scholarly journals Research on Evolutionary Game of Collaborative Innovation in Supply Chain under Digitization Background

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Meili Lu ◽  
Yujia Gao ◽  
Qin Wan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Data Sharing ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Resource Integration ◽  
Security Risk ◽  
Risk Coefficient ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Leading Enterprises

The development of digital technology has been rapidly pushing forward collaborative innovation in supply chain. This paper analyzes the influence mechanism of information sharing, resource integration, and trustworthiness among the enterprises in supply chain to collaborative innovation under the digitization background and builds the model of dynamic evolutionary game in which enterprises in supply chain participate collaborative innovation, and then, through the methods of model solution analysis and numerical simulation the following concrete conclusions are reached: the increase of data sharing profit coefficient, resource integration coefficient, and trustworthiness causes the increase of the probability that an enterprise selects to participate collaborative innovation in supply chain, and the increase of data sharing cost, security risk coefficient, and free rider income causes the decrease of the probability that an enterprise selects to participate collaborative innovation in supply chain; meanwhile, the increase of all the coefficients makes the velocity with which decision-making approaches to the direction toward decision higher and higher, and when the core enterprises participate the game, they can drive the common enterprises make decision more rapidly; and for the probability that an enterprise selects to participate collaborative innovation in supply chain, data sharing profit coefficient, data sharing cost coefficient, security risk coefficient, and free rider income have threshold values. These conclusions play active roles in leading enterprises to attach importance to digitization construction and actively participate collaborative innovation in supply chain.

Comparison of Supply Chain Consigning Collaborative Innovation Modes

2012 ◽  
Vol 452-453 ◽  
pp. 407-411
Author(s):  
Wei Tian ◽  
Li Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Innovation Cost ◽  
Innovation Modes ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Innovation Ability

In this paper, we have constructed supply chain consigning collaborative innovation modes and explored the innovation game process involving supplier, manufacturer and third-party research firm where the manufacturer acting as a core firm. We consider innovation cost coefficient information symmetry and asymmetry. The research shows that supplier’s innovation effect is more direct to supply chain. When innovation ability is similar, no matter judging from innovation inputs, expect profits or demand quantities, the mode of the supplier consigning innovation is superior to that with third-party and non-collaborative innovation.

scholarly journals Simulation Study on the Evolutionary Game Mechanism of Collaborative Innovation in Supply Chain Enterprises and Its Influencing Elements

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Jue-Ping Xie ◽  
Huai-Ying Lei
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation System ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Gain Coefficient ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Innovative Capability ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Innovative Capabilities

Collaborative innovation between companies is critical for increasing supply chain value. However, as a dynamic game process, the collaboration between manufacturer, provider, and seller in the supply chain is influenced by a range of elements. This paper is set out to investigate the collaborative innovation strategy adopted by manufacturer, supplier, and distributor (the “three players”). To meet this end, an analytical framework was built to study the evolutionary game of collaborative innovation in supply chain enterprises. Based on the analysis, this research further studied the dynamic evolutionary mechanism and influencing elements through four different simulation cases. The research showed the following. (1) When the three players have equal innovative capability, they are more willing to contribute to innovation if the projected revenue is higher reflecting an increasing coefficient of collaborative innovation gains. As a result, the three players are more likely to agree on their cooperation approach. (2) When the three players have different independent and innovative capabilities, they are more willing to innovate if the collaborative innovation gain coefficient increases, but supply chain players with stronger capability are more active to innovate than their peers. In other words, strong innovators attach particular attention to innovation. (3) When any collaborative innovation could generate profits for all players in the supply chain, the player who enjoys the benefit but lacks innovative capability will be unwilling to cooperate with others if additional gains rise. Thus, better maintenance of the stability of the collaborative innovation system requires a strictly implemented coordination mechanism.

Data Sharing im Supply-Chain-Management

2020 ◽  
Vol 115 (9) ◽  
pp. 563-566
Author(s):  
Maria Linnartz ◽  
Anja Leckel
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
Data Sharing ◽  
Chain Management

Network effect in shared supply chain platform value co-creation behavior in evolutionary game1

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Zou Xiaohong ◽  
Chen Jinlong ◽  
Gao Shuanping
Keyword(s):  
Boundary Condition ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Network Effect ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
The Cost

The shared supply chain model has provided new ideas for solving contradictions between supply and demand for large-scale standardized production by manufacturers and personalized demands of consumers. On the basis of a platform network effect perspective, this study constructs an evolutionary game model of value co-creation behavior for a shared supply chain platform and manufacturers, analyzes their evolutionary stable strategies, and uses numerical simulation analysis to further verify the model. The results revealed that the boundary condition for manufacturers to participate in value co-creation on a shared supply chain platform is that the net production cost of the manufacturers’ participation in the platform value co-creation must be less than that of nonparticipation. In addition, the boundary condition for the shared supply chain platform to actively participate in value co-creation is that the cost of the shared supply chain platform for active participation in value co-creation must be less than that of passive participation. Moreover, value co-creation behavior on the shared supply chain platform is a dynamic game interaction process between players with different benefit perceptions. Finally, the costs and benefits generated by the network effect can affect value co-creation on shared supply chain platforms.

A decision framework for the analysis of green supply chain contracts: An evolutionary game approach

2012 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 2965-2976 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sikhar Barari ◽  
Gaurav Agarwal ◽  
W.J.(Chris) Zhang ◽  
Biswajit Mahanty ◽  
M.K. Tiwari
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Decision Framework ◽  
Supply Chain Contracts

Operation decision of logistics service supply chain: considering interruption probability in emergencies

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangsheng Zhang ◽  
Xiao Wang ◽  
Zhiqing Meng ◽  
Qirui Zhang ◽  
Kexin Wu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Social Reputation ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
Optimal Decision Making

PurposeTo remedy the inherent defect in current research that focuses only on a single type of participants, this paper endeavors to look into the situation as an evolutionary game between a representative Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) and a representative Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP) in an environment with sudden crisis and tries to analyze how LSI supervises FLSP's operations and how FLSP responds in a recurrent pattern with different interruption probabilities.Design/methodology/approachRegarding the risks of supply chain interruption in emergencies, this paper develops a two-level model of single LSI and single FLSP, using Evolutionary Game theory to analyze their optimal decision-making, as well as their strategic behaviors on different risk levels regarding the interruption probability to achieve the optimal return with bounded rationality.FindingsThe results show that on a low-risk level, if LSI increases the degree of punishment, it will fail to enhance FLSP's operational activeness in the long term; when the risk rises to an intermediate level, a circular game occurs between LSI and FLSP; and on a high level of risk, FLSP will actively take actions, and its functional probability further impacts LSI's strategic choices. Finally, this paper analyzes the moderating impact of punishment intensity and social reputation loss on the evolutionary model in emergencies and provides relevant managerial implications.Originality/valueFirst, by taking both interruption probability and emergencies into consideration, this paper explores the interactions among the factors relevant to LSI's and FLSP's optimal decision-making. Second, this paper analyzes the optimal evolutionary game strategies of LSI and FLSP with different interruption probability and the range of their optimal strategies. Third, the findings of this paper provide valuable implications for relevant practices, such that the punishment intensity and social reputation loss determine the optimal strategies of LSI and FLSP, and thus it is an effective vehicle for LSSC system administrator to achieve the maximum efficiency of the system.

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