China’s Carbon Neutrality Policy: Objectives, Impacts and Paths

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (01) ◽  
pp. 5-18
Author(s):  
Liang DONG ◽  
Gaoyi MIAO ◽  
Weigang WEN

In order to realise the goal of the Paris Agreement, China has announced to enhance its nationally determined contributions (NDCs), demonstrating its determination to adopt more rigorous policies and measures to achieve a peak in carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. China’s pledge to carbon neutrality not only has a profound impact on its economic reforms, but also spurs the country to be more proactive in global climate governnance.

2021 ◽  
Vol 118 (21) ◽  
pp. e2100163118
Author(s):  
Susan M. Natali ◽  
John P. Holdren ◽  
Brendan M. Rogers ◽  
Rachael Treharne ◽  
Philip B. Duffy ◽  
...  

Rapid Arctic warming has intensified northern wildfires and is thawing carbon-rich permafrost. Carbon emissions from permafrost thaw and Arctic wildfires, which are not fully accounted for in global emissions budgets, will greatly reduce the amount of greenhouse gases that humans can emit to remain below 1.5 °C or 2 °C. The Paris Agreement provides ongoing opportunities to increase ambition to reduce society’s greenhouse gas emissions, which will also reduce emissions from thawing permafrost. In December 2020, more than 70 countries announced more ambitious nationally determined contributions as part of their Paris Agreement commitments; however, the carbon budgets that informed these commitments were incomplete, as they do not fully account for Arctic feedbacks. There is an urgent need to incorporate the latest science on carbon emissions from permafrost thaw and northern wildfires into international consideration of how much more aggressively societal emissions must be reduced to address the global climate crisis.


Author(s):  
Nathalie Seddon ◽  
Elizabeth Daniels ◽  
Rowan Davis ◽  
Rian Harris ◽  
Xiaoting Hou-Jones ◽  
...  

Ecosystems are not merely vulnerable to climate change but, if sustainably restored and protected, are a major source of human resilience. Not only is the evidence-base for the importance of these “Nature-based Solutions” (NbS) growing rapidly, but NbS are featuring with increasing prominence in global climate change policy. Here we report on the prominence of NbS in the 141 adaptation components of the 167 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) that were submitted to UNFCCC by all signatories of the Paris Agreement. In total, 103 nations include NbS in the adaptation component of their NDC, 76 nations include them in both their adaptation and mitigation component, and an additional 27 include them as part of their mitigation plans only. In other words, 130 nations—or 66% of all signatories to the Paris Agreement—have articulated intentions of working with ecosystems, in one form or another, to address the causes and consequences of climate change. However, commitments rarely translate into robust science-based targets. As climate pledges are revised in 2020, we urge the ecosystem science community to work closely with policymakers to identify meaningful adaptation targets that benefit both people and the ecosystems on which they depend.


2016 ◽  
Vol 02 (03) ◽  
pp. 383-400
Author(s):  
Huang Yitian

Climate change has been widely recognized as a global challenge that must be addressed in the twenty-first century. As an important step toward a post-2020 climate regime, the Paris Agreement has shown great achievements as well as future directions of global climate mitigation. Although some key features can be found in the mitigation provisions of the agreement, such as dual goals of temperature increase, reliance on “nationally determined contributions,” the blending of market and non-market elements, and ambiguity in financial and technology transfer, yet remaining debates including the allocation of responsibilities and the fairness of international transfer of mitigation outcomes will continue to affect the future of global climate governance. Furthermore, new challenges have also emerged after the Paris deal. Political and economic uncertainties, “carbon leakage” among industrializing countries, and the overgrowth of climate financial institutions will all generate impacts on future climate mitigation efforts. There is no ready panacea to these problems. Nevertheless, a few options of policy and institutional innovation at the technical level should be considered to generate incremental progress.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-104
Author(s):  
Sina Bergmann

Global climate governance is multilateral and involves both state and non-state actors. This study sets to identify the ways in which non-state actors can access and participate in the international climate change regime under the UNFCCC and the 2015 Paris Agreement and to evaluate how they can influence law-making processes and outcomes under the agreements. The study further provides recommendations on how the involvement of non-state actors can be improved under the agreements. The study emphasizes that under the UNFCCC, non-state actors have an important role in acting as intermediaries under the orchestration governance model and in participating to the Conference of Parties and under the Paris Agreement, by exerting influence on state’s nationally determined contributions. The study suggests that the role of non-state actors in formulating nationally determined contributions and in participating to the Conference of Parties should be further formalised and that the NAZCA portal should be improved.


Climate ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 41
Author(s):  
Hans Sanderson

With the Paris Agreement, countries are obliged to report greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions, which will ensure that the global temperature increase is maintained well below 2 °C. The parties will report their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) in terms of plans and progress towards these targets during the postponed COP26 (Conference of the Parties under the UNFCCC) in Glasgow in November 2021. These commitments, however, do not take significant portions of the consumption-related emissions related to countries imports into account. Similarly, the majority of companies that report their emissions to CDP (Formerly Carbon Disclosure Project) also do not account for their embodied value-chain-related emissions. Municipalities, on the path towards carbon neutrality in accordance with the methods outlined by C40, also do not include imported and embodied CO2 in their total emission tallies. So, who is responsible for these emissions—the producer or the consumer? How can we ensure that the NDCs, municipalities’ and companies’ reduction targets share the responsibility of the emissions in the value chain, thus ensuring that targets and plans become sustainable, climate fair, and just in global value chains? Today the responsibility lays with the producer, which is not sustainable. We have the outline for the tools needed to quantify and transparently share the responsibility between producers and consumers at corporate, municipal and national levels based on an improved understanding of the attendant sources, causes, flows and risks of GHG emissions globally. Hybrid life cycle analysis/environmentally extended input–output (LCA/EEIO) models can for example be further developed. This will, in the end, enable everyday consumption to support a more sustainable, green and low carbon transition of our economy.


