Police Action against the Threat of Special Weapons of Mass Destruction Chemical and Biological Weapons Terrorism: Forging a Response

2003 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 116-117
Author(s):  
I&S Monitor
Keyword(s):  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Police Action ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons

Unconventional Weapons

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pesach Malovany ◽  
Amatzia Baram ◽  
Kevin M. Woods ◽  
Ronna Englesberg
Keyword(s):  
International Atomic Energy Agency ◽  
Atomic Energy ◽  
Foreign Assistance ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Energy Agency ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Device

The chapter deals with the Iraqi efforts to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological and nuclear. It describes the various projects in each field, their history, the foreign assistance they got, the infrastructure the Iraqis built for them, their achievements and types of weapons the Iraqis produces and their arsenals, especially of the Chemical and Biological weapons. The efforts of the U. N. supervisory commissions (UNSCOM) and the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to disarm Iraq from those weapons and capabilities to renew the development and production of them by Iraq after 1991. The use of chemical weapons by the Iraqis against the Kurds and the Iranian forces during the war between the two countries, and the possibility of using them against coalition forces during the wars in 1991 and 2003. The Iraqi efforts to achieve a nuclear device in a crash program before the war in 1991.

On-Site Inspection Measures and Interviews

1995 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
David L. Huxsoll
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Special Commission ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
Development Support ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Ongoing Monitoring

In April 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which established the terms and conditions for a formal cease-fire between Iraq and the coalition of Member States. Resolution 687 states that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless—under international supervision—of all chemical and biological weapons; all stocks of agents, and all related subsystems and components; and all related research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities. The resolution further states that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct, or acquire any of the items mentioned above, and it calls for the development of a plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance. To accomplish these objectives, Resolution 687 provided for the establishment of a Special Commission to carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) itself. Soon after it was established, the commission initiated a series of unprecedented inspections to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

Efforts to Address Iraqi Compliance with UN Weapons Inspections

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 956-962 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean D. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
Medical Supplies ◽  
Ballistic Missiles ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
On Site Inspection

At the conclusion of the 1991 UN enforcement action against Iraq, the Security Council adopted a resolution setting the terms for a cease-fire. The resolution required, among other things, that Iraq “unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision,” of all chemical and biological weapons, all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and associated materials and facilities. Further, the resolution provided for the creation of a UN special commission to carry out “on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities,” and ordered Iraq to yield such weapons to the commission for “destruction, removal or rendering harmless.” Similar requirements were imposed with respect to the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons. While maintaining the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Security Council allowed exports to Iraq of foodstuffs and medical supplies (on the condition that a UN sanctions committee had been notified) and also other commodities (if approved by the same committee). The Security Council decided that the sanctions regime would be lifted, however, once Iraq complied with its obligations on the destruction and monitoring of weapons of mass destruction.

29. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

2019 ◽  
pp. 466-480
Author(s):  
Sheena Chestnut Greitens
Keyword(s):  
World Politics ◽  
The Other ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
International Intervention ◽  
Nuclear Disaster ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
Fukushima Nuclear Disaster

This chapter focuses on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It examines the patterns that can be observed in the spread and use/non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons since 1945, how nuclear weapons have changed world politics, and whether non-proliferation efforts have been successful. The chapter first provides an overview of WMD technology and its spread before discussing biological and chemical weapons. It then considers theoretical debates about nuclear proliferation and the evolution of non-proliferation efforts. Two case studies are presented, one dealing with the Fukushima nuclear disaster and the other with the nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran. There is also an Opposing Opinions box that asks whether the use of chemical weapons in 2013 should have been a red line triggering international intervention in Syria.

26. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheena Chestnut Greitens
Keyword(s):  
World Politics ◽  
The Other ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
International Intervention ◽  
Nuclear Disaster ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
Fukushima Nuclear Disaster

This chapter focuses on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It examines the patterns that can be observed in the spread and use/non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons since 1945, how nuclear weapons have changed world politics, and whether non-proliferation efforts have been successful. The chapter first provides an overview of WMD technology and its spread before discussing biological and chemical weapons. It then considers theoretical debates about nuclear proliferation and the evolution of non-proliferation efforts. Two case studies are presented, one dealing with the Fukushima nuclear disaster and the other with the nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran. There is also an Opposing Opinions box that asks whether the use of chemical weapons in 2013 should have been a red line triggering international intervention in Syria.

