engagement can be viewed “with fresh and skeptical eyes.” Using data obtained from actual audits by multiple U.S. offices of three large international audit firms, we examine whether there is a relationship between evidence of reduced audit quality, measured by estimated discretionary accruals, and audit partner tenure with a specific client. We find that estimated discretionary accruals are significantly and negatively associated with the lead audit partner's tenure with a specific client. Thus, audit quality appears to increase with increased partner tenure. After controlling for client size and engagement risk, we find audit partner tenure significantly and negatively associated with estimated discretionary accruals only for small clients with partner tenure of greater than seven years, regardless of risk level. We also find that tenure is not significantly associated with estimated discretionary accruals for large clients. This suggests that as partner tenure increases, auditors of small client firms become less willing to accept more aggressive financial statement assertions by managers, and that partner tenure does not affect audit quality for large clients or for shorter-tenure smaller clients. Our results relating to audit partner tenure are consistent with the conclusions about audit firm tenure by Geiger and Raghunandan (2002); Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds (2002);Myers, Myers, and Omer (2003); and Nagy (2005) and extend their findings by focusing on individual audit partners rather than on audit firms.

UKURAN KANTOR AKUNTAN PUBLIK, DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS DAN OPINI AUDIT GOING CONCERN

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 11
Author(s):  
Ravaela Amba Masiku ◽  
Christine Novita Dewi
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Discretionary Accrual ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Going Concern Opinion ◽  
Positive Effect

The purpose of this study is to examine auditor’s concervatism in term of their reaction to client’s earnings management behavior and their limitations to issue the going concern opinions (GCO). The population of this study consists of 672 observations from 69 companies are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) during 2012-2017. The author used the modified Jones model to measure discretionary accruals as a proxy of earnings management. The results of this study indicate that size of audit firm has a positive effect to discretionary accrual. Companies that have been audited by the Big4 tend to apply discretionary accrual in their financial reporting than companies audited by Non-Big4. Further, to strenghten the first hypothesis, we examine the effect of discretionary accruals and going concern opinion on companies that audited by audit firms Big4 lower than companies that audited by audit firms Non-Big4. We found that the result is consistent with the first hypothesis. Keywords : auditor reputation, discretionary accruals, going concern opinion, audit firm  ABSTRAK Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menguji konservatisme auditor dalam hal reaksi auditor terhadap akrual diskresioner yang dilakukan oleh perusahaan dan keterbatasan auditor untuk menerbitkan opini Going Concern (GC). Populasi penelitian terdiri dari 672 pengamatan dari 69 perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) selama tahun 2012-2017. Penulis menggunakan model modifikasi Jones untuk mengukur akrual diskresioner sebagai proksi manajemen laba. Hasil dari penelitian ini menjelaskan bahwa ukuran kantor akuntan publik berpengaruh positif terhadap akrual diskresioner, hal tersebut diperkuat dengan pengaruh akrual diskresioner dan opini audit going concern yang diaudit oleh kantor akuntan publik Big4 lebih rendah dari perusahaan yang tidak diaudit oleh kantor akuntan publik Non-Big4. Kata kunci : reputasi auditor, akrual diskresioner, opini audit going concern, kantor akuntan publik

scholarly journals An Interview Study to Understand the Reasons Clients Change Audit Firms and the Client's Perceived Value of the Audit Service

2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. A1-A14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Fontaine ◽  
Soumaya Ben Letaifa ◽  
David Herda
Keyword(s):  
Perceived Value ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Interview Study ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Auditor Switching ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Client Relationship

SUMMARY Audit firms are concerned that clients perceive the audit service as a commodity, with little value added, resulting in clients switching to firms that offer lower fees. However, the auditing literature lacks qualitative insight from clients on the reasons that they change audit firms and their perceptions of the value of audit services. To better understand the client's perspective, we conducted interviews with 20 financial managers who participate in audit firm appointment decisions. Our results suggest that the quality of the auditor-client relationship is the key determinant of auditor switching and audit value. Interestingly, price becomes an important factor only when the auditor-client relationship is mismanaged (e.g., when clients perceive that their auditor is not available to them).

Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph V. Carcello ◽  
Albert L. Nagy
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Fraudulent Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Client Relationship ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
The U.S

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) required the U.S. Comptroller General to study the potential effects of requiring mandatory audit firm rotation. The General Accounting Office (GAO) concludes in its recently released study of mandatory audit firm rotation that “mandatory audit firm rotation may not be the most efficient way to strengthen auditor independence” (GAO 2003, Highlights). However, the GAO also suggests that mandatory audit firm rotation could be necessary if the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's requirements do not lead to improved audit quality (GAO 2003, 5). We examine the relation between audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. Comparing firms cited for fraudulent reporting from 1990 through 2001 with both a matched set of non-fraud firms and with the available population of non-fraud firms, we find that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur in the first three years of the auditor-client relationship. We fail to find any evidence that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely given long auditor tenure. Our results are consistent with the argument that mandatory audit firm rotation could have adverse effects on audit quality.

