Transborder identities, bias, and third-party conflict management

2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 490-511
Author(s):  
Emir Yazici
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Management ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Majority Group ◽  
Ethnic Language ◽  
Interstate Conflicts ◽  
Economic Conflict ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

Which third parties are more likely to manage interstate conflicts? Once they do, what kind of conflict management methods do they use? I argue that ethnic, language, and/or religious ties between a potential third party and disputant states can affect both the likelihood and the type of conflict management. If there are strong identity ties (ethnic, language, and/or religious) between the majority group in a potential third-party state and the majority group in one of the disputant states, both the likelihood of conflict management in general and the likelihood of economic conflict management in particular should increase. Equally stronger identity ties between a potential third party and both disputants should also increase the likelihood of conflict management in which third parties use verbal and diplomatic conflict management methods since they do not harm any of the disputants. Empirical findings based on a dataset covering the militarized interstate disputes between 1946 and 2011 support my theoretical expectations. These findings contribute to the literature by exploring the role of transborder identities—in addition to material factors such as alliance, trade partnership, or joint regime type—in management of interstate conflicts by third parties.

Intervention in Conflicts from a Network Perspective

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 314-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renato Corbetta ◽  
Keith A. Grant
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dyadic Relationships ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Interstate Conflicts ◽  
Events Data ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes ◽  
Structural Theories ◽  
Hostility Scale

Whether neutral or on the side of a combatant, third-party states’ intervention in ongoing interstate conflicts is a triadic phenomenon which involves ties between a joining state and the two originators of the dispute. Existing studies on this topic have failed to fully capture the triadic nature of intervention, preferring instead to focus either on the joiner’s motivations or on the distinct dyadic relationships between joiners and the two separate combatants. Building on classic structural theories of triadic balance and on prior work by Maoz et al. (2007), in this article we address the triadic aspect of both mediation and “joining behavior”. The nature of the triadic relations among disputants and third parties influences not just the likelihood of intervention, but also the type of intervention. When triadic relations are unbalanced, third parties are more likely to intervene as intermediaries. On the contrary, when triadic relations are balanced, third parties are more likely to intervene in a partisan manner. We explore our main hypotheses by constructing a triadic data set that combines Corbetta and Dixon’s (2005) data on partisan third-party interventions and Frazier and Dixon’s (2006) data on neutral (intermediary) interventions in militarized interstate disputes with a friendship–hostility scale extracted from international events data (IDEA and COPDAB).

Regional Influences on Mediation Behavior

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-314
Author(s):  
Derrick V. Frazier ◽  
Andrew P. Owsiak ◽  
Virginia Sanders
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Interstate Conflict ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Regional Bias ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Regional Factors ◽  
Security Concerns ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes ◽  
Common Security

Research on interstate mediation tends to assume (implicitly) that regional factors have little effect on the occurrence of mediation. We relax this assumption and advance an explicit regional theory of mediation in which regional ties create a type of bias that motivates both (potential) third parties to mediate conflicts within their region and disputants to select or accept these regional actors as mediators more frequently than non-regional actors. This bias first appears when states belong to the same region. In such situations, the potential third party and disputants likely understand one another better and share common security concerns. Yet regional membership does not explain the variation in mediation behavior within regions. To account for this, we argue that regionally more powerful states, as well as those that share (regional) institutional memberships with the disputants, have greater incentives to mediate than some regional counterparts. We empirically test the effect of these characteristics on the likelihood of mediation in militarized interstate disputes during the period 1946–2000. Our findings uncover support for our argument and suggest that accounting for regional bias is important in explaining mediation patterns in interstate conflict.

Domestic uncertainty, third-party resolve, and international conflict

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 445-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew DiLorenzo ◽  
Bryan Rooney
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

Uncertainty about resolve is a well-established rationalist explanation for war. In addition to estimating the resolve of immediate rivals, leaders choose their actions in a crisis based on expectations about how third parties will respond. We argue that leaders will become more likely to develop inconsistent estimates of rivals’ relative capabilities and resolve – and thus will become more likely to fight – when domestic political changes occur in states that are allied with an opponent. We also consider how the relationship between conflict in rivalries and third-party domestic change depends on domestic political institutions in the third party. We argue that this effect should only hold when a challenger does not also share an alliance with the third party, and that the effect should be strongest when the third party is a non-democratic state. We test our theory using a dataset of changes in leaders’ domestic supporting coalitions and data on militarized interstate disputes from 1920 to 2001. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that the likelihood of conflict increases in rivalries only when domestic coalition changes occur in states that share an alliance with only one member of a rivalry, and that this effect is strongest and most consistent for non-democratic third parties.

