Review of Hila Naot, Raft on the Open Sea—Man and the World in Jan Patočka’s (1907–1977) Phenomenological Philosophy, (in Hebrew) Jerusalem: Carmel 2020, 536 pp. 107 shekels

Author(s):  
Oded Balaban
2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-66
Author(s):  
Monika Szuba

The essay discusses selected poems from Thomas Hardy's vast body of poetry, focusing on representations of the self and the world. Employing Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concepts such as the body-subject, wild being, flesh, and reversibility, the essay offers an analysis of Hardy's poems in the light of phenomenological philosophy. It argues that far from demonstrating ‘cosmic indifference’, Hardy's poetry offers a sympathetic vision of interrelations governing the universe. The attunement with voices of the Earth foregrounded in the poems enables the self's entanglement in the flesh of the world, a chiasmatic intertwining of beings inserted between the leaves of the world. The relation of the self with the world is established through the act of perception, mainly visual and aural, when the body becomes intertwined with the world, thus resulting in a powerful welding. Such moments of vision are brief and elusive, which enhances a sense of transitoriness, and, yet, they are also timeless as the self becomes immersed in the experience. As time is a recurrent theme in Hardy's poetry, this essay discusses it in the context of dwelling, the provisionality of which is demonstrated in the prevalent sense of temporality, marked by seasons and birdsong, which underline the rhythms of the world.


Author(s):  
Grant Gillett ◽  
Patrick Seniuk

This article combines an evolutionary perspective with phenomenological philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. Neuroscience addresses the way the brain connects individuals to domains of adaptation, while Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of perception explores the way sense situates humans the world. In particular, his concept “the intentional arc” captures the basic structure of embodied mental life through purposeful action. The processes of “sedimentation” and the neuroscience of ontogeny offer a perspective on the development of cortical and subcortical neural circuits that are in to-and-fro communication with the lived body. This dynamic sheds light on the genesis of a psychological life, structures of attunement, and capacity for adaptation to the world, which are all vulnerable to disruption in psychiatric disorder.


Author(s):  
Jérôme Englebert

This article presents a holistic conception of psychopathy inspired by phenomenological psychopathology and compares it with the mainstream nosographic diagnosis (Schneider, Cleckley, Hare, and Cooke). The article illustrates how a structural-phenomenological approach enhances the investigation of psychopathy. An epistemological discussion of the concept of emotions reveals that psychopaths are competent at managing emotional stimuli, which bestows a psychological advantage upon them. More specifically, a reflection enlightened by the contributions of phenomenological philosophy on empathy and sympathy clarifies the presentation of “psychopathic being-in-the-world.” Starting with the tension between clinical practice and criticism of the dominant diagnostic scales, this article considers the “essential characteristics” of the psychopathic disorder to be: reification of the alter ego without an ego-related disorder, emotional coldness as it provides adaptive benefits, and empathic skills without sympathy.


1912 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 409-459
Author(s):  
Thomas Willing Balch

Many of the foremost jurisconsults of the world, representing many nations, have in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries stated that Hudson Bay, a great North American sea, is a part of the open sea, and consequently free to the vessels of all nations for the purposes of navigation and fishing. This seems to have been a generally accepted doctrine until the close of the nineteenth century. Within recent years, however, the Dominion of Canada has set up the claim that all American vessels that enter Hudson Bay to catch fish or hunt whales must pay a license. The maintenance of such a policy would be tantamount to making of Hudson Bay a closed sea (mare clausum).


Author(s):  
Alexei V. Nesteruk

This paper represents a direct continuation and development of my stance on the sense of the dialogue between theology and science as it is seen through the eyes of phenomenological philosophy and its extension towards theology. I further interpret the paradoxical position of humanity in the world (being an object in the world and subject for the world) to be the cause in the split between science and theology. Since, according to modern philosophy, no reconciliation between two opposites in the hermeneutics of the subject is possible, the whole issue of the facticity of human subjectivity as the sensebestowing centre of being acquires theological dimensions, requiring new developments in both theology and philosophy. The intended overcoming of the unknowability of man by himself, tacitly attempted through the “reconciliation” of science and theology (guided by a purpose to ground man in some metaphysical substance), is not ontologically achievable, but demonstrates the working of formal purposefulness (in the sense of Kant). Then the dialogue between theology and science can be considered as a teleological activity without a purpose representing never-ending hermeneutics of the human condition


