scholarly journals Simulation Study on the Evolutionary Game Mechanism of Collaborative Innovation in Supply Chain Enterprises and Its Influencing Elements

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Jue-Ping Xie ◽  
Huai-Ying Lei
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation System ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Gain Coefficient ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Innovative Capability ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Innovative Capabilities

Collaborative innovation between companies is critical for increasing supply chain value. However, as a dynamic game process, the collaboration between manufacturer, provider, and seller in the supply chain is influenced by a range of elements. This paper is set out to investigate the collaborative innovation strategy adopted by manufacturer, supplier, and distributor (the “three players”). To meet this end, an analytical framework was built to study the evolutionary game of collaborative innovation in supply chain enterprises. Based on the analysis, this research further studied the dynamic evolutionary mechanism and influencing elements through four different simulation cases. The research showed the following. (1) When the three players have equal innovative capability, they are more willing to contribute to innovation if the projected revenue is higher reflecting an increasing coefficient of collaborative innovation gains. As a result, the three players are more likely to agree on their cooperation approach. (2) When the three players have different independent and innovative capabilities, they are more willing to innovate if the collaborative innovation gain coefficient increases, but supply chain players with stronger capability are more active to innovate than their peers. In other words, strong innovators attach particular attention to innovation. (3) When any collaborative innovation could generate profits for all players in the supply chain, the player who enjoys the benefit but lacks innovative capability will be unwilling to cooperate with others if additional gains rise. Thus, better maintenance of the stability of the collaborative innovation system requires a strictly implemented coordination mechanism.

Network effect in shared supply chain platform value co-creation behavior in evolutionary game1

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Zou Xiaohong ◽  
Chen Jinlong ◽  
Gao Shuanping
Keyword(s):  
Boundary Condition ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Network Effect ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
The Cost

The shared supply chain model has provided new ideas for solving contradictions between supply and demand for large-scale standardized production by manufacturers and personalized demands of consumers. On the basis of a platform network effect perspective, this study constructs an evolutionary game model of value co-creation behavior for a shared supply chain platform and manufacturers, analyzes their evolutionary stable strategies, and uses numerical simulation analysis to further verify the model. The results revealed that the boundary condition for manufacturers to participate in value co-creation on a shared supply chain platform is that the net production cost of the manufacturers’ participation in the platform value co-creation must be less than that of nonparticipation. In addition, the boundary condition for the shared supply chain platform to actively participate in value co-creation is that the cost of the shared supply chain platform for active participation in value co-creation must be less than that of passive participation. Moreover, value co-creation behavior on the shared supply chain platform is a dynamic game interaction process between players with different benefit perceptions. Finally, the costs and benefits generated by the network effect can affect value co-creation on shared supply chain platforms.

scholarly journals The Dynamic Game of Knowledge Hiding Behavior from Organizational Members: To Hide or Not to Hide?

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Fan Yang ◽  
Long Yang ◽  
Ping Li
Keyword(s):  
Negative Correlation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Stable Equilibrium Point ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Knowledge Leakage ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Innovation Ability ◽  
Hiding Behavior ◽  
Knowledge Hiding

In the era of the knowledge economy, it is urgent for organizations to solve the problem of knowledge hiding of internal members to accelerate the speed and efficiency of knowledge dissemination and innovation and adapt to rapid changes in the market. At present, research on knowledge hiding has received extensive attention from Western countries, but there are few relevant studies in China. Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of second-level knowledge hiding of organizational members and analyzes the main factors affecting the stable equilibrium point using MATLAB numerical simulation. The results show that knowledge leakage risk is positively correlated with knowledge hiding. The ability of knowledge absorption and transformation is positively correlated with the behavior of knowledge hiding. There is a negative correlation between collaborative innovation ability and knowledge hiding. There is a negative correlation between knowledge stock and knowledge hiding. Only when the incentive reaches a certain level can organizational members be encouraged to give up knowledge hiding. This paper provides a more comprehensive and dynamic picture of the evolutionary game of knowledge hiding among members in the organization and provides a new idea of knowledge management for organizational managers.

