China, Europe and the G-Zero World

2018 ◽  
Vol 01 (04) ◽  
pp. 1850027 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katja Banik

What does it mean to live in a world without global leadership? Where is the European Union heading? What impact will Trump’s “America first” policy and China’s Belt and Road Initiative have on tomorrow’s world order? Geopolitical reflections on the G-Zero world.

2020 ◽  
pp. 33-45
Author(s):  
Mikhail Nosov ◽  

At present time, there are three main international integration projects actually operating in the Eurasian space ‒ the European Union (EU), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Chinese “Belt & Road Initiative” (BRI) project. All three differ in the time of their beginning, in economic and political possibilities, in methods of implementation and in its goals. All projects, one way or another, interact with each other in Eurasia with different intensity, potentially open up wide opportunities for them, but also create new problems. For Russia relations with China is one of the most important factors of its foreign policy and the Chinese project is a substantial part of it. The article examines the history of the Chinese project, the reasons for its occurrence, and the problems arising in bilateral and global relations in the context of Russia’s participation in it.


Author(s):  
D. Potapov

The article analyses the foreign direct investment cooperation between the European Union and the People’s Republic of China under the Belt and Road Initiative. The initiative is proposed by China and is aimed at developing cross-regional transport and logistics infrastructure connecting China with South-East, South and Central Asia, the Middle East, East Africa and Europe. The author examines the history of the initiative and its assessments by international organizations (e.g. the World Bank and the ESCAP UN) and investigates the structure and statistics of the EU-China investment relations, basing on the examples of the most important China’s investment partners (including France, Italy, Germany and the Vishegrad Group countries). The discrepancy between the conditions for the EU and the Chinese investors is highlighted. The author defines and characterizes the major models of the Belt and Road projects’ development, which are used by China in cooperation with the EU Member States. The EU investors in China face restrictions imposed by the national regulation of foreign investments. In particular, the external investors do not have access to the sectors crucially important for national interest and security (e.g. high-tech sectors and mass media). At the same time, Chinese investors’ access to the EU financial markets is not limited, allowing them to become important shareholders in the EU companies and to transfer technologies. It raises concerns within national governments and the European Union itself. The national governments are establishing and adopting screening mechanisms for foreign direct investments and additional regulations to control important sectors and enterprises. At the same time, the EU Member States are developing a common view on the prospects and mechanisms of cooperation with China under the Belt and Road initiative. The EU countries have not yet reached a consensus upon the Belt and Road initiative and the prospects of the EU participation in it, so the author focuses on the strategies of the examined countries. Germany is calling for a common position for all the EU member states and advocates for using the EU-based mechanisms and platforms for cooperation with China. Such demands are also connected with the promotion of a common EU investment screening mechanism in order to protect the Member States’ interests and security. Italy is deepening its cooperation with China through bilateral mechanisms, mainly based on a memorandum of understanding with China on the Belt and Road initiative. France, on the one hand, shares the common interest with Germany regarding the need for the common EU policy towards the Chinese initiative, but on the other hand, the country is deploying new projects with China. The Visegrad Group states are forging their ties with China through bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms and they are interested in the growth of Chinese investment inflows. This undermines the unanimity of policy towards China and the Belt and Road.


Author(s):  
Fabienne Bossuyt ◽  
Irina Bolgova

As China further embarks on implementing its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and remains firmly set on pursuing the ambitious goal of connecting China overland with Europe, the European Union (EU) and Russia - as indispensable stakeholders for this continental connection to successfully materialize – have been developing policy responses to China's initiative that reveal an unexpected willingness to cooperate. In scrutinizing the likelihood of cooperation on connectivity between the EU, China, and Russia in Central Asia, this chapter identifies the common interests between the three sides, and highlights to what extent cooperation between them is possible in Central Asia. In doing so, the chapter points to the main opportunities while outlining the main bottlenecks, which mostly stem from the underlying geopolitical rivalry between these three actors, as well as their diverging beliefs and approaches to connectivity and development.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dick Dunmore ◽  
Alberto Preti ◽  
Clémence Routaboul

Abstract China’s Belt and Road Initiative, announced in late 2013, includes the construction of land-based transport connections between Asia and Europe, the creation of an economic belt for Eurasian cooperation, and maritime routes between China and all continents with which it may trade. Within the European Union, it will interact with infrastructure and services provided in the private sector, by the Member States, and by the European Union including through the Trans-European Transport Network programme. This paper focuses on the scope for rail services between China and Europe to attract freight currently travelling by sea and air, and the resulting changes in relative accessibility and competitive attractiveness of different maritime and landlocked regions of Europe. It estimates that, by 2040, 3 million TEU of freight between the Far East and Europe might travel by rail, comprising 2.5 million TEU from sea and 0.5 million TEU from air. While it concludes that it is not possible to predict whether and where these transfers will require changes to the Trans-European Transport Network programme, it describes recommendations on how the programme should take the Belt and Road Initiative into account.


2020 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 337-355
Author(s):  
Mihajlo Vucic

The topic of this article is the Serbian foreign policy between its main strategic aims - membership in the European Union, and cooperation with China in the framework of the Belt and Road initiative. Serbia bases its foreign policy upon four pillars - the accession process to the EU and three strategic partnerships with great world powers - China, the United States of America, and Russia. However, the accession process to the EU requires from Serbia to strictly follow its obligations from the Stabilization and Association Agreement, Treaty Establishing the Transport Community, and other treaties signed with the EU which might sometimes conflict with project activities from the Belt and Road partnership process. These obligations relate mostly to competition and environmental protection. The author gives the analysis of the main points of possible conflict and indicates a double standard in the EU approach to the Belt and Road initiative. Then he presents arguments that indicate the Belt and Road can serve as a bridge between candidate countries and the EU internal market. The author concludes that although there exist some structural justifications to EU?s skepticism towards the Belt and Road, the best way to overcome them is to insist on political dialogue on many existing levels between the EU and China, with the aim to exchange information between them on EU rules, policies and standards to make sure Chinese investments and other financial activities in Serbia are in accordance with its accession obligations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 321-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Merje Kuus

This commentary foregrounds the import of regulatory power in region-making practices in the Arctic. I note the increasing interest in Arctic governance from China in the context of its Belt and Road Initiative and from the European Union in the context of its overall political agenda. I discuss what regulatory power means, why it matters, and what greater attention to it would add to our understanding of Arctic regionalism. My goal is to highlight the standard-making practices that may remain invisible on the ground but govern economic and political life from a distance.


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