scholarly journals Novel Data Sponsoring Control Scheme Based on the Dual-Leader Stackelberg Game Model

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Sungwook Kim
Keyword(s):  
Service Providers ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Main Idea ◽  
Research Area ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Mobile Data ◽  
Data Usage ◽  
Control Scheme ◽  
5G Network ◽  
Basic Ideas

In the phase of the process that will lead to the future 5G networks, the demand of mobile data usage will continue to rise sharply, and the high cost of data will become a critical concern. As a major paradigm shift, data sponsoring has been introduced with the hope of benefiting the practice of the telecommunication industry. The main idea of data sponsoring is to subsidize the service payment while appealing to more users; it can potentially generate more profit gains for both the users and the system operators. In this paper, the intelligent interactions of three network entities, i.e., the users, the service providers, and the content providers, are analyzed based on the basic ideas of game theory, and we design an effective data sponsoring control scheme using a novel dual-leader Stackelberg game model. As dual leaders, service and content providers share the profit in a cooperative manner, and mobile users react individually to the leaders in a competitive manner. By employing different game methodologies, we investigate the mutual relationship between the network entities and aim to balance the user’s payoff and the system revenue. To validate the proposed approach, an analytic simulation model and numerical results are provided to demonstrate the efficiency and feasibility of the proposed approach under the 5G network infrastructure. Finally, we provide further challenges and various future opportunities in this research area.

A Resamping Approach for Customer Gender Prediction Based on E-Commerce Data

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duong Tran Duc ◽  
Pham Bao Son ◽  
Tan Hanh ◽  
Le Truong Thien
Keyword(s):  
Data Mining ◽  
Bayesian Network ◽  
Web Applications ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Main Idea ◽  
Classification Methods ◽  
Cost Sensitive Learning ◽  
Network Method ◽  
Demographic Attributes ◽  
Privacy Issues

Demographic attributes of customers such as gender, age, etc. provide the important information for e-commerce service providers in marketing, personalization of web applications. However, the online customers often do not provide this kind of information due to the privacy issues and other reasons. In this paper, we proposed a method for predicting the gender of customers based on their catalog viewing data on e-commerce systems, such as the date and time of access, the products viewed, etc. The main idea is that we extract the features from catalog viewing information and employ the classification methods to predict the gender of the viewers. The experiments were conducted on the datasets provided by the PAKDD’15 Data Mining Competition and obtained the promising results with a simple feature design, especially with the Bayesian Network method along with other supporting techniques such as resampling, cost-sensitive learning, boosting etc.

Cloud Provider's Response to Multiple Models of Attack Behaviors

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 325-333
Author(s):  
Xu Liu ◽  
Xiaoqiang Di ◽  
Jinqing Li ◽  
Huamin Yang ◽  
Ligang Cong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Multiple Models ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Cloud Provider ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Attack Behavior ◽  
Behavior Model ◽  
Protection Strategy ◽  
Behavior Models ◽  
Optimal Protection

Background: User behavior models have been widely used to simulate attack behaviors in the security domain. We revised all patents related to response to attack behavior models. How to decide the protected target against multiple models of attack behaviors is studied. Methods: We utilize one perfect rational and three bounded rational behavior models to simulate attack behaviors in cloud computing, and then investigate cloud provider’s response based on Stackelberg game. The cloud provider plays the role of defender and it is assumed to be intelligent enough to predict the attack behavior model. Based on the prediction accuracy, two schemes are built in two situations. Results: If the defender can predict the attack behavior model accurately, a single-objective game model is built to find the optimal protection strategy; otherwise, a multi-objective game model is built to find the optimal protection strategy. Conclusion: The numerical results prove that the game theoretic model performs better in the corresponding situation.

Essentially non-oscillatory and weighted essentially non-oscillatory schemes

Acta Numerica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 701-762
Author(s):  
Chi-Wang Shu
Keyword(s):  
Main Idea ◽  
High Order Accuracy ◽  
Finite Difference Schemes ◽  
Approximation Procedure ◽  
Discontinuous Solutions ◽  
Weno Schemes ◽  
Convection Diffusion ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Basic Ideas ◽  
Weighted Eno

Essentially non-oscillatory (ENO) and weighted ENO (WENO) schemes were designed for solving hyperbolic and convection–diffusion equations with possibly discontinuous solutions or solutions with sharp gradient regions. The main idea of ENO and WENO schemes is actually an approximation procedure, aimed at achieving arbitrarily high-order accuracy in smooth regions and resolving shocks or other discontinuities sharply and in an essentially non-oscillatory fashion. Both finite volume and finite difference schemes have been designed using the ENO or WENO procedure, and these schemes are very popular in applications, most noticeably in computational fluid dynamics but also in other areas of computational physics and engineering. Since the main idea of the ENO and WENO schemes is an approximation procedure not directly related to partial differential equations (PDEs), ENO and WENO schemes also have non-PDE applications. In this paper we will survey the basic ideas behind ENO and WENO schemes, discuss their properties, and present examples of their applications to different types of PDEs as well as to non-PDE problems.

