scholarly journals Study on the Compliance Management of the Electricity Market in China Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Luosong Jin ◽  
Chang He ◽  
Xiangyang Wang ◽  
Wei Wang ◽  
Panting Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Power Market ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
System Reform ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
Effective Compliance

China’s new round of power system reform has further released market vitality, making the power market more open and diversified. Meanwhile, China’s power market faces various risks and challenges incurred by this new reform, which further highlights the importance of the compliance management. However, the study on effective compliance management of China’s power market is missing, and the way to achieving effective compliance management is still unanswered. This paper tries to fill the research gap using the evolutionary game theory. We constructed a tripartite game model to analyze the strategic choices and influencing factors of power generators, compliance departments of the trading centre, and government regulatory agencies. Furthermore, simulation analysis was conducted based on evolutionary stable strategies. The results show that effective compliance management can be achieved without government supervision if the market mechanism is properly designed. In addition, the costs and profits of market participants and regulators are important factors influencing the effectiveness of compliance management. Our findings may arouse inspiration for the policy makers to construct an effective compliance management system.

PATENTING OR SECRET? THE INTERACTION BETWEEN LEADING FIRMS AND FOLLOWING FIRMS BASED ON EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND MULTI-AGENT SIMULATION

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (07) ◽  
pp. 1950068 ◽  
Author(s):  
XIAOYANG ZHAO
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Patent Protection ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Imitation Strategy

Firms who want to appropriate innovation often need to make decision facing the trade-off between patenting and secret. This paper explores how leading firms make trade-off between patenting and secret through the view of the interaction between leading firms and following firms who have the option of imitation or substitution, based on the evolutionary game theory. Then, a simulation model is built combining the evolutionary game model and agent-based modelling method, which allows us to implement bounded rationality and interactivities. The simulation is run with different gain parameters and the results are checked by cross-validation. It is found that leading firms are more likely to adopt patenting strategy with well developed patent protection regime. While depending on variations on patent protection effectiveness, technological characteristics, and leading firms’ investment in patent portfolio development, following firms may choose imitation strategy or substitution strategy. Considering bounded rationality, firms could choose sub-optional strategies and leads to scenarios other than evolutionary equilibrium solutions, which provide deeper insights of strategic choices of leading firms and following firms. This paper makes contributions to theory by using the perspective of multi-agent view and integrating bounded rationality in the simulation. Finally, this paper draws conclusion and puts forward some suggestions.

scholarly journals Research on Promotion of Consumers’ Application of After Service in Online Shopping Based on Evolutionary Game Theory-- Introduction of Smart Contract

2021 ◽  
Vol 233 ◽  
pp. 01074
Author(s):  
Hongzhen Lei ◽  
Di Lu ◽  
HongHong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Online Shopping ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Smart Contract ◽  
Service Guarantee ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

In order to research how to promote online shopping consumers’ application of after service, build an evolutionary game model of both consumers and e-stores. This paper introduces the variables of supervision and punishment, tries to introduce the smart contract as a powerful service guarantee, and analyzes the influence relationship of variables between the two players and their strategic choices. This paper analyzes the ESS of the system when the relationship among smart contract, revenue, supervision and punishment meets 8 different conditions. Finally, giving suggestions to optimize the after service in online shopping according to the results.

scholarly journals Exploring Tourism Recovery in the Post-COVID-19 Period: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (16) ◽  
pp. 9162
Author(s):  
Hui Yan ◽  
Haixiang Wei ◽  
Min Wei
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Health Events ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Tourism Enterprises ◽  
The Impact

This study aims to explore the process of tourism recovery in the post-COVID-19 period and the role of stakeholders in promoting such a process. Using evolutionary game theory, this study analyzes the behavior interactions and game equilibrium of stakeholders in the development of tourism by constructing an evolutionary game model amongst governments, tourists and tourism enterprises. Then, the influences of different evolution paths and major parameters affecting stakeholders’ strategy selection are discussed. With the aim of illustrating the role of the stakeholders in the tourism sector’s economic recovery under the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the numerical experiment was conducted using the MATLAB 2016 software. The results show that the development and change of the emergent public health events affect tourism stakeholders’ behavior strategy. Moreover, the strategic choices of each player, including governments, tourism enterprises and tourists, are also constantly evolving at different stages of the pandemic.

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

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