Author(s):  
Hans Sanderson

With the Paris Agreement, countries are obliged to report greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduc-tions, which will ensure that the global temperature increase is maintained well below 2C. The Parties will report their Nationally Determined Contributions in terms of plans and progress to-wards these targets during the postponed COP26 in Glasgow in November 2021. These commit-ments however do not take significant portions of the consumption related emissions related to countries imports in to account. Similarly, the majority of companies that report their emissions to CDP also do not account for their embodied value-chain related emissions. Municipalities, on the path towards carbon neutrality in accordance with the methods outlined by C40, also do not in-clude imported and embodied CO2e in their total emission tallies. So, who is responsible for these emissions - the producer or the consumer? How can we ensure that the NDC's, municipalities and companies reduction targets share the responsibility of the emissions in the value-chain thus en-suring that targets and plans become, sustainable, climate fair, and just in global value chains? Today the responsibility lays with the producer, which is not sustainable. We have the outline for the tools needed to quantify and transparently share the responsibility between producers and consumers at corporate, municipal and national level based on an improved understanding of the attendant sources, causes, flows and risks og GHG emissions globally. Hybrid LCA/EEIO models can for example be further developed. This will, in the end, enable everyday consumption to support a more sustainable, green and low carbon transition of our economy.


Author(s):  
Michelle Cain ◽  
Stuart Jenkins ◽  
Myles R. Allen ◽  
John Lynch ◽  
David J. Frame ◽  
...  

Meeting the Paris Agreement temperature goal necessitates limiting methane (CH 4 )-induced warming, in addition to achieving net-zero or (net-negative) carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions. In our model, for the median 1.5°C scenario between 2020 and 2050, CH 4 mitigation lowers temperatures by 0.1°C; CO 2 increases it by 0.2°C. CO 2 emissions continue increasing global mean temperature until net-zero emissions are reached, with potential for lowering temperatures with net-negative emissions. By contrast, reducing CH 4 emissions starts to reverse CH 4 -induced warming within a few decades. These differences are hidden when framing climate mitigation using annual ‘CO 2 -equivalent’ emissions, including targets based on aggregated annual emission rates. We show how the different warming responses to CO 2 and CH 4 emissions can be accurately aggregated to estimate warming by using ‘warming-equivalent emissions', which provide a transparent and convenient method to inform policies and measures for mitigation, or demonstrate progress towards a temperature goal. The method presented (GWP*) uses well-established climate science concepts to relate GWP100 to temperature, as a simple proxy for a climate model. The use of warming-equivalent emissions for nationally determined contributions and long-term strategies would enhance the transparency of stocktakes of progress towards a long-term temperature goal, compared to the use of standard equivalence methods. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue ‘Rising methane: is warming feeding warming? (part 2)’.


Author(s):  
Hans Sanderson

With the Paris Agreement countries are obliged to report greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions which will ensure that the global temperature increase is maintained well below 2C. The Parties will report their Nationally Determined Contributions in terms of plans and progress towards these targets during the postponed COP26 in Glasgow in November 2021. These commitments however do not take significant portions of the consumption related emissions related to countries imports in to account. Similarly, the majority of companies that report their emissions to CDP also do not account for their embodied value-chain related emissions. Municipalities on the path towards carbon neutrality in accordance with the methods outlined by C40 also do not include imported and embodied CO2 in their total emission tallies. So, who is responsible for these emissions - the producer or the consumer? How can we ensure that the NDC's, municipalities and companies reduction targets share the responsibility of the emissions in the value-chain, so that the targets and plans become, sustainable, climate fair, and just in global value chains?


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 115 ◽  
pp. 80-85
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky

After four years of not simply inaction but significant retrogression in U.S. climate change policy, the Biden administration has its work cut out. As a start, it needs to undo what Trump did. The Biden administration took a step in that direction on Day 1 by rejoining the Paris Agreement. But simply restoring the pre-Trump status quo ante is not enough. The United States also needs to push for more ambitious global action. In part, this will require strengthening parties’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement; but it will also require actions by what Sue Biniaz, the former State Department climate change lawyer, likes to call the Greater Metropolitan Paris Agreement—that is, the array of other international actors that help advance the Paris Agreement's goals, including global institutions such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Montreal Protocol, and the World Bank, as well as regional organizations and non-state actors. Although the Biden administration can pursue some of these international initiatives directly through executive action, new regulatory initiatives will face an uncertain fate in the Supreme Court. So how much the Biden Administration is able to achieve will likely depend significantly on how much a nearly evenly-divided Congress is willing to support.


2015 ◽  
Vol 01 (03) ◽  
pp. 423-446
Author(s):  
Hongyuan Yu

Climate change has emerged as one of the top security challenges in the early 21st century. It is now widely acknowledged that international cooperation and collective action will be the key to addressing challenges caused by climate change. This article will give an explanation on the evolution of the global climate change governance system by linking history, governance, and diplomacy. The challenge of climate change involves not only international competition for new energy but also related adjustments in the global governance pattern. Specifically, the carbon emission reduction to be discussed at the 2015 UN Paris Climate Conference will still be problematic, and negotiations with regard to financing mechanisms between developed and developing countries will remain in doubt. Furthermore, the attitudes of the two sides toward common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) are disparate. In addition, negotiations among China, the UN, the U.S., and the EU are decisive in tackling this tricky matter. Finally, this article outlines some potential diplomatic options for China's future developmental trend.


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