Chapter 2 Seismic hazard

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. M. W. Musson

AbstractIt is often thought that earthquakes do not occur in the UK; however, the seismicity of the UK is usually classified as low-to-moderate. On average, a magnitude 3.2 Mw moment magnitude or larger earthquake occurs once per year, and 4.2 Mw or larger every 10 years. The latter is capable of causing non-structural damage to property. The damage caused by British earthquakes is generally not life-threatening, and no-one has been killed in a British earthquake (at the time of writing, May 2013) since 1940. Damage is caused by shaking, not by ground rupture, so the discovery of a fault surface trace at a construction site is not something to be worried about as far as seismic hazard is concerned. For most ordinary construction in the UK, earthquake hazard can be safely discounted; this is not the case with high-consequence facilities such as dams, bridges and nuclear power plants.

ANRI ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 31-44
Author(s):  
Aleksey Ekidin ◽  
Aleksey Vasil'ev ◽  
Maksim Vasyanovich ◽  
Evgeniy Nazarov ◽  
Mariya Pyshkina ◽  
...  

The article presents the results of field studies in the area of the Belarusian NPP in the pre-operational period. The «background» contents of gamma-emitting radionuclides in individual components of the environment are determined. The main array of dose rate measurements in the area of the NPP construction site is in the range 0.048 ÷ 0.089 μSv/h. External radiation in the surveyed area is formed at 96% due to 40K, 226Ra and 232Th. The information obtained can be used to correctly interpret the data of future radiation monitoring during normal operation of nuclear power plants.


Author(s):  
Y. Yan ◽  
A. Laskar ◽  
Z. Cheng ◽  
F. Menq ◽  
Y. Tang ◽  
...  

The concept of periodic materials, based on solid state physics theory, is applied to earthquake engineering. The periodic material is a material which possesses distinct characteristics that do not allow waves with certain frequencies to be transmitted through; therefore, this material can be used in structural foundations to block unwanted seismic waves with certain frequencies. The frequency band of periodic material that can filter out waves is called the band gap, and the structural foundation made of periodic material is referred to as the periodic foundation. In designing a periodic foundation, the first step is to match band gaps of the periodic foundation with the natural frequencies of the superstructure. This is an iterative process. Starting with a design of the periodic foundation, the band gaps are identified by performing finite element analyses using ABAQUS. This design process is repeated until the band gaps match natural frequencies of the superstructure, and the field tests of a scaled specimen are conducted to validate the design. This is an on-going research project. Presented in this paper are the preliminary results, which show that the three dimensional periodic foundation is a promising and effective way to mitigate structural damage caused by earthquake excitations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain J. Tromans ◽  
Guillermo Aldama-Bustos ◽  
John Douglas ◽  
Angeliki Lessi-Cheimariou ◽  
Simon Hunt ◽  
...  

2002 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-261
Author(s):  
Steve Thomas

In 1990, the privatisation of the British electricity supply industry revealed how uneconomic Britain's nuclear power plants were. The nuclear sector was withdrawn from privatisation and it seemed likely that by 2000, most of Britain's nuclear power plants would be closed. However, operating costs were dramatically reduced and in 1996, most of the nuclear plants were privatised in British Energy. Nuclear output made an important contribution to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the future looked secure for the existing plants. However, the early success of British Energy was based on an inflated wholesale electricity price and by 2000, British Energy was struggling to cover its costs. The British government is now conducting a review of energy policy. The economic case for new nuclear power plants is poor but the need to meet greenhouse gas emission targets and the influence British Energy and BNFL may ensure the long-term future of the existing plants.


Author(s):  
H. Reece-Barkell ◽  
W. J. J. Vorster

Effective outage planning and implementation is critical to the efficient and safe operation of commercial nuclear power plants in the UK. Statutory outages are necessary for refuelling, for preventive and corrective maintenance when shutdown conditions are required, and for major modification and improvement projects. Outages involve the support of many companies and individuals working together and, as such, require high levels of coordination. Planning of activities before the outage is critical to the overall success of the outage. Establishing the integrity of power plant piping and pressure vessels is a key objective as part of any outage and the methodology and processes involved are the subject of this paper. Establishing the integrity of piping and pressure vessels requires an understanding of the specific threats, their relationship to the overall condition of the system, and the mitigating measures required to assure safe operation. Understanding the specific threats allows the engineering function of an organisation to advise on pipework and pressure vessel ‘Minimum Acceptable Thicknesses’ which can be used to assure integrity via comparison with thicknesses measured during outage inspections. Minimum Acceptable Thicknesses should be recorded in the outage management documentation so they are accessible during the outage implementation phase. Historically a variety of different methodologies have been used to advise on Minimum Acceptable Thickness requirements including design drawing specified minimum thicknesses, design code based required thicknesses and thicknesses calculated based on Fitness for Purpose methods. It is important that a robust procedure be applied to promote consistency of approach as regards the calculation of pipework and pressure vessel Minimum Acceptable Thickness requirements across all power station assets. An additional consideration is that of ensuring that the approach adopted is consistent with high level safety case guidance, i.e., the assessment is appropriate for the failure tolerability of the plant item. This paper provides an overview of the strategy, methodologies and processes employed to determine Minimum Acceptable Thicknesses for pipework components. These ensure that, over a specified inspection interval, were the weld/component to be defect free, it would not fail due to any of the relevant failure mechanisms, which typically are plastic collapse, creep rupture, fatigue, incremental collapse (ratcheting) or buckling. Readers of this paper will gain a valuable insight into the statutory outage process applicable to nuclear power plants in the UK. A particular focus of this paper is on the structural integrity assessments applied in a non-traditional sense prior to, during and after the statutory outage. As well as sharing a valuable insight into the assessment methodologies this paper highlights best industrial practice.


Author(s):  
Tim Jelfs ◽  
James O’Neill ◽  
Angus Beveridge

Nuclear power plants contain certain components whose gross failure would lead to intolerable radiological consequences. In the UK, a common terminology used for such components is Very High Integrity (VHI). If it is not possible to engineer lines of protection for these components, a safety case must demonstrate to UK regulators that the probability of gross failure is demonstrably so low that it can be discounted. A previous paper [Ref. 1] has described, at a high level, how the structural integrity safety case for a nuclear new build project in the UK — the UK Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (UK ABWR) is being structured. As described in [Ref. 1], the structural integrity safety case for the UK ABWR is based on the guidance provided by the UK Technical Advisory Group on Structural Integrity (TAGSI) and aims to demonstrate a multi-legged safety case with robust and independent legs giving confidence of defense in depth. Design to the internationally recognized ASME code [Refs. 2, 3, 4] is supplemented by a significant number of beyond code requirements such as supplementary inspection and inspection qualification, augmented material testing requirements, defect tolerance assessment to the well-established R6 procedure [Ref. 5], and demonstration that design and manufacturing processes have reduced risks to As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). This paper provides an updated position of the progress made on the UK ABWR project. It also provides more specific details on the activities the future licensee, Horizon Nuclear Power, has performed in support of the demonstration that design and manufacturing processes have reduced risks to ALARP. This kind of additional work is vital to providing the UK regulator with confidence that the risk of failure of VHI components has been reduced to ALARP.


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