Sartre’s Transcendental Phenomenology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Webber
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Phenomenological Reduction ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
The World

The first phase of Sartre’s philosophical publications displays an apparent ambivalence toward Husserl’s transcendental turn. Sartre accepts both major aspects of that turn, the phenomenological reduction and the use of transcendental argumentation. Yet his rejection of the transcendental ego that Husserl derives from this transcendental turn overlooks an obvious transcendental argument in favor of it. His books on emotion and imagination, moreover, make only very brief comments about the transcendental constitution of the world of experience. In each case, these appear at the end of the book and can seem to contradict the book’s central analysis. The problem underlying these features of his works of phenomenological psychology is clarified and resolved, however, when Sartre articulates his own transcendental phenomenology and ontology in Being and Nothingness a decade after he first encountered the work of Husserl. This resolution raises a new problem that animates the next phase of his philosophy.

scholarly journals The Earth and Pregivenness in Transcendental Phenomenology

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-52
Author(s):  
Denis Džanić
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Transcendental Function ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The World

Abstract The doctrine of the pregivenness of the world features prominently in Husserl’s numerous phenomenological analyses and descriptions of the role the world plays in our experience. Properly evaluating its function within the overall system of transcendental phenomenology is, however, by no means a straightforward task, as evidenced by many manuscripts from the 1930s. These detail various epistemological and metaphysical difficulties and potential paradoxes encumbering the notion of the pre-given world. This paper contends that some of these difficulties can be alleviated by revisiting Husserl’s late concept of the earth and, more specifically, disclosing its transcendental function in the constitution of pregivenness. To test this claim, I turn to Husserl’s 1931 manuscript describing the paradox of “the originary acquisition of the world.” I argue that the paradox is dissolved by introducing the transcendental-phenomenological concept of the earth.

Positionality and Consciousness in Husserl’s Ideas I

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-295
Author(s):  
Andrea Staiti
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Reduction ◽  
Natural Attitude ◽  
Pure Consciousness ◽  
The World

In this paper I argue that in Husserl’sIdeas I(1913) there is a seeming contradiction between the characterization of pure consciousness as theresidueof the performance of the phenomenological reduction and the claim that in the natural attitude consciousness is taken to be an entity is the world. This creates a puzzle regarding the positional status of consciousness in the natural attitude. After reviewing some possible options to solve this puzzle in the existing literature, I claim that the positional status of conscious experiences in the natural attitude is best characterized asunsettled. The act thatsettlesthe positional status of conscious experiences (i.e. our manifoldErlebnisse) is reflection. In reflection, experiences are posited as beings, either in a psychological or in a phenomenological key. I conclude by arguing that the problem of positing is of paramount importance to understand correctly Husserl’s claim that phenomenology isvoraussetzungslos.

Temporality and Existence

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Françoise Dastur ◽  
Robert Vallier
Keyword(s):  
Martin Heidegger ◽  
Edmund Husserl ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
The Other ◽  
Problem Of Time ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
New Beginning ◽  
Phenomenology Of Perception ◽  
The World ◽  
The One

This chapter brings Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, whose different phenomenological styles are normally opposed, into dialogue with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's claim that temporality is not a contingent attribute of existence. According to Merleau-Ponty, consciousness and the world, the inside and the outside, sense and non-sense, are interdependent beings. For Merleau-Ponty, the problem of time is the problem of the subject's relation to time. The chapter examines how Merleau-Ponty's position in Phenomenology of Perception becomes the intermediary position between, on the one hand, the completion of the tradition and the fulfillment of modernity represented by Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and, on the other hand, the “new beginning for thought” that Heidegger wants to promote, insofar as he attempts to assume or take on metaphysics.

scholarly journals Patočka's Critique of Husserl: The Possibility of A-Subjective Phenomenology

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-90
Author(s):  
Gabriel Vidal
Keyword(s):  
Edmund Husserl ◽  
Phenomenological Reduction ◽  
Intentional Consciousness ◽  
Phenomenology Of Perception ◽  
The World ◽  
Thing In Itself

Edmund Husserl created phenomenology with the attempt of founding a new philosophical departure detached from past mistakes, specifically, the rigid split between things as they appear to us and the thing-in-itself. As such, it rejects both realism and idealism. With this in mind, Husserl posits that we ought to describe things only as they appear, without posing any predetermined thesis regarding the nature of the world. This gesture came to be known as epoché, which led to the development of the phenomenological reduction to intentional consciousness. And yet, in this latter gesture, Jan Patočka seem to have found a psychologistic and subjectivistic degradation of phenomenology, where the appearance of things happens only inside and within a consciousness. Under this approach, he critiques Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, correcting it, and proposing instead a phenomenology equally committed to the epoché but void of reduction, so that things have an autonomous appearance indicative of a horizon of world instead of an act of subject. 

