scholarly journals The Role of Withholding in the Self-Enforcement of a Value-Added Tax: Evidence from Pakistan

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-44
Author(s):  
Mazhar Waseem

I leverage the staggered roll out of VAT in Pakistan to document the role of withholding mechanism in the self-enforcement of a VAT. Focusing on firms already in the tax net, I see how their outcomes respond when the tax is extended upward to intermediates used by them. I find that the upward extension of VAT, which triggers the withholding mechanism, causes an immediate and large (more than 40 log-points) surge in sales reported by firms. The evolution of bunching above the zero-liability point and of input costs reported by firms suggest that this large response is indeed driven by the withholding mechanism. I also explore the role of withholding in the extensive margin compliance choices of firms.

1979 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-346
Author(s):  
JAMES W. WETZLER

Ekonomika ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandras Vytautas Rutkauskas ◽  
Manuela Tvaronaviciene

In this article an officially declared direction of a future tax reform is discussed. The main emphasis is put on the examination of a role of a profit tax in conditioning of contemporary economical environment of operating business firm and impact of consumption taxes on a behavior of various participants of market. International practice of imposing a profit tax and a value added tax (VAT) is considered and international comparisons are made. The article argues for introducing a progressive profit tax and reducing value added tax.


2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (8) ◽  
pp. 2539-2569 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dina Pomeranz

Claims that the VAT facilitates tax enforcement by generating paper trails on transactions between firms contributed to widespread VAT adoption worldwide, but there is surprisingly little evidence. This paper analyzes the role of third-party information for VAT enforcement through two randomized experiments among over 400,000 Chilean firms. Announcing additional monitoring has less impact on transactions that are subject to a paper trail, indicating the paper trail's preventive deterrence effect. This leads to strong enforcement spillovers up the VAT chain. These findings confirm that when taking evasion into account, significant differences emerge between otherwise equivalent forms of taxation. (JEL D83, H25, H26, K34, O17)


1994 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 731-746
Author(s):  
ERIK CASPERSEN ◽  
GILBERT METCALF
Keyword(s):  

1989 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-351
Author(s):  
GEORGE N. CARLSON ◽  
MELANIE K. PATRICK
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Jose Maria Da Rocha ◽  
Javier García-Cutrín ◽  
Maria-Jose Gutiérrez ◽  
Raul Prellezo ◽  
Eduardo Sanchez

AbstractIntegrated economic models have become popular for assessing climate change. In this paper we show how these methods can be used to assess the impact of a discard ban in a fishery. We state that a discard ban can be understood as a confiscatory tax equivalent to a value-added tax. Under this framework, we show that a discard ban improves the sustainability of the fishery in the short run and increases economic welfare in the long run. In particular, we show that consumption, capital and wages show an initial decrease just after the implementation of the discard ban then recover after some periods to reach their steady-sate values, which are 16–20% higher than the initial values, depending on the valuation of the landed discards. The discard ban also improves biological variables, increasing landings by 14% and reducing discards by 29% on the initial figures. These patterns highlight the two channels through which discard bans affect a fishery: the tax channel, which shows that the confiscation of landed discards reduces the incentive to invest in the fishery; and the productivity channel, which increases the abundance of the stock. Thus, during the first few years after the implementation of a discard ban, the negative effect from the tax channel dominates the positive effect from the productivity channel, because the stock needs time to recover. Once stock abundance improves, the productivity channel dominates the tax channel and the economic variables rise above their initial levels. Our results also show that a landed discards valorisation policy is optimal from the social welfare point of view provided that incentives to increase discards are not created.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Agista Ayu Aksari

On 1st July 2012 SOE (State-Owned Enterprises)become the Value Added Tax (VAT) collector. According to the regulation of the Ministher of Finance No.85/PMK.03/2012 about the appointment of the State Owned Enterprises to collect, deposit and reporting Value Added Tax (VAT) and Sales Tax on Luxurious Goods, and precedures for collecting, depositing and reporting. The purpose of this research is to determine the difference between SOE as a Value Added Tax collector and not as a Value Added Tax collector.The object of this research is PT Pelabuhan Indonesia III cabang Benoa. The data analysis in this research is to analyze the calculation and reportig of VAT before being VAT collector and when it became VAT collector.The result of this research it is known that are the application of the value added tax on PT Pelabuhan Indonesia III Cabang Benoa before becoming tax collector is charged directly by fiskus and has official assessment system and as a PT Pelabuhan Indonesia III Cabang Benoa has a self assessment system whereby PT Pelabuahan Indonesia III Cabang Benoa became ILL wapu. Differnce in PT Pelabuhan Indonesia III Cabang Benoa as a collector, and the collector Is a time before becoming a collector has aself just my assessment system whereas before becoming a collector has official assessment system. Tax eceipt when it became a collector of VAT using duplicate counts 3 before becoming a collector only uses 2 of the double. For SSp before becoming a duplicate while using 4 collector as a collector to use duplicate. DOI 10.5281/zenodo.1214932


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