Coordination of a Supply Chain with Demand Stimulation and Random Demand Disruption

2011 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiaojun Xiao ◽  
Jia Luo ◽  
Jiao Jin
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Penalty Costs ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

This chapter develops a dynamic game model of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer to study the coordination mechanism and the effect of demand disruption on the coordination mechanism, where the market demand is sensitive to retail price and service. We assume that the supplier and the retailer only know the distribution of the disrupted amount after the demand disruption and they share the quantity deviation costs. We find that an all-unit wholesale quantity discount-subsidy mechanism can coordinate the supply chain. We give the coordination mechanism of the supply chain after the demand disruption and find that the demand disruption remarkably influences the price-service level decisions of the centralized supply chain and the coordination mechanism of the decentralized supply chain. In particular, the expected quantity differs from the planned quantity although the penalty costs prevent from this deviation.

EVOLUTION OF TRUST IN A DUAL-CHANNEL SUPPLY CHAIN CONSIDERING RECIPROCAL ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (06n07) ◽  
pp. 1650014 ◽  
Author(s):  
KUIRAN SHI ◽  
HUJIE MA
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Input Output ◽  
Learning Abilities ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Output Ratio ◽  
High Level ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

In order to alleviate the conflict between the channels in dual-channel supply chain, the altruism tendency and trust input are important for strengthening the cooperation between the channels. We view the dual-channel supply chain as a nonlinear system that consists of co-competition, learning decision and dynamic game between direct channels and retail channels. Then, we develop learning dynamics and evolutionary game model to analyze the channels’ altruism behavior and the factors that influence trust input. We find that the evolutionary direction of altruistic behavior is determined by the sensitiveness and the learning abilities of both members of supply chains. The trust input decision of both channels is highly related to the output ratio of high-level trust input, only if the input–output ratio is ideal for both game parties, the system may come to an evolutionary stable equilibrium of high trust input. If the trust input of the two sides is unilateral, then one side chooses high trust input, while the other side chooses low trust input. In this case, even the input–output ratio is high, it will not be evolutionary stable. The profit both sides earned from the low-trust cooperation is the basic for further trust input, the increased free ride income, trust input risk and the trust evaluation cost will affect the enthusiasm of trust input for the dual-channel supply chain members. To promote high trust input in dual-channel supply chain, a certain amount of compensation should be negotiated in the contract in order to improve the performance of the supply chain.

scholarly journals Optimal pricing and complex analysis with carbon emission reduction preference in an apparel supply chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Zongxian Wang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Complex Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Global Bifurcation ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Better Than

Abstract In this paper, we study the supply chain competition models that consider consumers' low-carbon consumption preferences. By constructing the supply chain of manufacturers and retailers with different market positions, two game types, decentralized decision making and centralized decision making are proposed, and the static and dynamic game methods are combined respectively for research. Although research has found that centralized decision making is always better than decentralized decision making under the static game mode, when considering the long-term dynamic evolutionary game, the average profit of decentralized decision making may be better than the average profit of centralized decision making. Moreover, there are complex dynamic characteristics under dynamic games. In order to fully understand the nature of the dynamic game systems, we discussed the stability, local bifurcation, and global bifurcation of these dynamic systems. It is found that although dynamic game systems may lose stability with changes in parameters, they are better than static game results in some cases, this is beneficial to decision-makers and has practical management significance.

scholarly journals Research on Evolutionary Game of Collaborative Innovation in Supply Chain under Digitization Background

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Meili Lu ◽  
Yujia Gao ◽  
Qin Wan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Data Sharing ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Resource Integration ◽  
Security Risk ◽  
Risk Coefficient ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Leading Enterprises

The development of digital technology has been rapidly pushing forward collaborative innovation in supply chain. This paper analyzes the influence mechanism of information sharing, resource integration, and trustworthiness among the enterprises in supply chain to collaborative innovation under the digitization background and builds the model of dynamic evolutionary game in which enterprises in supply chain participate collaborative innovation, and then, through the methods of model solution analysis and numerical simulation the following concrete conclusions are reached: the increase of data sharing profit coefficient, resource integration coefficient, and trustworthiness causes the increase of the probability that an enterprise selects to participate collaborative innovation in supply chain, and the increase of data sharing cost, security risk coefficient, and free rider income causes the decrease of the probability that an enterprise selects to participate collaborative innovation in supply chain; meanwhile, the increase of all the coefficients makes the velocity with which decision-making approaches to the direction toward decision higher and higher, and when the core enterprises participate the game, they can drive the common enterprises make decision more rapidly; and for the probability that an enterprise selects to participate collaborative innovation in supply chain, data sharing profit coefficient, data sharing cost coefficient, security risk coefficient, and free rider income have threshold values. These conclusions play active roles in leading enterprises to attach importance to digitization construction and actively participate collaborative innovation in supply chain.

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