Changes in the Global Energy Strategic Landscape: Implications for China’s International Strategic Environment

2015 ◽  
Vol 07 (03) ◽  
pp. 73-85
Author(s):  
Chi ZHANG

The global energy strategic landscape is undergoing significant changes. Factors leading to such changes include the eastward shift of the world energy consumption centre, the emergence of the United States as a major oil producer and the dramatic waning of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ influence. These developments are shaping a new order of the global energy system and exerting profound influence on China’s international strategic environment.

A brief review and interpretation of regional and world-wide trends in total energy consumption and its composition since the end of World War II is given. A review of energy-consumption projections into the 1980s — world-wide and regional — focuses on the role of international trade in oil in achieving supply—demand balances. The prospective position of the U.S. as a major oil importer is emphasized. An analysis of the sensitivity of world supply prospects to alternative assumptions concerning the growth of indigenous sources of supply in the United States of America and Western Europe is presented. The post-war growth rate in world energy consumption averaged out to over 5% per annum. Marked shifts in regional shares and variations in regional growth rates have occurred, but regional differences in the level of per capita energy use, while narrowing, remain conspicuously wide. The sharp relative decline of coal during this period was accompanied by a dramatic relative increase in both oil and gas. The rapid growth of world energy consumption as a whole, the continued shift toward oil and the rising volume of U.S. oil imports all failed to be adequately anticipated in past energy projections. A standard projection to the mid-1980s shows: world-wide energy growth of between 5-J- and 6% ; an even faster growth rate for oil, resulting in about 115x10® barrels (18.3 x 10® m3)/day in 1985 (compared to 53 x 102 b (8.4 x 104 m3)/d in 1972); and the addition of the U.S. to the ranks of the major oil importers. The Middle East, along with areas of lesser reserve holdings, is in all likelihood physically capable of accommodating expected oil demand to the mid-1980s. But the acute degree of dependence that this would pose for major consuming regions prompts the question of how a greatly expanded indigenous producing capability in the U.S. could blunt the one-sidedness of the demand-supply picture. Recently completed research suggests that, within an appropriate policy setting, the U.S. could probably meet all but 20% of its oil and gas internally by 1985 - and do so at real prices no higher than the $6/barrel ($38/m3>) delivered price rapidly being approached by Persian Gulf crude. Such a development, along with whatever contribution can be made by Western Europe’s own petroleum-producing capability, can perhaps introduce a stabilizing element of major importance into world energy flows.


2002 ◽  
pp. 252-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Podobnik

This study examines the evolution of global energy inequalities over the modern period, with particular attention paid to the years 1958–1998. The analysis reveals that global energy inequalities were modestly reduced in the 1970s, as semi-peripheral nations increased their consumption of modern energy resources. However, an inten-si? cation of inequalities reasserted itself in the 1980s and 1990s, as the semi-periphery lost ground in relation to resurgent consumption in core nations such as the United States. The study argues that, in an increasingly bounded energy system, geopolitical, commercial, and social tensions will rise if fundamental inequa-ities in energy consumption are not addressed. Prospects for achieving reforms in the system over the medium term are evaluated at the conclusion of the study.


2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 405-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Rosnick ◽  
Mark Weisbrot

European employees work fewer hours per year, and use less energy per person, than their American counterparts. This article compares the European and U.S. models of labor productivity, supply, and energy consumption. It finds that if employees in the EU-15 worked as many hours as those in the United States, they would consume at least 15 percent more energy. This aspect of the debate over Europe's economic model reaches globally. Over the coming decades, developing countries will decide how to make use of their increasing productivity. If, by 2050, the world works as do Americans, total energy consumption could be 15 to 30 percent higher than it would be if following a more European model. Translated directly into higher carbon emissions, this could mean an additional 1 to 2 degrees Celsius in global warming.