scholarly journals Single-Manufacturer Multi-Retailer Supply Chain Models with Discrete Stochastic Demand

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (15) ◽  
pp. 8271
Author(s):  
Yaqing Xu ◽  
Jiang Zhang ◽  
Zihao Chen ◽  
Yihua Wei
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Programming Model ◽  
Dynamic Programming Method ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Stochastic Demands ◽  
Demand Models

Although there are highly discrete stochastic demands in practical supply chain problems, they are seldom considered in the research on supply chain systems, especially the single-manufacturer multi-retailer supply chain systems. There are no significant differences between continuous and discrete demand supply chain models, but the solutions for discrete random demand models are more challenging and difficult. This paper studies a supply chain system of a single manufacturer and multiple retailers with discrete stochastic demands. Each retailer faces a random discrete demand, and the manufacturer utilizes different wholesale prices to influence each retailer’s ordering decision. Both Make-To-Order and Make-To-Stock scenarios are considered. For each scenario, the corresponding Stackelberg game model is constructed respectively. By proving a series of theorems, we transfer the solution of the game model into non-linear integer programming model, which can be easily solved by a dynamic programming method. However, with the increase in the number of retailers and the production capacity of manufacturers, the computational complexity of dynamic programming drastically increases due to the Dimension Barrier. Therefore, the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) approach is introduced, which significantly reduces the computational complexity of solving the supply chain model.

scholarly journals Pricing Policies in a Retailer Stackelberg O2O Green Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (8) ◽  
pp. 3236
Author(s):  
Gan Wan ◽  
Gang Kou ◽  
Tie Li ◽  
Feng Xiao ◽  
Yang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Good Combination ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Mathematical Function ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Offline Channels

Due to the popularization of the concept of “new retailing”, we study a new commercial model named O2O (online-to-offline), which is a good combination model of a direct channel and a traditional retail channel. We analyze an O2O supply chain in which manufacturers are responsible for making green products and selling them through both online and offline channels. The retailer is responsible for all online and offline channels’ orders, and the manufacturer gives the retailer a fixed fee. We construct a mathematical function model and analyze the greenness and pricing strategies of centralized and decentralized settings through the retailer Stackelberg game model. Due to the effects of the double marginalization of supply chain members, we adopt a simple contract to coordinate the green supply chain. The paper’s contributions are that we obtain pricing and greening strategies by taking the cooperation of offline channels and online channels into consideration under the O2O green supply chain environment.

WeStat: a Privacy-Preserving Mobile Data Usage Statistics System

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sébastien Canard ◽  
Nicolas Desmoulins ◽  
Sébastien Hallay ◽  
Adel Hamdi ◽  
Dominique Le Hello
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Preserving ◽  
Mobile Data ◽  
Data Usage

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

Manufacturing service order allocation in the context of social manufacturing based on Stackelberg game

2018 ◽  
Vol 233 (8) ◽  
pp. 1890-1901
Author(s):  
Wei Guo ◽  
Pingyu Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Quality Of Service ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Manufacturing Industry ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Service Cost ◽  
Order Allocation ◽  
Multi Objective ◽  
Bird Swarm Algorithm

For adapting the socialization, individuation and servitization in manufacturing industry, a new manufacturing paradigm called social manufacturing has received a lot of attention. Social manufacturing can be seen as a network that enterprises with socialized resources self-organized into communities that provide personalized machining and service capabilities to customers. Since a community of social manufacturing has multiple enterprises and emphasizes on the importance of service, manufacturing service order allocation must be studied from the new perspective considering objectives on service cost and quality of service. The manufacturing service order allocation can be seen as a one-to-many game model with multi-objective. In this article, a Stackelberg game model is proposed to tackle the manufacturing service order allocation problem with considering the payoffs on cost and quality of service. Since this Stackelberg game can be mapped to a multi-objective bi-level programming, a modified multi-objective hierarchical Bird Swarm Algorithm is used to find the Nash equilibrium of the game. Finally, a case from a professional printing firm is analyzed to validate the proposed methodology and model. The objective of this research is to find the Nash equilibrium on the manufacturing service order allocation and provide strategies guidance for customer and small- and medium-sized enterprises with optimal service cost and lead time. According to the game process and Nash equilibrium, some rules are revealed, and they are useful for guiding practical production.

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