scholarly journals Lessons Learned from Military Intelligence Services Reform in Hungary

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-49
Author(s):  
Andras Hugyik
Keyword(s):  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Military Intelligence ◽  
Intelligence Services

The German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND): Evolution and Current Policy Issues

2010 ◽  
pp. 789-805
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Krieger
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Current Policy ◽  
Operational Control ◽  
Military Intelligence ◽  
The West ◽  
German Government ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
Intelligence Services ◽  
Intelligence Agencies ◽  
The Cold War

This article discusses German's foreign intelligence services through the context of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). Unlike other intelligence services of other nations, Germany has no separate military intelligence. The BND serves as Germany's sole foreign and military espionage agency. It also does not have an acknowledged capacity of covert operations compared to the intelligence agencies of other nations. The BND was established in 1956 as part of the West German rearmament within the NATO framework; however, by the time of its establishment the Bonn government had already abandoned its previous efforts to build a military intelligence organization from scratch and with people of its own. Because of this, the BND was under American operational control during the Cold War and German intelligence professionals have served as mercenaries for the Americans over a period of ten years, giving Americans an unique intelligence asset inside the West German government. In this article, the discussions include the evolution of the BND and the current issues faced by the German intelligence services.

Intelligence and Counterterrorism Tasks

2011 ◽  
pp. 289-296
Author(s):  
Antonio Badia
Keyword(s):  
Intelligence Analysis ◽  
Military Intelligence ◽  
Military Literature ◽  
Intelligence Services ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Terrorist Acts ◽  
The Military ◽  
Religious Elements ◽  
Different Sources

At the end of the Cold War, the intelligence situation (characterized in the past by a confrontation among equals and information scarcity) changed radically to the current situation of today, characterized as an asymmetric threat: On one side, there is still a nation, but on the other, there is a relatively small group of individuals brought together by a common ideology, usually with ethnic and religious elements. These individuals can only confront their opponent by using subterfuge, deception, and terrorist acts. They try to disguise their activities by infiltrating society at large and seeking refuge in anonymity. This kind of conflict has long been analyzed in the military literature under names like low-intensity conflict (LIC) or operation other than war (OOTW; for more on this perspective, the reader is referred to the classic work by Kitson, 1971). The task of the nations under terrorist threat is to detect the group’s individuals and their intentions before they can carry out destructive actions. For this, their intelligence services count with large amounts of raw data obtained from many different sources: signal intelligence, open sources, tips from informants, friendly governments, and so forth. However, this data is not always reliable and almost never complete, and the truly interesting events are usually to be found hidden among large amounts of similar looking facts. To deal with this situation, intelligence officers use sophisticated information technology tools. Several authors have pointed out that this task is not at all dissimilar from the task that strategists in business intelligence (BI) and knowledge management (KM) face: As in KM, in intelligence the challenge is that “the right knowledge must get to the right people at the right time” (Pappas & Simon, 2002). Therefore, intelligence experts may learn something from studying BI and KM, and their history and milestones, while business strategists may also be enlightened by the history and lessons of military intelligence (after all, military intelligence is an ancient discipline; in contrast, KM can be considered a newcomer). In this article, we describe the intelligence analysis cycle and compare it with the KM cycle (we assume the reader is familiar with KM, but not with intelligence tasks). We point out the similarities (and the differences) between the two, and highlight several ways in which military intelligence may benefit from the hindsights and techniques developed by KM practitioners. We also briefly describe tools and methods from military intelligence that KM practitioners may find illuminating. We close with a discussion of future trends and some conclusions.

scholarly journals German preparations for the war in the light of documents of the Polish military intelligence (1933-1939) – selected aspects

2019 ◽  
Vol 192 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-265
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Nowacki ◽  
Adam Szymanowicz
Keyword(s):  
Military Service ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
German Society ◽  
Nazi Party ◽  
Military Intelligence ◽  
German Army ◽  
Treaty Of Versailles ◽  
Compulsory Military Service ◽  
Intelligence Services ◽  
New Information

As a result of the Treaty of Versailles the provisions concerning the issue of limitation of the armed forces were imposed on Germany. These provisions were unilaterally terminated by Germany two years after Adolf Hitler had come to power. There was introduced general and compulsory military service. On 21st May 1935, Hitler – as the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor – signed the secret Reich Defence Law, which gave the Wehrmacht command wide powers to expand the army. Thus, the intensive development of the German army was initiated. After the Nazi Party came to power in Germany, gaining new information by the Polish military intelligence became increasingly difficult. It was connected with the expansion of the German counter-intelligence services, especially the Gestapo, as well as the police supervision over the German society. Through good operational work of the Polish intelligence the Polish side already before the outbreak of the war was relatively well familiarized with the particular phases of the overall German army’s armaments, as well as the German operational doctrine and methods of warfare.

The General Headquarters Operational System and Military Intelligence

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pesach Malovany ◽  
Amatzia Baram ◽  
Kevin M. Woods ◽  
Ronna Englesberg
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Technical Equipment ◽  
Military Intelligence ◽  
Electronic Warfare ◽  
Operational System ◽  
Intelligence Services ◽  
Signal Corps ◽  
Military Security ◽  
Survey System ◽  
The Military

This chapter deals with the Operational system of the Iraqi armed forces. It describes the Operations Division of the General Staff, its missions and responsibilities and its development, especially during the Iran-Iraq war, and the staff directorates subordinated to it—Operations, Planning, Organization and Armament and Equipment. It describes the field corps that were involved in this field—the Signal corps, the Technical Equipment (Electronic Warfare), the computer system and the Military Survey system that was responsible for mapping and their training systems. It deals also with the Military Intelligence and its important role in the operations system, its responsibilities, organization and functioning, especially during the war against Iran. Its cooperation with foreign intelligence services, and the functioning of the Military Security Directorate.