2020 ◽  
pp. 343-368

This chapter speculates about the major factors in, and challenges to, China in its relations with the world between 2020 and 2030. It first considers several dimensions of China’s likely growth over the next two decades: GDP, energy consumption, research and development spending, and military expenditure. It then examines seven separate challenges—the impact of domestic politics, relations with the United States, governance, and soft power—and posits the likely trajectories in each category. China’s future relations with its neighbors and the United States will be particularly difficult for Beijing to manage.


2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (13) ◽  
pp. 7108-7114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deidra Miniard ◽  
Joseph Kantenbacher ◽  
Shahzeen Z. Attari

How do people envision the future energy system in the United States with respect to using fossil fuels, renewable energy, and nuclear energy? Are there shared policy pathways of achieving a decarbonized energy system? Here, we present results of an online survey (n = 2,429) designed to understand public perceptions of the current and future energy mixes in the United States (i.e., energy sources used for electric power, transportation, industrial, commercial, and residential sectors). We investigate support for decarbonization policies and antidecarbonization policies and the relative importance of climate change as an issue. Surprisingly, we find bipartisan support for a decarbonized energy future. Although there is a shared vision for decarbonization, there are strong partisan differences regarding the policy pathways for getting there. On average, our participants think that climate change is not the most important problem facing the United States today, but they do view climate change as an important issue for the world today and for the United States and the world in the future.


2021 ◽  
Vol 303 ◽  
pp. 01018
Author(s):  
Yuri Fridman ◽  
Galina Rechko ◽  
Ekaterina Loginova ◽  
Aleksandr Pimonov

The world energy system has entered the so-called energy transition stage, with decarbonization and the fight against climate change as drivers for change. This event may pose many grave dangers for the Russian coal industry and commodity-rich regions of the country, whose economy is based on coal mining. The authors rely on the research into the strategic development of Kuzbass, Russia’s major coal center, and discuss whether the state should actively participate in ensuring that the region adjusts to the terms of the energy transition.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-353
Author(s):  
Yury Viktorovich Borovsky

Since the mid-2000s, the American energy industry has undergone profound changes. Having made the so-called shale revolution and achieved impressive results in the field of energy efficiency and renewable energy, the United States of America has not only radically reduced its dependence on imported hydrocarbons, but has begun to increase exports of these commodities. Given the economic weight of the U.S., such changes have significantly transformed the global energy market, requiring leading oil and gas exporters (including Russia) to take non-standard steps (for example, the OPEC+ deal). They also created serious prerequisites for Washington’s revision of its traditional energy policy in the international arena. The author makes a conclusion that the United States has not yet come out of the paradigm of net oil importer, which was formed after the first world oil crisis of 1973-1974. This means that Washington is still committed to the traditional principles of it’s foreign energy policy: diversification of oil import sources; promotion of free trade in world energy; special relations with oil exporters in the Persian Gulf and the strategic importance of the Middle East; reliance on energy suppliers from the Western hemisphere, etc. However, having radically reduced oil and gas imports and having got the opportunity to export them, the United States could not help but bring something new to its energy policy. While still prioritizing security of energy supply, the U.S. under B. Obama has started talking about the American energy independence, and D. Trump has proclaimed the global energy dominance as a new key American goal. The author assumes that global energy dominance implies Washington’s aggressive promotion of the American energy exporters, as well as its intention to turn the U.S. into a technological leader and a key regulator in the global energy market. Moreover, the U.S. has become freer in the matter of sanctions and other pressure on major oil and gas exporters, guided by its geopolitical and economic interests. Due to the growth of the American oil and gas export potential, the confrontation between Moscow and Washington in the energy sector, which began during the Cold war, has now acquired an additional economic dimension. Previously, the United States has tried to restrain the development of the Soviet, later Russian energy industry, but acted purely in the logic of political rivalry, not economic competition. Thus, in the foreseeable future the United States is unlikely to abandon its attempts to politicize and discredit Russia as an energy supplier to Europe and other regions of the world.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document