6 Means of Combat

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Longobardo Marco ◽  
Fleck Dieter
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Effective Implementation ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons

This chapter provides an overview of treaty and customary international law rules applicable to means of combat. Belligerents do not need an authorization from international humanitarian law in relation to a specific means of combat. Rather, they are free to develop, produce, stockpile, transfer, or use any particular weapon, except for those cases in which a prohibitive rule of international humanitarian law dictates to the contrary. In order to guarantee effective implementation of the prohibition of certain means and methods of warfare, it is necessary to provide for an efficient procedure to ensure the legality of new weapons. This procedure is preventive in nature and aims at providing the belligerents with means of combat that do not violate international law prohibitions. The chapter discusses the prohibition of certain conventional weapons and then looks at weapons of mass destruction, which are simply defined as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. While the production, possession, and use of chemical weapons and biological weapons is prohibited under treaty law, the legal status of nuclear weapons is more complex.

scholarly journals Past as Prologue? The Risk of Adoption of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Non-State Actors in the EU

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 626-642
Author(s):  
James REVILL
Keyword(s):  
Historical Record ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Relative Advantage ◽  
Public Health Agencies ◽  
European Public ◽  
Health Agencies ◽  
Biological Terrorism ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
State Actors

AbstractThere have been relatively few serious incidents of chemical or biological terrorism in Europe; however, there is growing concern over how non-state groups might exploit chemistry and biology for hostile purposes in the future. This article uses the historical record of past incidents of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) adoption by non-state actors to inform understandings of the current and future risks. To achieve this, the article analyses six interlinked clusters of factors that can be seen as important in assessing the risk of whether or not to adopt such weapons. These are: the perceived relative advantage of CBW and their utilities; the complexity of such weapons; their ideological compatibility; the role of organisational structures; the visibility and ‘fashionability’ of such weapons; and the wider environmental context. Drawing from past cases of CBW adoption and the present European context, an analysis of these factors suggests that sophisticated CBW with gigantic effect are possible, but unlikely; however, the adoption and use of scruffy low-level chemical weapons is a distinct possibility. Accordingly, European public health agencies need to prepare for the possibility of a variety of CBW, not all of which are likely to be weapons of “mass destruction”.

scholarly journals Threat of biological weapons

Securitologia ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-75
Author(s):  
Bogdan Michailiuk
Keyword(s):  
Current Level ◽  
Biological Weapon ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Terrorist Organizations ◽  
Biological Terrorism ◽  
Unpublished Information

The biological weapons often is defined as ‘weapons of mass destruction poor’, because this is relatively cheap and easy in the production, hidden and relocation. The risk of the use biological weapons still seems to be very real. A possibility of using weapons of mass destruction (biological weapon) is arousing special danger by contemporary terrorist organizations. In this article in a synthetic, based on the available references and the unpublished information, author present the current level of threat of biological terrorism.

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Kühn
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
European Security ◽  
European Continent ◽  
Major Powers ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
The Military

This chapter discusses the military- and defence-related capabilities and policies of Western Europe’s major powers (Germany, France, United Kingdom), of the NATO alliance, the Russian Federation, and Austria in the realm of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction (WMD)). It focuses on the differing roles, positions, and security policy outlooks of these actors, with a special emphasis on their respective policies towards nuclear weapons. Particularly in the realm of nuclear weapons, the situation on the European continent is extremely diverse and complex, with officially recognized nuclear-weapons states, non-nuclear-weapons states under NATO’s ‘nuclear umbrella’, and staunch supporters of a world free from nuclear weapons. Highlighting converging and diverging international policy trends, the chapter concludes that European security policies on WMD continue to have a significant impact on related global security and defence matters.

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