Small Audit Firm Membership in Associations, Networks, and Alliances: Implications for Audit Quality and Audit Fees

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 767-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth L. Bills ◽  
Lauren M. Cunningham ◽  
Linda A. Myers
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Matched Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Association Member ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Control Samples

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine the benefits of membership in an accounting firm association, network, or alliance (collectively referred to as “an association”). Associations provide member accounting firms with numerous benefits, including access to the expertise of professionals from other independent member firms, joint conferences and technical trainings, assistance in dealing with staffing and geographic limitations, and the ability to use the association name in marketing materials. We expect these benefits to result in higher-quality audits and higher audit fees (or audit fee premiums). Using hand-collected data on association membership, we find that association member firms conduct higher-quality audits than nonmember firms, where audit quality is proxied for by fewer Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection deficiencies and fewer financial statement misstatements, as well as less extreme absolute discretionary accruals and lower positive discretionary accruals. We also find that audit fees are higher for clients of member firms than for clients of nonmember firms, suggesting that clients are willing to pay an audit fee premium to engage association member audit firms. Finally, we find that member firm audits are of similar quality to a size-matched sample of Big 4 audits, but member firm clients pay lower fee premiums than do Big 4 clients. Our inferences are robust to the use of company size-matched control samples, audit firm size-matched control samples, propensity score matching, two-stage least squares regression, and to analyses that consider changes in association membership. Our findings should be of interest to regulators because they suggest that association membership assists small audit firms in overcoming barriers to auditing larger audit clients. In addition, our findings should be informative to audit committees when making auditor selection decisions, and to investors and accounting researchers interested in the relation between audit firm type and audit quality.

Comparing the Auditor Quality of Arthur Andersen to that of the Big 4

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross D. Fuerman
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Securities Litigation ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Auditor Quality ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Arthur Andersen

This study compares the audit quality of Arthur Andersen with that of the Big 4 accounting firms. An expanded indicator of audit quality is developed based on the law of business misconduct literature and the legal process literature. A representation of audit quality is derived from an analysis of the legal actions initiated against these five large public accounting firms from 1996 to 2004. The legal action was partitioned into three year periods. In the first period, Arthur Andersen and the Big 4 evidenced no quality differential. In the second and third periods, the Big 4, in aggregate, rated higher on the audit quality indicator than did Andersen. The robustness of these findings is substantiated using multiple logistic regression and sensitivity analysis. When the individual firms are compared with Andersen, all four evidenced higher audit quality; three of the firms are significantly higher. This suggests that Andersen represents an outlier within the audit population. However, the analysis also indicates that overall audit quality declined in the period immediately following the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. This suggests that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provisions directed toward remedying auditing deficiencies is justified and not an overreaction to a “few bad apples.”

Insights into Large Audit Firm Sampling Policies

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. P7-P18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brant E. Christensen ◽  
Randal J. Elder ◽  
Steven M. Glover
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Sampling Methods ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Current Sampling ◽  
Audit Sampling

SUMMARY Changes in the audit profession after Sarbanes-Oxley, including mandatory audits of internal control over financial reporting and PCAOB oversight and inspection of audit work, have potentially changed the nature and extent of audit sampling in the largest accounting firms. In our study, “Behind the Numbers: Insights into Large Audit Firm Sampling Policies” (Christensen, Elder, and Glover 2015), we administered an extensive, open-ended survey to the national offices of the Big 4 and two other international accounting firms regarding their firm's audit sampling policies. We find variation among the largest firms' policies in their use of different sampling methods and in inputs used in the sampling applications that could result in different sample sizes. We also provide evidence of some of the sampling topics firms find most problematic, as well as changes to firms' policies regarding revenue testing due to PCAOB inspections. Our evidence provides important insights into current sampling policies, which may be helpful to audit firms in evaluating their sampling inputs and overall sampling approaches.

Do government-experienced auditors reduce audit quality?

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (6) ◽  
pp. 722-748
Author(s):  
Murat Ocak ◽  
Gökberk Can
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Data Access ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Small Sample ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Government Experience ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Independent Audit