Author(s):  
Jan Zalasiewicz

One of the books that changed my perception of the world is The Open Sea, Part 1, by the marine biologist Sir Alister Hardy. He had set out to write one book about the sea, but found that there was so much to say about the world of the plankton that it took up a whole book (he then had to write another book about everything else). It’s now more than half a century old, and yet this hidden world remains marvellously evoked by his words, and by the antique black and white photographs and line drawings. Coming to this as a palaeontologist, it was eye-opening. I was aware that in the strata, one normally only finds the remains of those forms of life that had some hard parts to fossilize. Bones, teeth, shells—and in the case of the acritarchs, chitinozoa and graptolites, their tough organic casings and homes. I knew that there had been other soft-bodied things out there of course, but alas these don’t register often enough on the radar of the geologically programmed. So the sheer variety and exuberance of this world, revealed in those pages, took me by surprise. The remains of some of this life, within the pebble, lie somewhere within the amorphous black carbon that gives this object its dark colour, and in some of the subtle chemical signals of the rock itself. Parts of the hidden Silurian sea are beginning to be decoded from this unpromising material, and the stories emerging—fragmentary, ambiguous, tantalizing— sometimes have surprising uses. Tow a fine-mesh net behind a ship for a few minutes, as Hardy did as a working scientist, and then examine its contents with a microscope, and a small fraction of this world is revealed—enough to reveal its almost boundless diversity. There are microscopic plants, the base of the food chain: the diatoms, for instance, single-celled algae with a silica skeleton that looks like a tiny ornate hatbox; the coccolithophores, even smaller algae with a bizarre calcium carbonate skeleton made of overlapping shield-like discs, and the dinoflagellates, too.


1998 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amedeo Giorgi

AbstractA description of the founding of the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology and some of its vicissitudes during its first 25 years are described. Some of the difficulties the journal experienced are correlated with the minority status of phenomenological psychology in the world of psychology at large. Several factors are hypothesized to be the basis of Phenomenology's little impact on mainstream psychology: intrinsic difficulties in comprehending phenomenological philosophy, the fact that phenomenological psychology has not yet sufficiently diflerentiated itself from phenomenological philosophy; and mainstream psychology's clear non-openness to approaches that seem different to its established values.


The general explanation of the phenomena of the tides originally given by Newton, although assented to by all subsequent philosophers, has never been pursued in all the details of which its results are susceptible, so as to show its bearing on the more special and local phenomena, to connect the actual tides of all the different parts of the world, and to account for their varieties and seeming anomalies. The first scientific attempt that was made to compare the developed theory with any extensive range of observations, was that of Daniel Bernouilli in 1740: the subject has since been pursued by Laplace and Bouvard, and still more recently by Mr. Lubbock. But the comparison of contemporaneous tides has hitherto been unaccountably neglected: and to this particular branch of the subject the researches of the author are in this paper especially directed the principal object of his inquiry being to ascertain the position of what may be called cotidal lines , that is, lines drawn through all the adjacent parts of the ocean where it is high water at the same time; as, for instance, at a particular hour on a given day. These lines may be considered as representing the summit or ridge of the tide wave existing at that time, and which advances progressively along the sea, bringing high water to every place where it passes. Hence the cotidal lines for successive hours represent the successive positions of the summit of the tide wave, which in the open sea travels round the earth once in twenty-four hours, accompanied by another at twelve hours’ distance from it, and both sending branches into the narrower seas. Thus a map of cotidal lines may be constructed, at once exhibiting to the eye the manner and the velocity of all these motions. Although the observations on the periods of the tides at different places on the coast and different parts of the ocean, which have been at various times recorded, are exceedingly numerous, yet they are unfortunately for the most part too deficient in point of accuracy, or possess too little uniformity of connexion to afford very satisfactory results, or to admit of any extended comparison with theory. With a view to arrive at more correct conclusions, the author begins his inquiry by endeavouring to determine what may be expected to be the forms of the cotidal lines, as deduced from the laws which regulate the motions of water: and he proceeds afterwards to examine what are their real forms, as shown by the comparison of all the tide observations which we at present possess.


Open Theology ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 278-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olga Louchakova-Schwartz

Abstract This paper presents a phenomenological analysis of the argument in The First Discourse of Part 2 of Suhrawardī’s Philosophy of Illumination. Specifically, this argument is considered with regard to temporal extension of its logos, i.e., the succession of logical steps. Contrary to traditional views of Suhrawardī as a Neoplatonizing proponent of the primacy of essence over existence, the steps of his argument convey a much more nuanced picture in which ligh t emerges as the main metaphysical principle. First, Suhra wardī explicates full evidentiality in visible light (which is the most patent, ’aẓhar, from the Arabic root ẓ-h-r = ‘to appear, be [made] manifest’): this light gives us the world as “this-there”; and second, as self-evidentiality (ẓuhūru-hu, ‘being obvious to itself by itself’) in the first-person consciousness of the knower. Suhrawardī accesses these modes by reduction(s) which liberate the transcendental character of light. The correlation in the evidential mode of light between the knower and the objects serves as a ground for the claims of transcendental unity of the self and the world, and as a condition of possibility for knowledge. A juxtaposition of this approach with phenomenological philosophy suggests that in Suhrawardī’s analysis, the evidentiality of visual light plays a role of a new universal a priori. I show that under the phenomenological reduction, this a priori participates in constitution of ontological validities; and within the transcendental empiricism of the physics of light, this a priori underlies the construction of causality. Thereby, the Philosophy of Illumination suggests a new horizon of entry into transcendental phenomenological philosophy. The paper also contains a justification of a phenomenological reading of Suhrawardī’s work, including explanation of the historical reduction.


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