The deterrence effect of real-world operational tax audits on self-employed taxpayers: evidence from Italy

We use a large administrative tax-returns panel dataset merged with a tax audit database to estimate the effect of real-world operational tax audits on subsequent tax behavior of a large sample of Italian self-employed taxpayers. Results from operational audits do not suffer from the fact that taxpayers are aware that they have been randomly selected for research purposes and, then, such audits are viewed as more of a signal about true audit rates by the taxpayer. Our empirical approach relies on fixed-effects difference-in-difference comparisons with an ex-ante matched sample of non-audited taxpayers. To address concerns about the endogenous selection into audit, we provide evidence for the common trends assumption. We find a positive and lasting effect of audits on subsequent reported income. However, in line with theoretical predictions, taxpayers do not increase tax compliance when the tax authority does not assess a positive additional income. Our results are robust to a variety of specifications and samples.

Profiling Crime in Pakistan: An Aggregated and Disaggregated Socioeconomic Analysis

Crime is more than just a sociological and psychological phenomenon. The economic effects of any criminal activity are intriguing and vice versa. This paper attempts to profile crime scenario in Pakistan in the socio-economic context at aggregated and disaggregated level. Three crime supply models have been constructed using formal econometric techniques i.e., aggregated crime, crime against person and crime against property. These models depict the various socioeconomic variables effecting different crimes. The paper also captures the deterrence effect but on a very limited scale using police strength as proxy. The paper has drawn many conclusions indicating effects of social and economic injustices making people choose illegal activities over lawful ways of earnings and the role of government to intervene and promote socio-economic equity. Government should introduce effective social security programs to create more jobs and to minimize income inequalities. Policing and effective justice system is key to control crime.

Violence, non-violence and the conditional effect of repression on subsequent dissident mobilization

This article examines the conditional effect that repression has on non-violent vs. violent mass mobilization. While governments often resort to violence to deter future mobilization, studies of the repression–dissent nexus have produced divergent evidence with regard to the effect of repression. Many argue that repression tends to backfire, while others demonstrate its effectiveness in reducing mobilization. I argue that the effect of repression varies by differing opposition tactics. I test two competing propositions regarding the effect of repression using event data from the Non-violent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes dataset (NAVCO 3.0) from 1990 to 2012. The results show that repression, specifically physical repression, of non-violent opposition reduces participation size. Non-physical repression, on the other hand, has less of a deterrence effect on non-violent dissident mobilization.

Police Repression and Protest Behavior: Evidence from Student Protests in Chile

Police repression is a common feature of street protests around the world but evidence about its impact on dissident behavior is limited. We provide an empirical analysis of people linked to a student killed by a stray bullet coming from a policeman during a large protest. Using administrative data on daily school attendance, we follow his schoolmates and those living nearby the shooting in hundreds of protest and non-protest days to estimate whether police repression affected their protest behavior. We find that repression causes a temporary deterrence effect but only on students with social (rather than geographic) links to the victim. Moreover, we show that police violence increased adherence to a student-led boycott two years after the shooting and had negative educational consequences for students. These findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of police repression in quieting dissent and ensuring public safety.

The Price of Probity: Anticorruption and Adverse Selection in the Chinese Bureaucracy

Fighting corruption is often seen as a crucial step toward building better institutions, but how it affects political selection remains less well understood. This article argues that in systems where corruption functions as an informal incentive for government to attract talent, anticorruption initiatives that curb rent-seeking opportunities may unintentionally weaken both the quality and the representativeness of the bureaucracy. The authors test this argument in China using an original nationwide survey of government officials and an identification strategy that exploits exogenous variations in enforcement levels created by the recent anticorruption campaign. The study finds that intensified enforcement has generated two potentially negative selection effects: a deterrence effect that lowers the average ability of newly recruited bureaucrats, and a compositional effect that discourages the entry of lower-class individuals in favor of those who are affluent and well connected. These findings highlight important hidden human capital costs of corruption elimination in developing countries.

IMPLEMENTATION OF CROSS-MINISTRY AND INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION ON THE ERADICATION OF CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA IN THE FRAMEWORK OF UNCATOC & UNCAC AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE IMMIGRATION LAW

The international community, including Indonesia, agrees that corruption is a serious crime that can be transnational, therefore cooperation between countries is needed. Cooperation can be done bilaterally, regionally or multilaterally. Cooperation will be more solid if these countries have the same commitment to eradicating corruption, one of which is realized by ratifying UNCATOC & UNCAC, then harmonizing the laws and regulations in their countries so that they can implement the anti-corruption guidelines properly. Immigration has become one of the fulcrums of national interests. The form of coordination and cooperation with DITJENIM is often carried out by certain ministries or agencies in the event that the perpetrator of the corruption crime has fled abroad through the track record of crossing in the immigration database. This research uses a statute approach and a conceptual approach. This study found that the handling of corruption cases must pay attention to quality and be able to provide a deterrence effect. There are various provisions, then a collective agreement is made to strengthen cohesiveness and togetherness in the eradication of corruption, which in turn will have a positive impact in optimizing the eradication of corruption in Indonesia.

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY COMPARISION BETWEEN IVER HUITFELDT CLASS AND PKR105 CLASS BASED ON SALVO MODEL

Warship ability owned by Indonesian Navy is expected to have deterrence effect on other countries that want to disturb the sovereignty of Indonesia. Therefore, the right decision is needed to determine which warship should be chosen to carry out the task of guarding Indonesia's territorial waters. The newest warship that has a deterrence effect and is owned by the Indonesian Navy is the KRI PKR105 class. This ship has reliable capabilities both in terms of offensive and defensive because it is equipped with qualified equipment and weapons. Meanwhile, in future plans, the Indonesian Navy is interested in having a Danish-made Iver Huitfeldt class warship which also has a fairly reliable capability. In this paper, we will discuss the calculation of the capabilities of the PKR105 class and Iver Huitfeldt class which are planned to be purchased by the Indonesian Navy based on the Salvo Model. From the calculation, it can be seen that PKR105 class has the same offensive capability as Iver Huitfeldt class but Iver Huitfeldt class has higher defensive caspability than PKR105. This is because the tonnage of Iver Huitfeldt class is greater than PKR105 as one of the staying power parameters for calculating defensive ability. To overcome the shortage of PKR105 defensive capabilities, a $ 21 million CIWS can be added as one of the defensive power parameters in calculating defensive capability considering that there is still a difference in the PKR105 price of $ 285 million with the Iver Huitfeldt class price of $ 325. With this upgrade option then it can be used as one of the considerations in determining the type of ship that can be selected to increase the combat capability of the fleet. Keywords : Iver Huitfeldt Class , PKR105 class, reserve fuel, Salvo Model.

China’s Anti-Monopoly Law and the role of economics in its enforcement

China has made significant achievements in enforcing its 2008 Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) during the past twelve years. We review the application of economics by the China’s competition law enforcers and courts in dealing with antitrust cases. We discuss selected cases to illustrate the application of the relevant theories of competition harms. While the use of economics in its AML enforcement is consistent with international best practice, China can benefit from further raising the deterrence effect of the AML, increasing enforcement resources, and enhancing its cost-effectiveness of its Fair Competition Review system.