Purpose Recent studies regarding auditor experience generally focus on auditor overall experience in accounting, auditing, finance and related fields (Hardies et al., 2014), auditor sector and domain experience (Bedard and Biggs, 1991; Hammersley, 2006), auditor experience as CPA (Ye et al., 2014; Sonu et al., 2016) or big N experience (Chi and Huang, 2005; Gul et al., 2013; Zimmerman, 2016) or auditors’ international working experience (Chen et al., 2017). But there is little attention paid to where auditors obtained their experience from? And how do auditors with government experience affect audit quality (AQ)? This paper aims to present the effect of auditors with government experience on AQ. Design/methodology/approach The authors used Turkish publicly traded firms in Borsa Istanbul between the year 2008 and 2015 to test the hypothesis. The sample comprises 1,067 observations and eight years. Two main proxies of government experience are used in this paper. The first proxy is auditor’s government experience in the past. The second proxy is the continuous variable which is “the logarithmic value of the number of years of government experience”. Further, auditor overall experience in auditing, accounting, finance and other related fields are also used as a control variable. Audit reporting aggressiveness, audit reporting lag and discretionary accruals are used as proxies of AQ. Besides this, the authors adopted the model to estimate the probability of selecting a government-experienced auditor, and they presented the regression results with the addition of inverse Mills ratio. Findings The main findings are consistent with conjecture. Government-experienced auditors do not enhance AQ. They are aggressive, and they complete audit work slowly and they cannot detect discretionary accruals effectively. Spending more time in a government agency makes them more aggressive and slow, and they do not detect earnings management practices. The Heckman estimation results regarding the variable of interest are also consistent with the main estimation results. In addition, the authors found in predicting government-experienced auditor choice that family firms, domestic firms and firms that reported losses (larger firms, older firms) are more (less) likely to choose government-experienced auditors. Research limitations/implications This study has some limitations. The authors used a small sample to test the impact of government-experienced auditors on AQ because of data access problems. Much data used in this study were collected manually. Earnings quality was calculated using only discretionary accruals. Real activities manipulation was not used as the proxy of AQ in this paper. The findings from emerging markets might not generalize to the developed countries because the Turkish audit market is developing compared to Continental Europe or USA. Practical implications The findings are considered for independent audit firms. Audit firms may employ new graduates and train them to offer more qualified audit work for their clients. The results do not mean that government-experienced auditors should not work in an audit firm, or that they should not establish an audit firm. It is clear that government-experienced auditors provide low AQ in terms of audit reporting aggressiveness, audit report lag and discretionary accruals. But as they operate more in the independent audit sector, they will become successful and provide qualified audit work. One other thing we can say is that it is perhaps better for government-experienced auditors to work in the tax department of independent audit firms. Originality/value This paper tries to fill the gap in the literature regarding the effect of auditor experience on AQ and concentrates on a different type of experience: Auditors with government experience.

Strong Corporate Governance and Audit Firm Rotation: Effects on Judges' Independence Perceptions and Litigation Judgments

2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianne Moody Jennings ◽  
Kurt J. Pany ◽  
Philip M. J. Reckers
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Auditor Liability ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Governance Environment ◽  
Audit Firms

The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) legislation mandated modest threshold levels of corporate board independence and expertise, as well as audit partner (not firm) rotation. One objective was to create an environment supportive of enhanced actual and perceived auditor independence. This study examines whether perceptions of auditor independence and auditor liability are incrementally influenced by further strengthening corporate governance and by rotating audit firms. Our experimental study addresses these questions by analyzing responses of 49 judges attending a continuing education course at the National Judicial College. The experiment manipulates corporate governance at two levels (minimally compliant with current corporate governance requirements versus strong) and auditor rotation at two levels (partner rotation versus audit firm rotation). We find that strengthening corporate governance (beyond minimal SOX levels) and rotating audit firms (compared to partner rotation) lead to enhanced auditor independence perceptions. We also find that judges consider auditors less likely to be liable for fraudulently misstated financial statements when firm rotation is involved in a minimally compliant corporate governance environment.

scholarly journals The effect of audit firm tenure in artificial rotation on audit quality

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 439
Author(s):  
Junaidi Junaidi ◽  
Harun Pamungkas Apriyanto ◽  
Nurdiono Nurdiono ◽  
Eko Suwardi
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Client Relationship ◽  
Going Concern Opinion ◽  
The Relationship

This study aimed to examine the effect of auditor tenure in artificial rotation on audit quality. Tenure shows the relationship between the audit firms and a client that is measured in years. Artificial rotation of auditor (audit firm) indicates a condition that, conceptually, there has been a change of auditors leading to the auditor relationship with the client to be disconnected, whereas substantive auditor-client relationship is ongoing. Formally, the auditor does not violate the rules and is still able to audit for the same client. Yet, in the long-term, it could affect the audit quality. The longer auditor tenure, the closer auditor-client relationship is. Thus, the auditor accommodates the interests of the client at the client's financial statements, including the practice of discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality. The samples were selected by purposive sampling method of the companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange from the year 2002-2010, with multiple linear regression approach. It shows that tenure, and total assets do not affect the quality of the audit while the size of the audit firm, and debt statistically have significant effect on audit quality. Future studies may extend the period of observation, and using other audit quality measures, such as fraud, and the propensity of auditor to issue going concern opinion..

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