Third party conflict management of transboundary river disputes

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 402-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elvira Bobekova
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Conflict Management ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Individual Case ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Security Challenges

Purpose – This paper aims to fill the gaps by conducting the first large n study examining the role of third parties in the emergence of river agreements in Asia and Africa during the time period 1948-2007. There is a growing literature on what explains agreements in river disputes. However, beyond individual case analysis, little systematic study has been done on the role of third parties in settling river disputes through agreement, in particular on the regions that are mostly affected by the global climate change. Design/methodology/approach – Through utilising new data on the role of third parties in river disputes, this study shows that third party involvement in the conflict management of river disputes increases the likelihood of reaching river agreements. Findings – The findings suggest that third parties use both diplomatic and economic means to increase the likelihood of emergence of river agreements, and both strategies are equally important to induce formalised cooperation. Research limitations/implications – Yet the present study covers only two regions, and it does not delve into a discussion of the conditions under which third party interventions are successful. Rather, these are aspects that need to be explored in the future. Practical implications – Given the current uncertainty around security challenges resulting from climate change, and with predictions of future water wars, this research contributes to the understanding how to peacefully manage current and potential conflicts around transboundary waters. Originality/value – This study is the first large n study examining the role of third parties in the emergence of river agreements in Asia and Africa.

Conflict Management of Territorial Disputes

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krista E. Wiegand
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Management ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Territorial Disputes ◽  
Management Tools ◽  
Peaceful Resolution ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Maritime Disputes ◽  
Bilateral Negotiations

Despite the decline in interstate wars, there remain dozens of interstate disputes that could erupt into diplomatic crises and evolve into military escalation. By far the most difficult interstate dispute that exists are territorial disputes, followed by maritime and river boundary disputes. These disputes are not only costly for the states involved, but also potentially dangerous for states in the region and allies of disputant states who could become entrapped in armed conflicts. Fortunately, though many disputes remain unresolved and some disputes endure for decades or more than a century, many other disputes are peacefully resolved through conflict management tools. Understanding the factors that influence conflict management—the means by which governments decide their foreign policy strategies relating to interstate disputes and civil conflicts—is critical to policy makers and scholars interested in the peaceful resolution of such disputes. Though conflict management of territorial and maritime disputes can include a spectrum of management tools, including use of force, most conflict management tools are peaceful, involving direct bilateral negotiations between the disputant states, non-binding third party mediation, or binding legal dispute resolution. Governments most often attempt the most direct dispute resolution method, which is bilateral negotiations, but often, such negotiations break down due to uncompromising positions of the disputing states, leading governments to turn to other resolution methods. There are pros and cons of each of the dispute resolution methods and certain factors will influence the decisions that governments make about the management of their territorial and maritime disputes. Overall, the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes is an important but complicated issue for states both directly involved and indirectly affected by the persistence of such disputes.

scholarly journals Exploiting common resources with capital-intensive technologies: the role of external forces

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 565-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEFANIE ENGEL ◽  
RAMÓN LÓPEZ
Keyword(s):  
Local Communities ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Bargaining Process ◽  
Outside Options ◽  
Model Distribution ◽  
External Forces ◽  
Capital Intensive

ABSTRACTThis paper focuses on the interactions between local communities having at least some degree of informal claims over natural resources and firms interested in commercially exploiting such resources, explicitly allowing for interventions by third parties interested in community welfare and environmental outcomes. Integrating conflict and bargaining theories, we develop a bargaining model with endogenous inside and outside options, in which the feasibility and outcomes of a potential bargaining game depend on the unraveling of a conflict stage and vice versa. The model implies that, contrary to the conventional bargaining model, distribution and efficiency cease to be separable. We show that certain third-party interventions in the bargaining process may have unexpected and counterproductive effects.

Mediation in Interstate Disputes

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Management ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Supply Side ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Supply Side Factors

This commentary provides a brief summary of the articles in this special issue and emphasizes four questions raised by this research: 1) ways to define and measure mediators’ strategies, 2) teasing out demand side factors from supply side factors in mediation, 3) capturing differences between states and international organizations as conflict managers, and 4) understanding the role of particular conflict management actors like the International Criminal Court.

Contact and Conflict Resolution: Examining the Extent to which Interpersonal Contact and Cooperation Can Affect the Management of International Conflicts1

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-37
Author(s):  
Jacob Bercovitch ◽  
Julie Chalfin
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Conflict Management ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Interpersonal Contact ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
Interstate Conflicts ◽  
Management Techniques ◽  
Facilitating Conditions

AbstractConflict between states, as well as between governments and non-state actors, continues to pose one of the most serious threats to individuals in the international community today. In an effort to reduce the destruction caused by these conflicts, a number of interventions, processes, and conflict management methods have been attempted. One of these methods involves facilitating conditions for positive contact between the disputants thus enabling them to develop a rapport of some sort. While this idea has received widespread theoretical support, there is little empirical analysis considering the benefits of such an approach. Here we examine how the context in which contact occurs can affect conflict management; we outline the assumptions that underpin conditions of the context, and discuss strategies, such as interactive problem solving, that have at their heart the goal of improving conditions of contact and communication as a prelude to conflict resolution. Our research goes beyond most studies, in that we subject the ideas of various conditions of contact and communication to an empirical test. We develop specific hypotheses on the role and relevance of the conditions of contact, and investigate the extent to which conflict management techniques can create positive conditions to contribute to conflict resolution. An original dataset including various conflict management techniques is examined to analyze our hypotheses. Findings indicate that factors such as the rank of a mediator and the type of conflict are more significant predictors of successful conflict management than the involvement of a third party facilitator. We examine both interstate conflicts and civil conflict to determine whether these different types should be managed differently.

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