scholarly journals Strategic Conditions for Opening an Internet Store and Pricing Policies in a Retailer-Dominant Supply Chain

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yonghong Cheng ◽  
Zhongkai Xiong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Pricing Policies ◽  
Equilibrium Prices ◽  
Multichannel Retailing ◽  
Dominant Retailer ◽  
Theoretical Results

To examine when the manufacturer and dominant retailer open their own Internet stores and how setting prices to ensure opening Internet stores are profitable. We consider a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and one dominant retailer. The retailer has a physical store in a monopolist market. Depending on whether the Internet stores are opened successfully by them, we firstly obtain equilibrium prices and profits under four possible supply chain structures. Secondly, we identify several strategic conditions when it is optimal to open an Internet store for the manufacturer and dominant retailer and discuss its implications. It is interesting to note that multichannel retailing is not necessarily the best strategy for the dominant retailer. In addition, we investigate the impacts of problem parameters (the dominant retailer’s bargaining power and consumers’ disutility of purchasing a product from Internet store) on the manufacturer and dominant retailer’s pricing policies. We find that the manufacturer’s optimal price at her Internet store is not always being lower than the dominant retailer’s. Finally, we conduct numerical examples to illustrate the theoretical results.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination Contracts under Double Sided Disruptions Simultaneously

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huan Zhang ◽  
Yang Liu ◽  
Jingsi Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Pricing Policy ◽  
Product Cost ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Supply Chain Contracts ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Key Factor

Supply chain coordination models are developed in a two-echelon supply chain with double sided disruptions. In a supply chain system, the supplier may suffer from the product cost disruption and the retailer suffers from the demand disruption simultaneously. The purpose of this study is to design proper supply chain contracts, under which the supply chain with double sided disruption can be coordinated. Firstly, the centralized decision-making models are applied to find the optimal price and quantity under three cases as the baseline. The different cases are divided by the different relationship between the product cost disruption and the demand disruption. Secondly, two different types of contracts are introduced to coordinate the whole supply chain. One is all-unit wholesale quantity discount policy (AQDP) contract, and the other one is capacitated linear pricing policy (CLPP) contract. And it is found out that the gap between the demand disruption and the product cost disruption is the key factor to influence the supply chain coordination. Some numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are given to illustrate the models. The AQDP contracts are listed out under different cases to show how to use it under double sided disruptions.

scholarly journals Bargaining Power Choices with Moral Hazard in a Supply Chain

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongmei Guo ◽  
Shuiliang Gu ◽  
Yingsheng Su
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Power Allocation ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Supply Chain Contract ◽  
Nash Bargaining Game ◽  
Information Problem ◽  
Theoretical Results

A supply chain contract is established using a dynamic, Nash bargaining game which determines the optimal bargaining power allocation for the manufacturer, retailer, and society in an environment affected by moral hazard and irreversible investment. The results found that the manufacturer’s choice was to hold all bargaining power; however, due to the remaining information problem, the retailer still had a profit; in contrast, the retailer was only willing to give up bargaining power if the manufacturer’s profit was reserved. The optimal bargaining power allocation was found to be strongly related to the ability to convert and monitor technology, with the bargaining power gradually shifting to the manufacturer as the technology improved. A numerical simulation is given to examine the theoretical results.

scholarly journals Coordination Contracts for Hotels and Online Travel Agents

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (8) ◽  
pp. 3355
Author(s):  
Qiang Guo ◽  
Chris K. Anderson ◽  
Junfeng Dong ◽  
Pengfei Zhao ◽  
Qingkai Ji
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Travel Agents ◽  
New Type ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Online Travel ◽  
Theoretical Results ◽  
Online Travel Agents

Herein, we address a common problem of hotels in the current world of online selling, namely the management of relationships with third party resellers (also known as online travel agents (OTAs)). We highlight the role of OTAs in the current travel landscape, and we discuss the popular contracting forms between OTAs and hotels, which are the so-called merchant and retail (commission) models. We illustrate how these contracts fail to coordinate the hotel–OTA relationship, and then, we develop a new type of contract that can efficiently coordinate a supply chain consisting of the OTA and the individual hotels. We provide theoretical results and numerical examples for a one-to-one model with one OTA and one supplier and a more realistic setting with an OTA selling to consumers on behalf of numerous hotel partners.

