Regional Influences on Mediation Behavior

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-314
Author(s):  
Derrick V. Frazier ◽  
Andrew P. Owsiak ◽  
Virginia Sanders
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Interstate Conflict ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Regional Bias ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Regional Factors ◽  
Security Concerns ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes ◽  
Common Security

Research on interstate mediation tends to assume (implicitly) that regional factors have little effect on the occurrence of mediation. We relax this assumption and advance an explicit regional theory of mediation in which regional ties create a type of bias that motivates both (potential) third parties to mediate conflicts within their region and disputants to select or accept these regional actors as mediators more frequently than non-regional actors. This bias first appears when states belong to the same region. In such situations, the potential third party and disputants likely understand one another better and share common security concerns. Yet regional membership does not explain the variation in mediation behavior within regions. To account for this, we argue that regionally more powerful states, as well as those that share (regional) institutional memberships with the disputants, have greater incentives to mediate than some regional counterparts. We empirically test the effect of these characteristics on the likelihood of mediation in militarized interstate disputes during the period 1946–2000. Our findings uncover support for our argument and suggest that accounting for regional bias is important in explaining mediation patterns in interstate conflict.

Transborder identities, bias, and third-party conflict management

2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 490-511
Author(s):  
Emir Yazici
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Management ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Majority Group ◽  
Ethnic Language ◽  
Interstate Conflicts ◽  
Economic Conflict ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

Which third parties are more likely to manage interstate conflicts? Once they do, what kind of conflict management methods do they use? I argue that ethnic, language, and/or religious ties between a potential third party and disputant states can affect both the likelihood and the type of conflict management. If there are strong identity ties (ethnic, language, and/or religious) between the majority group in a potential third-party state and the majority group in one of the disputant states, both the likelihood of conflict management in general and the likelihood of economic conflict management in particular should increase. Equally stronger identity ties between a potential third party and both disputants should also increase the likelihood of conflict management in which third parties use verbal and diplomatic conflict management methods since they do not harm any of the disputants. Empirical findings based on a dataset covering the militarized interstate disputes between 1946 and 2011 support my theoretical expectations. These findings contribute to the literature by exploring the role of transborder identities—in addition to material factors such as alliance, trade partnership, or joint regime type—in management of interstate conflicts by third parties.

Domestic uncertainty, third-party resolve, and international conflict

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 445-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew DiLorenzo ◽  
Bryan Rooney
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

Uncertainty about resolve is a well-established rationalist explanation for war. In addition to estimating the resolve of immediate rivals, leaders choose their actions in a crisis based on expectations about how third parties will respond. We argue that leaders will become more likely to develop inconsistent estimates of rivals’ relative capabilities and resolve – and thus will become more likely to fight – when domestic political changes occur in states that are allied with an opponent. We also consider how the relationship between conflict in rivalries and third-party domestic change depends on domestic political institutions in the third party. We argue that this effect should only hold when a challenger does not also share an alliance with the third party, and that the effect should be strongest when the third party is a non-democratic state. We test our theory using a dataset of changes in leaders’ domestic supporting coalitions and data on militarized interstate disputes from 1920 to 2001. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that the likelihood of conflict increases in rivalries only when domestic coalition changes occur in states that share an alliance with only one member of a rivalry, and that this effect is strongest and most consistent for non-democratic third parties.

Intervention in Conflicts from a Network Perspective

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 314-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renato Corbetta ◽  
Keith A. Grant
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dyadic Relationships ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Interstate Conflicts ◽  
Events Data ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes ◽  
Structural Theories ◽  
Hostility Scale

Whether neutral or on the side of a combatant, third-party states’ intervention in ongoing interstate conflicts is a triadic phenomenon which involves ties between a joining state and the two originators of the dispute. Existing studies on this topic have failed to fully capture the triadic nature of intervention, preferring instead to focus either on the joiner’s motivations or on the distinct dyadic relationships between joiners and the two separate combatants. Building on classic structural theories of triadic balance and on prior work by Maoz et al. (2007), in this article we address the triadic aspect of both mediation and “joining behavior”. The nature of the triadic relations among disputants and third parties influences not just the likelihood of intervention, but also the type of intervention. When triadic relations are unbalanced, third parties are more likely to intervene as intermediaries. On the contrary, when triadic relations are balanced, third parties are more likely to intervene in a partisan manner. We explore our main hypotheses by constructing a triadic data set that combines Corbetta and Dixon’s (2005) data on partisan third-party interventions and Frazier and Dixon’s (2006) data on neutral (intermediary) interventions in militarized interstate disputes with a friendship–hostility scale extracted from international events data (IDEA and COPDAB).

Status Deficits and War

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Renshon
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
The United States ◽  
Interstate Conflict ◽  
Reference Groups ◽  
Unique Data ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Large N ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

This chapter explores the relationship between status deficits and international conflict using empirical evidence drawn from a large-N statistical analysis of the link between status dissatisfaction and war at several degrees of intensity (ranging from crises to interstate conflict). It first considers whether conflict serves as a status-altering event before discussing the connection of status deficits to initiation of war and militarized interstate disputes. It also presents unique data on which comparisons are most salient in motivating international conflict (for example, who powerful states compare themselves to, or whether South Africa and the United States are likely to compare themselves to similar groups of countries. The chapter shows that the types of comparisons that are made—who the “reference groups” are—have important implications for how status concerns are manifested in international politics.

scholarly journals When and Whom to Join: The Expansion of Ongoing Violent Interstate Conflicts

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 205-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle A. Joyce ◽  
Faten Ghosn ◽  
Reşat Bayer
Keyword(s):  
Competing Risks ◽  
Statistical Models ◽  
Interstate Conflict ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Democratic Peace ◽  
Duration Model ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Interstate Conflicts ◽  
Conflict Expansion ◽  
Conflict Research

The opportunity and willingness framework has received much attention in research on interstate conflict expansion. This framework is extended here by examining when and what side third parties join during ongoing conflicts. It is maintained that without examining both timing and side selection, understanding of conflict expansion is limited. The timing and side joined in interstate disputes between 1816 and 2001 are analysed using a competing risks duration model. The findings contribute novel insights into many key debates in conflict research such as balancing versus bandwagoning, as well as alliance reliability and the democratic peace. The results also indicate that relying on statistical models that do not distinguish between which side a third party can join may produce misleading results.

scholarly journals Democratic vs. Capitalist Peace: A Test in the Developing World

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faruk Ekmekci
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Developing World ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Interstate Conflict ◽  
Democratic Peace ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
World Economic ◽  
Time Periods ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes ◽  
Developing And Developed Countries

This paper aims to test the capitalist and democratic peace arguments within the developing world. Notwithstanding the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence which indicate two different dynamics of interstate conflict in the developing and the developed worlds, the proponents of both “democratic peace” and “capitalist peace” arguments did not take into account the distinction between developing and developed countries and tested their hypotheses within samples that included “all dyads” in different time periods. This study aims to fill this gap by testing capitalist and democratic peace arguments within the developing world. It tests the capitalist and democratic peace arguments through statistical analysis (logistic regression) of the militarized interstate disputes in the developing world between 1951 and 2000. The results support the “capitalist peace” argument and suggest that, within the developing world, economic development leads to interstate peace, whereas democracy does not. The findings are robust to different measures of conflict, democracy and economic development.

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