scholarly journals Carl Hempel e a questão da explicação histórica: modernidade, filosofia científica e o \'covering-law model debate\'

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Patric Wunderlich
Keyword(s):  
Carl Hempel ◽  
Covering Law

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Reutlinger ◽  
Juha Saatsi
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Covering Law

What is a scientific explanation? This has been a central question in philosophy of science at least since Hempel and Oppenheim’s pivotal attempt at an answer in 1948 (also known as the covering-law model of explanation; Hempel 1965: chapter 10). It is no surprise that this question has retained its place at the heart of contemporary philosophy of science, given that it is one of the sciences’ key aims to provide ...

scholarly journals Between positivism and narrativism in Polish methodology of history

HISTOREIN ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Brzechczyn
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Font Size ◽  
Theory Of Science ◽  
The Third ◽  
Nancy Cartwright ◽  
The Status ◽  
Scientific Context ◽  
Scientific Laws ◽  
Covering Law ◽  
The 1960S

<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <w:WordDocument> <w:View>Normal</w:View> <w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom> <w:HyphenationZone>21</w:HyphenationZone> <w:PunctuationKerning /> <w:ValidateAgainstSchemas /> <w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>false</w:SaveIfXMLInvalid> <w:IgnoreMixedContent>false</w:IgnoreMixedContent> <w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>false</w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText> <w:Compatibility> <w:BreakWrappedTables /> <w:SnapToGridInCell /> <w:WrapTextWithPunct /> <w:UseAsianBreakRules /> <w:DontGrowAutofit /> </w:Compatibility> <w:BrowserLevel>MicrosoftInternetExplorer4</w:BrowserLevel> </w:WordDocument> </xml><![endif]--> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">This paper has two main purposes. Its primary purpose is to present the reception of the discussion between positivism and narrativism in the Polish methodology of history. A secondary one is to paraphrase, using the notion apparatus of the idealisational theory of science, the issue of the accuracy of explanation. The article consists of six parts. In the first part, Hempel’s deductive-nomological (or covering-law) model of explanation is presented. In the second part, the main tenets and assumptions of the Poznań school of methodology are presented. The emergence of this school at the end of the 1960s delayed the popularisation of narrativism in Polish methodology of history. In the third part, the manifold reasons of this delayed reception are analysed. The popularization of narrativism was only possible in Poland after 1989, but it had a primarily imitative character. This outline of cultural and scientific context allows Chris Lorenz’s proposals (on the problem of the accuracy of explanation) to be put in a wider perspective (part four). Namely, this author describes “a theoretical historical debate” on the status of scientific laws and refers to a post-positivistic approach to science represented by Nancy Cartwright. This approach was to introduce new perspectives to the understanding of lawfulness. In the fifth part, the main assumptions and tenets (for example, modes of explanation) of another post-positivistic approach to science, namely the idealisational theory of science, are presented and compared with the Hempelian model of explanation. In the sixth part, Hempel’s explanatory sketch is paraphrased using the notion apparatus of the idealisational model of science which provides a solution in this theoretical framework, to the problem of accuracy of explanation posed by Lorenz.</p> <!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <w:LatentStyles DefLockedState="false" LatentStyleCount="156"> </w:LatentStyles> </xml><![endif]--><!--[if !mso]><object classid="clsid:38481807-CA0E-42D2-BF39-B33AF135CC4D" id=ieooui></object> <mce:style><! st1\:*{behavior:url(#ieooui) } --> <!--[endif] --><!--[if gte mso 10]> <mce:style><! /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:Standardowy; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} --> <!--[endif] -->

Reasons, Causes, and Intentional Explanation

1986 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Stoutland
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Social ◽  
Intentional Explanation ◽  
Covering Law ◽  
Causal Laws ◽  
Physical Laws ◽  
And Behavior

AbstractThe reasons-causes debate concerns whether explanations of human behavior in terms of an agent's reasons presuppose causal laws. This paper considers three approaches to this debate: the covering law model which holds that there are causal laws covering both reasons and behavior, the intentionalist approach which denies any role to causal laws, and Donald Davidson’s point of view which denies that causal laws connect reasons and behavior, but holds that reasons and behavior must be covered by physical laws if reasons explanations are to be valid. I defend the intentionalist approach against the two causalist approaches and conclude with reflections on the significance of the debate for the social sciences.

Event and Portent: the Fall of Old Oyo, a Problem in Historical Explanation

Africa ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 186-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Smith
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Central Place ◽  
Main Issue ◽  
Historical Writing ◽  
Crucial Importance ◽  
Early Nineteenth Century ◽  
Historical Explanation ◽  
Covering Law ◽  
Opening Paragraph

Opening ParagraphExplanation, or the identification and assessment of the causes of events and situations, occupies the central place in nearly all historical writing in the present century. It is also the aspect of history which is most keenly debated by philosophers, and is the main issue today in the unending, wearisome, but seemingly inescapable controversy as to whether history belongs, or belongs more, with the sciences or with the humanities. The scientific or positivist school, numbering among its recent exponents Popper and Gardiner, emphasizes the extent to which historical explanation attains a regularity akin to, though not identical with, that found in the physical and other sciences, Hempel adding the contention that such explanation can always, and often should, be reduced to a ‘covering law’, or single universal statement subsuming the whole explanation. The idealists, among whom Croce, Collingwood, and most recently Oakeshott are prominent, stress conversely the uniqueness of history, and Dray has reinforced their position by his attack on the covering law thesis. The debate is one in which historians themselves have taken little part, and African historians none at all, despite its crucial importance for almost every aspect of their profession. Yet it is a debate which needs continuous illustration from the historiographical process, a need which historians are best able to meet. The aim of the present article is to contribute to the debate by examining as a problem in historical explanation the fall of Oyo, the powerful state of the northern Yoruba, in the early nineteenth century.

Smart Contracts

2019 ◽  
pp. 311-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Brownsword
Keyword(s):  
New Technologies ◽  
Peer To Peer ◽  
The Other ◽  
Smart Contracts ◽  
Rule Based ◽  
Smart Contract ◽  
Regulatory Purpose ◽  
Business To Consumer ◽  
Covering Law ◽  
Business To Business

The main purpose of this chapter is to sketch two principal ways in which lawyers are likely to engage with new transactional technologies (such as smart contract applications of blockchain technologies), each form of engagement being characterized by its own questions and conversations. Whereas one form of engagement, ‘coherentism’, focuses on the fit between particular new technologies and the covering law of contract, the other, ‘regulatory-instrumentalism’, focuses on whether the law (relative to particular new technologies) is fit for regulatory purpose. The sketch is refined by drawing further distinctions between ‘transactionalist’ and ‘relationalist’ variants of ‘coherentism’ and ‘rule-based’ and ‘technocratic’ variants of regulatory-instrumentalism. With a view to decoding legal debates about emerging transactional technologies, this sketch is then applied to questions concerning smart contracts in, respectively, business-to-consumer, business-to-business, and peer-to-peer transactions.

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