Advertising and Pricing Policies in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained Retailer

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 1331-1342
Author(s):  
Honglin Yang ◽  
Lingling Chu ◽  
Hong Wan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
Initial Capital ◽  
Pricing Policies ◽  
The Interest Rate ◽  
Theoretical Results

We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one capital-constrained retailer. The supplier can offer the retailer trade credit to fund his orders. To boost sales, the retailer invests part or all of initial capital exclusively in advertising at the beginning of the sales season. Demand is sensitive to both retail price and advertising expenses of the retailer. With a wholesale price contract, we analytically derive the Stackelberg equilibrium with respect to pricing by both parties and advertising by the retailer. Our results show that the retailer with less initial capital prefers to invest full initial capital in advertising irrespective of the advertising elasticity or the interest rate charged by the supplier. The retailer with more initial capital only invests part of initial capital in advertising. The retailer’s advertising policy under different initial capital levels always benefits the supply chain and the supplier. We further identify the effects of the advertising elasticity and the interest rate on the pricing policies. Numerical simulations and sensitivity analysis are given to elaborate our theoretical results.

scholarly journals Optimal Alliance Strategy and Its Impact in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain by considering Greenness and Service Effort

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Wei Shi ◽  
Haoran Chen ◽  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
Chenhao Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Operation Efficiency ◽  
The Third

This paper handles Stackelberg game models in light of different alliance strategies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a third-party recycler. In this CLSC, four scenarios are examined: the decentralized case, the manufacturer and the retailer forming an alliance, the manufacturer and the third-party recycler forming an alliance, and the centralized case. And in these Stackelberg game models, a comparison between four alliance strategies is analyzed by considering greenness and service effort. The effect of alliance strategy on the decisions of the CLSC system, consumer, environment, and society is also investigated. The main objective is to find out the optimal price, greenness level, and service effort to maximize the CLSC members’ profits and give the optimal alliance strategy by using theoretical analysis. It is found that the alliance strategy improves the operation efficiency of the CLSC, and it also benefits consumers, the environment, and society. The MR alliance strategy is more effective than the MT alliance strategy, but it cannot achieve the efficiency of a centralized scenario. Finally, numerical examples are illustrated to justify the feasibility and practicability of the proposed models in reality.

The Impact of E-Procurement Systems in the Biomedical Industry

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 66
Author(s):  
A. Seetharaman ◽  
Nitin Patwa ◽  
Simon Lai Koek Wai ◽  
Ahammed Shamir
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Savings ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Business Analytics ◽  
Process Automation ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Compliance Cost ◽  
Biomedical Industry ◽  
The Impact

The evolution of the Internet has revolutionised the sourcing and procurement processes in organisations in every industry. The focus of this paper is to analyse the perception of business users on the factors which impact the usage of eprocurement systems in the biomedical industry. There are four factors identified in this research: i.e. control and compliance, cost savings, process automation, and improvements and transparency. The benefit of achieving process automation is the first biggest factor, followed by the need for control and compliance, and transparency, being the second and third factors respectively. The fourth factor, cost savings, is ignored because the users perceived that cost savings will not be realised in the short term, and the returns from the investment could be a couple of years after the eprocurement system has been fully operational. The research also concludes that the ability to perform business analytics and to strengthen the supply chain are the most important factors in measuring the success in the adoption of e-procurement systems

scholarly journals Bargaining power as moderator of the “delay costs effect” in supply chain negotiations

2021 ◽  
Vol 51 ◽  
pp. 100737
Author(s):  
Susana Gago-Rodríguez ◽  
Gilberto Márquez-Illescas ◽  
Manuel Núñez-Nickel
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Bargaining Power

scholarly journals A Model of Waste Price in a Symbiotic Supply Chain Based on Stackelberg Algorithm

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 1740
Author(s):  
Cheng Che ◽  
Xiaoguang Zhang ◽  
Yi Chen ◽  
Liangyan Zhao ◽  
Zhihong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Sensitivity Analysis ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Income Level ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Revenue Model

By establishing a two-level symbiotic supply chain system consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer, we use Stackelberg method to analyze the optimal price and revenue model of supplier and manufacturer in the symbiotic supply chain under two power structures in which the supplier and manufacturer are dominant respectively, and analyze the influence of the degree of symbiosis and power structure on the model. Through comparative analysis, we find that: There is a relationship between the income level and the degree of symbiosis in the symbiotic supply chain. The change of power structure will affect the relative benefits of suppliers and manufacturers in the symbiotic supply chain. The manufacturer’s expected unit product revenue will affect the supply chain revenue when the manufacturer is dominant. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of relevant parameters is carried out through an example analysis, and the validity of the conclusion is verified. This paper has a guiding significance for the behavior of enterprises in the cogeneration supply chain.

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