scholarly journals S3

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Habiba Farrukh ◽  
Tinghan Yang ◽  
Hanwen Xu ◽  
Yuxuan Yin ◽  
He Wang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mobile Sensors ◽  
Magnetic Data ◽  
Smart Devices ◽  
High Dimensional ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Motion Sensor ◽  
Motion Sensors ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
2Nd Generation ◽  
Apple Ipad

With smart devices being an essential part of our everyday lives, unsupervised access to the mobile sensors' data can result in a multitude of side-channel attacks. In this paper, we study potential data leaks from Apple Pencil (2nd generation) supported by the Apple iPad Pro, the latest stylus pen which attaches to the iPad body magnetically for charging. We observe that the Pencil's body affects the magnetic readings sensed by the iPad's magnetometer when a user is using the Pencil. Therefore, we ask: Can we infer what a user is writing on the iPad screen with the Apple Pencil, given access to only the iPad's motion sensors' data? To answer this question, we present Side-channel attack on Stylus pencil through Sensors (S3), a system that identifies what a user is writing from motion sensor readings. We first use the sharp fluctuations in the motion sensors' data to determine when a user is writing on the iPad. We then introduce a high-dimensional particle filter to track the location and orientation of the Pencil during usage. Lastly, to guide particles, we build the Pencil's magnetic map serving as a bridge between the measured magnetic data and the Pencil location and orientation. We evaluate S3 with 10 subjects and demonstrate that we correctly identify 93.9%, 96%, 97.9%, and 93.33% of the letters, numbers, shapes, and words by only having access to the motion sensors' data.

Advanced Encryption Standard With Randomized Round Keys for Communication Security in IoT Networks

2019 ◽  
pp. 280-288
Author(s):  
Ishpal Singh Gill ◽  
Dharm Singh Jat
Keyword(s):  
Smart Cities ◽  
Health Sector ◽  
Smart Devices ◽  
Advanced Encryption Standard ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Key ◽  
The World ◽  
In Transit

Internet of things (IoT) is a rapidly emerging architecture connecting smart devices all across the world in various fields like smart homes, smart cities, health sector, security, etc. Security is a very important aspect of IoT. As more and more devices are connecting to the Internet, it becomes a lucrative target for hackers. The communication between the various devices, nodes, and between nodes and the cloud, needs to be secured. A combination of public and private key cryptography systems is used to secure the IoT networks. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is used for encrypting the data in transit. However, the AES is known to be prone to brute force attacks, side channel attacks, and other forms of cryptanalysis. This chapter proposes a more secure AES algorithm with randomised round keys, which provides better security with negligible overheads, and is ideal for use in IoT networks.

scholarly journals A Randomized Switched-Mode Voltage Regulation System for IoT Edge Devices to Defend Against Power Analysis based Side Channel Attacks

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohd Khan ◽  
Yu Chen
Keyword(s):  
Power Analysis ◽  
Voltage Regulation ◽  
Security And Privacy ◽  
Smart Devices ◽  
Regulation System ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
User Data ◽  
Commercial Off The Shelf ◽  
Iot Devices

The prevalence of Internet of Things (IoT) allows heterogeneous and lightweight smart devices to collaboratively provide services with or without human intervention. With an ever-increasing presence of IoT-based smart applications and their ubiquitous visibility from the Internet, user data generated by highly connected smart IoT devices also incur more concerns on security and privacy. While a lot of efforts are reported to develop lightweight information assurance approaches that are affordable to resource-constrained IoT devices, there is not sufficient attention paid from the aspect of security solutions against hardware-oriented attacks, i.e. side channel attacks. In this paper, a COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) based Randomized Switched-Mode Voltage Regulation System (RSMVRS) is proposed to prevent power analysis based side channel attacks (P-SCA) on bare metal IoT edge device. The RSMVRS is implemented to direct power to IoT edge devices. The power is supplied to the target device by randomly activating power stages with random time delays. Therefore, the cryptography algorithm executing on the IoT device will not correlate to a predictable power profile, if an adversary performs a SCA by measuring the power traces. The RSMVRS leverages COTS components and experimental study has verified the correctness and effectiveness of the proposed solution.

scholarly journals A Randomized Switched-Mode Voltage Regulation System for IoT Edge Devices to Defend Against Power Analysis based Side Channel Attacks

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohd Khan ◽  
Yu Chen
Keyword(s):  
Power Analysis ◽  
Voltage Regulation ◽  
Security And Privacy ◽  
Smart Devices ◽  
Regulation System ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
User Data ◽  
Commercial Off The Shelf ◽  
Iot Devices

The prevalence of Internet of Things (IoT) allows heterogeneous and lightweight smart devices to collaboratively provide services with or without human intervention. With an ever-increasing presence of IoT-based smart applications and their ubiquitous visibility from the Internet, user data generated by highly connected smart IoT devices also incur more concerns on security and privacy. While a lot of efforts are reported to develop lightweight information assurance approaches that are affordable to resource-constrained IoT devices, there is not sufficient attention paid from the aspect of security solutions against hardware-oriented attacks, i.e. side channel attacks. In this paper, a COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) based Randomized Switched-Mode Voltage Regulation System (RSMVRS) is proposed to prevent power analysis based side channel attacks (P-SCA) on bare metal IoT edge device. The RSMVRS is implemented to direct power to IoT edge devices. The power is supplied to the target device by randomly activating power stages with random time delays. Therefore, the cryptography algorithm executing on the IoT device will not correlate to a predictable power profile, if an adversary performs a SCA by measuring the power traces. The RSMVRS leverages COTS components and experimental study has verified the correctness and effectiveness of the proposed solution.

New Countermeasures Against Side-Channel Attacks for Cryptography on Elliptic Curves

2006 ◽  
Vol 65 (10) ◽  
pp. 913-922
Author(s):  
Ya. N. Imamverdiev
Keyword(s):  
Elliptic Curves ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks

Countermeasure for Cryptographic Chips to Resist Side-Channel Attacks

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (11) ◽  
pp. 2990-2998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tao ZHANG ◽  
Ming-Yu FAN
Keyword(s):  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks

scholarly journals ThermalAttackNet: Are CNNs Making It Easy to Perform Temperature Side-Channel Attack in Mobile Edge Devices?

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 146
Author(s):  
Somdip Dey ◽  
Amit Kumar Singh ◽  
Klaus McDonald-Maier
Keyword(s):  
Information Flow ◽  
Heat Dissipation ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attack ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Information Flow Control ◽  
On Chip ◽  
Temperature Side ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Memory Efficient

Side-channel attacks remain a challenge to information flow control and security in mobile edge devices till this date. One such important security flaw could be exploited through temperature side-channel attacks, where heat dissipation and propagation from the processing cores are observed over time in order to deduce security flaws. In this paper, we study how computer vision-based convolutional neural networks (CNNs) could be used to exploit temperature (thermal) side-channel attack on different Linux governors in mobile edge device utilizing multi-processor system-on-chip (MPSoC). We also designed a power- and memory-efficient CNN model that is capable of performing thermal side-channel attack on the MPSoC and can be used by industry practitioners and academics as a benchmark to design methodologies to secure against such an attack in MPSoC.

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