Mapping a Political Network

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Red Scare ◽  
Military Intelligence ◽  
Us Army ◽  
Spider Web ◽  
Intelligence Services ◽  
Political Interests ◽  
Political Network ◽  
The Us ◽  
Challenging Environment ◽  
The Great War

This chapter examines the significance of the Anticommunist Spider Web to anticommunism. Members of the Anticommunist Spider Web formed a conspiracy against democracy that was far more influential than the “communist” conspiracy they fought. Protecting economic advantage was only part of the Anticommunist Spider Web's purpose. Business and political interests also used anticommunism as a tool to control foreign and domestic policy in the challenging environment created by the Great War, socialist revolutions in Europe, and the bitter industrial disputes of the postwar downturn. Government intelligence operatives were among those most concerned by anticommunism, and the Red Scare put state and military intelligence services at the heart of the Spider Web. This chapter discusses the relationship between the Bureau of Investigation, the US Army Military Intelligence Division, the US Navy Office of Naval Intelligence, and the private intelligence networks run by the Spider Web.

scholarly journals The making of terrorists

Focaal ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 2006 (48) ◽  
pp. 144-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Keenan
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
War On Terror ◽  
Military Intelligence ◽  
Intelligence Services ◽  
The Us ◽  
Anthropological Research ◽  
The Future

This article, based on almost eight years of continuous anthropological research amongst the Tuareg people of the Sahara and Sahel, suggests that the launch by the US and its main regional ally, Algeria, in 2002–2003 of a ‘new’, ‘second’, or ‘Saharan’ Front in the ‘War on Terror’ was largely a fabrication on the part of the US and Algerian military intelligence services. The ‘official truth’, embodied in an estimated 3,000 articles and reports of one sort or another, is largely disinformation. The article summarizes how and why this deception was effected and examines briefly its implications for both the region and its people as well as the future of US international relations and especially its global pursuance of an increasingly suspect ‘War on Terror’.

Intelligence and Counterterrorism Tasks

2011 ◽  
pp. 3374-3384
Author(s):  
Antonio Badia
Keyword(s):  
Intelligence Analysis ◽  
Military Intelligence ◽  
Military Literature ◽  
Intelligence Services ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Terrorist Acts ◽  
The Military ◽  
Religious Elements ◽  
Different Sources

At the end of the Cold War, the intelligence situation (characterized in the past by a confrontation among equals and information scarcity) changed radically to the current situation of today, characterized as an asymmetric threat: On one side, there is still a nation, but on the other, there is a relatively small group of individuals brought together by a common ideology, usually with ethnic and religious elements. These individuals can only confront their opponent by using subterfuge, deception, and terrorist acts. They try to disguise their activities by infiltrating society at large and seeking refuge in anonymity. This kind of conflict has long been analyzed in the military literature under names like low-intensity conflict (LIC) or operation other than war (OOTW; for more on this perspective, the reader is referred to the classic work by Kitson, 1971). The task of the nations under terrorist threat is to detect the group’s individuals and their intentions before they can carry out destructive actions. For this, their intelligence services count with large amounts of raw data obtained from many different sources: signal intelligence, open sources, tips from informants, friendly governments, and so forth. However, this data is not always reliable and almost never complete, and the truly interesting events are usually to be found hidden among large amounts of similar looking facts. To deal with this situation, intelligence officers use sophisticated information technology tools. Several authors have pointed out that this task is not at all dissimilar from the task that strategists in business intelligence (BI) and knowledge management (KM) face: As in KM, in intelligence the challenge is that “the right knowledge must get to the right people at the right time” (Pappas & Simon, 2002). Therefore, intelligence experts may learn something from studying BI and KM, and their history and milestones, while business strategists may also be enlightened by the history and lessons of military intelligence (after all, military intelligence is an ancient discipline; in contrast, KM can be considered a newcomer). In this article, we describe the intelligence analysis cycle and compare it with the KM cycle (we assume the reader is familiar with KM, but not with intelligence tasks). We point out the similarities (and the differences) between the two, and highlight several ways in which military intelligence may benefit from the hindsights and techniques developed by KM practitioners. We also briefly describe tools and methods from military intelligence that KM practitioners may find illuminating. We close with a discussion of future trends and some conclusions.

Lessons Learned From Coaching Postsecondary Students With Traumatic Brain Injury

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-96
Author(s):  
Mary R. T. Kennedy
Keyword(s):  
College Students ◽  
Traumatic Brain Injury ◽  
Brain Injury ◽  
Sense Of Self ◽  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
Sudden Onset ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Speech Language Pathologists ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Exhaustive List

Purpose The purpose of this clinical focus article is to provide speech-language pathologists with a brief update of the evidence that provides possible explanations for our experiences while coaching college students with traumatic brain injury (TBI). Method The narrative text provides readers with lessons we learned as speech-language pathologists functioning as cognitive coaches to college students with TBI. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list, but rather to consider the recent scientific evidence that will help our understanding of how best to coach these college students. Conclusion Four lessons are described. Lesson 1 focuses on the value of self-reported responses to surveys, questionnaires, and interviews. Lesson 2 addresses the use of immediate/proximal goals as leverage for students to update their sense of self and how their abilities and disabilities may alter their more distal goals. Lesson 3 reminds us that teamwork is necessary to address the complex issues facing these students, which include their developmental stage, the sudden onset of trauma to the brain, and having to navigate going to college with a TBI. Lesson 4 focuses on the need for college students with TBI to learn how to self-advocate with instructors, family, and peers.

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