scholarly journals Anonymous Data Reporting Strategy with Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Participatory Sensing

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Yang Li ◽  
Hongtao Song ◽  
Yunlong Zhao ◽  
Nianmin Yao ◽  
Nianbin Wang
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Low Latency ◽  
Participatory Sensing ◽  
Data Reporting ◽  
Additional Information ◽  
Sensing Applications ◽  
Multimodal Information ◽  
Intelligent Devices ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism

Participatory sensing is often used in environmental or personal data monitoring, wherein a number of participants collect data using their mobile intelligent devices for earning the incentives. However, a lot of additional information is submitted along with the data, such as the participant’s location, IP and incentives. This multimodal information implicitly links to the participant’s identity and exposes the participant’s privacy. In order to solve the issue of these multimodal information associating with participants’ identities, this paper proposes a protocol to ensure anonymous data reporting while providing a dynamic incentive mechanism simultaneously. The proposed protocol first establishes a submission schedule by anonymously selecting a slot in a vector by each member where every member and system entities are oblivious of other members’ slots and then uses this schedule to submit the all members’ data in an encoded vector through bulk transfer and multiplayer dining cryptographers networks (DC-nets) . Hence, the link between the data and the member’s identity is broken. The incentive mechanism uses blind signature to anonymously mark the price and complete the micropayments transfer. Finally, the theoretical analysis of the protocol proves the anonymity, integrity, and efficiency of this protocol. We implemented and tested the protocol on Android phones. The experiment results show that the protocol is efficient for low latency tolerable applications, which is the cases with most participatory sensing applications, and they also show the advantage of our optimization over similar anonymous data reporting protocols.

scholarly journals A Privacy-Preserving Incentive Mechanism for Participatory Sensing Systems

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoguang Niu ◽  
Jiawei Wang ◽  
Qiongzan Ye ◽  
Yihao Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Balance ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Privacy Preserving ◽  
Circulation System ◽  
Participatory Sensing ◽  
Sensing Systems ◽  
Sensing Applications ◽  
Ideal Situation ◽  
Conflicting Objectives ◽  
Share Information

The proliferation of mobile devices has facilitated the prevalence of participatory sensing applications in which participants collect and share information in their environments. The design of a participatory sensing application confronts two challenges: “privacy” and “incentive” which are two conflicting objectives and deserve deeper attention. Inspired by physical currency circulation system, this paper introduces the notion of E-cent, an exchangeable unit bearer currency. Participants can use the E-cent to take part in tasks anonymously. By employing E-cent, we propose an E-cent-based privacy-preserving incentive mechanism, called EPPI. As a dynamic balance regulatory mechanism, EPPI can not only protect the privacy of participant, but also adjust the whole system to the ideal situation, under which the rated tasks can be finished at minimal cost. To the best of our knowledge, EPPI is the first attempt to build an incentive mechanism while maintaining the desired privacy in participatory sensing systems. Extensive simulation and analysis results show that EPPI can achieve high anonymity level and remarkable incentive effects.

scholarly journals A Geoprivacy by Design Guideline for Research Campaigns That Use Participatory Sensing Data

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 203-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ourania Kounadi ◽  
Bernd Resch
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Participatory Sensing ◽  
Practical Relevance ◽  
Design Guideline ◽  
Technical Aspects ◽  
Sensing Data ◽  
Research Survey ◽  
Sensing Applications ◽  
Clear Guideline

Participatory sensing applications collect personal data of monitored subjects along with their spatial or spatiotemporal stamps. The attributes of a monitored subject can be private, sensitive, or confidential information. Also, the spatial or spatiotemporal attributes are prone to inferential disclosure of private information. Although there is extensive problem-oriented literature on geoinformation disclosure, our work provides a clear guideline with practical relevance, containing the steps that a research campaign should follow to preserve the participants’ privacy. We first examine the technical aspects of geoprivacy in the context of participatory sensing data. Then, we propose privacy-preserving steps in four categories, namely, ensuring secure and safe settings, actions prior to the start of a research survey, processing and analysis of collected data, and safe disclosure of datasets and research deliverables.

scholarly journals Cooperation Promotion from the Perspective of Behavioral Economics: An Incentive Mechanism Based on Loss Aversion in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks

Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiaqi Liu ◽  
Shiyue Huang ◽  
Hucheng Xu ◽  
Deng Li ◽  
Nan Zhong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc Networks ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
High Speed ◽  
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Mobile Ad Hoc Network ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Hoc Networks

As a special mobile ad-hoc network, Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) have the characteristics of high-speed movement, frequent topology changes, multi-hop routing, a lack of energy, storage space limitations, and the possible selfishness of the nodes. These characteristics bring challenges to the design of the incentive mechanism in VANETs. In the current research on the incentive mechanism of VANETs, the mainstream is the reward-based incentive mechanism. Most of these mechanisms are designed based on the expected utility theory of traditional economics and assume that the positive and negative effects produced by an equal amount of gain and loss are equal in absolute value. However, the theory of loss aversion points out that the above effects are not equal. Moreover, this will lead to a deviation between the final decision-making behavior of nodes and the actual optimal situation. Therefore, this paper proposed a Loss-Aversion-based Incentive Mechanism (LAIM) to promote the comprehensive perception and sharing of information in the VANETs. This paper designs the incentive threshold and the threshold factor to motivate vehicle nodes to cooperate. Furthermore, based on the number of messages that the nodes face, the utility function of nodes is redesigned to correct the assumption that a gain and a loss of an equal amount could offset each other in traditional economics. The simulation results show that compared with the traditional incentive mechanism, the LAIM can increase the average utility of nodes by more than 34.35%, which promotes the cooperation of nodes.

scholarly journals Research on incentive mechanism of benefit distribution in collaborative innovation of industry alliance

2021 ◽  
Vol 336 ◽  
pp. 09008
Author(s):  
Yue Li ◽  
Jiepeng Huang ◽  
Hang Guo ◽  
Zhuo Wang
Keyword(s):  
Return On Investment ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Logistic Function ◽  
Distribution Model ◽  
Risk Avoidance ◽  
Benefit Distribution ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Two Stages ◽  
And Behavior

In order to improve the performance of alliance collaborative innovation and stimulate members' willingness and behavior to participate in collaborative innovation, this paper puts forward the incentive mechanism of benefit distribution. This paper divides the needs of members to participate in collaborative innovation into two stages: "risk avoidance-return on investment". Firstly, an effective benefit distribution model is established by using Logistic function. Then, by building a game model, we can get the best effort. The results show that building the benefit distribution model of alliance collaborative innovation according to the different needs of alliance members can fully stimulate members to participate in collaborative innovation and improve the performance of alliance collaborative innovation.

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