Consciousness, Being and Life: Phenomenological Approaches to Mindfulness

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Bitbol
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Phenomenological Reduction ◽  
First Person ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
And Behaviors ◽  
Phenomenological View ◽  
Cross Fertilization

Abstract A phenomenological view of contemplative disciplines is presented. However, studying mindfulness by phenomenology is at odds with both neurobiological and anthropological approaches. It involves the first-person standpoint, the openness of being-in-the-world, the umwelt of the meditator, instead of assessing her neural processes and behaviors from a neutral, distanced, third-person standpoint. It then turns out that phenomenology cannot produce a discourse about mindfulness. Phenomenology rather induces a cross-fertilization between the state of mindfulness and its own methods of mental cultivation. A comparison between the epochè, the phenomenological reduction, and the practice of mindfulness, is then undertaken.

Husserl’s Timaeus. Plato’s Creation Myth and the Phenomenological Concept of Metaphysics as the Teleological Science of the World

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 77-100
Author(s):  
Emiliano Trizio ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Creation Myth ◽  
The World ◽  
Scientific Ideas ◽  
The Ideal ◽  
Conceptual Resources

According to Husserl, Plato played a fundamental role in the development of the notion of teleology, so much so that Husserl viewed the myth narrated in the Timaeus as a fundamental stage in the long history that he hoped would eventually lead to a teleological science of the world grounded in transcendental phenomenology. This article explores this interpretation of Plato’s legacy in light of Husserl’s thesis that Plato was the initiator of the ideal of genuine science. It also outlines how Husserl sought conceptual resources within transcendental phenomenology to turn the key elements of Plato’s creation myth into rigorous scientific ideas.

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDY OF STUDENTS' KNOWLEDGE OF BIOLOGY IN A SWEDISH COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOL

2000 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Sages ◽  
Piotr Szybek
Keyword(s):  
Everyday Life ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Phenomenological Study ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Comprehensive School ◽  
School Subject ◽  
School Knowledge ◽  
The World

AbstractA text written by a student in a Swedish comprehensive school, during a Biology test, is analyzed using a method based on Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. The method is presented in the article. The analysis results in an explicitation of horizons, which enables an access to the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) opened by the text. In this case, the interplay of school Biology (the school subject Biology) and "everyday life" is visible. The meaning constituted in the encounter with school Biology seems to lack natural science aspects. The visible aspects pertain to the bodily situatedness of a student in school and to the character of school knowledge. The world as constituted by school Biology seems to be a place of disembedded, general people where school is a place of non-learning.

scholarly journals Cartography of the Phenomenon and the Phenomenon as Cartography

Phainomenon ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-232
Author(s):  
Guilherme Riscali
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Natural Attitude ◽  
The World ◽  
A Share

Abstract This paper discusses Gilbert Ryle’s image of philosophy as cartography in an attempt to explore the idea of a cartography of the phenomenon, confronting it with the sense it takes in Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Ryle tries to grasp the particularity of philosophical tasks as being about specific sorts of problems, not about specific sorts of objects. What is required both of a cartographer and of a philosopher is, according to him, to look at familiar spaces in wholly unusual terms. Husserlian phenomenology then, with its rediscovery of consciousness as an absolute, unbounded field, meets quite well this demand. The uncovered field of the phenomena is not a new region, opposing that of the objects as faced in the natural attitude. It is rather a completely different attitude, just as a map is not a share of the world, but a distinct orientation towards it. The phenomenon, therefore, would not be something that is there to be cartographed as much as a kind of cartography itself. A phenomenological cartography, however, is one that has its specific marks, different from those of the Rylean conception.

scholarly journals El papel de la darse-previo en la fenomenología trascendental

Phainomenon ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-52
Author(s):  
Roberto J. Walton
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
The Other ◽  
Second Step ◽  
Natural Attitude ◽  
Cartesian Meditation ◽  
Surface Level ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
The Way

Abstract This article is an attempt to clarify the role of pregivenness by drawing on the accounts afforded by Eugen Fink both in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation and in the complementary writings to this study. Pregivenness is first situated, along with givenness and non-givenness, within the framework of the system of transcendental phenomenology. As a second step, an examination is undertaken of the dimensions of pregivenness in the natural attitude. Next, nonpregivenness in the transcendental sphere is examined with a focus upon the way in which indeterminateness does not undermine the possibility of a transcendental foreknowledge in the natural attitude, and on the other hand implies the productive character of phenomenological knowledge. After showing how, with the reduction, the pregivennes of the world turns into the pregivenness of world-constitution, the paper addresses the problems raised by the nonpregivenness both of the depth-levels and the reach of transcendental life. By unfolding these lines of inquiry, transcendental phenomenology surmounts the provisional analysis of constitution at the surface level as well as the limitation of transcendental life to the egological sphere. Finally, it is contended that Fink’s account of pregivenness overstates apperceptive or secondary pregivenenness because is does not deal with the pregivenness that precedes acts and is the condition of possibility for primary passivity. Reasons for the omission of impressional or primary pregivenness are suggested.

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