Slav non-citizens in the Baltics

1994 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-137
Author(s):  
Bart Driessen

AbstractThis study argues that customary international law obliges the Baltic states to accept the Slav populations as an integral part of the Baltic peoples. The history and collapse of the Soviet Union has produced large groups of Slav immigrants to remain in the Baltic states. They are not automatically granted citizenship rights in Estonia and Latvia, as they have to prove to qualify for naturalisation. People descending from the inter-War citizenry do ipso facto qualify for citizenship. First the nature of the coming-to-independence of the Baltic states is analysed, after which the law on self-determination is investigated. The de facto recognition of the Soviet annexation by most of the international community is seen as the watershed as far as the status of the Baltic states is concerned; from then on they were for all practical purposes part of the Soviet Union. Following an analysis of the applicable norms of customary international law, a scrutiny of relevant Baltic legislation is presented.

2000 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-316
Author(s):  

AbstractInternational legal practice in the 20th century is rich in challenging cases of state continuity and extinction. One of those cases is the preservation of the continuity of the Baltic states throughout 51 years of foreign occupation and annexation. After decades of non-recognition of Soviet annexation by leading Western powers, the present-day Baltic republics have not been seen as successor states of the Soviet Union, but as identical with the independent Baltic states of 1918–1940. How could the continuity of the Baltic states be preserved, especially as the Soviet Union had effectively and seemingly “forever”established its control over the Baltic republics? This article focuses on the Estonian situation, laying out the events of 1944 which led to the proclamation of the new constitutional government, and after the country was for the second time occupied by the Soviet army, to the creation of an Estonian government in exile. One of the main questions asked in this article is whether and how the Estonian government in exile contributed to the preservation of the continuity of the Republic of Estonia. Both legal and political aspects played a role in the preservation of the continuity of the Republic of Estonia, and for various reasons, the role of the Estonian government in exile was not exactly that of “the” preserver of state continuity.


2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 383-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. Galbreath

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent independence of Latvia, a minority group became a majority and a majority group became a minority. This has been the situation for Latvians and Russians after August 1991. The Baltic States led the way towards first autonomy and then independence. The nationalist movement in the Latvian SSR was primarily a minority nationalist movement. Why do minorities mobilise? Gurr finds that minorities rebel for two reasons: relative deprivation and group mobilisation. Relative deprivation answers the question of why and it characterizes the status of the Latvian language and culture vis-à-vis that of Russia during the Soviet period. While relative deprivation has come under considerable criticism because of its inability to explain when a group will mobilise, the notion can be found in the nationalist rhetoric before and since the restoration of Latvian independence. Group mobilisation goes further in explaining when minorities may assert political claims. Considered in terms of changes in the political opportunity structure, the changing politics of glasnost allowed the nationalist movements to mobilise in the Baltic States.


Author(s):  
Olavi Arens

The following paper deals with US policy toward the Baltic states at two different time periods (1918–20 and 1989–91) and by two very different presidents (Woodrow F. Wilson and George H. W. Bush). The first period represented the time that saw the emergence of the United States on the world stage. Woodrow Wilson seemingly advocated self-determination as was understood by a number of his advisers at the Peace Conference, but eventually decided to support the unity of Russia as part of an anti-Bolshevik policy. During the second period, George H. W. Bush negotiated a settlement to end another conflict, the Cold War. While self-determination of the Baltic states (on the basis of the US non-recognition policy) was not of prime importance for the US, it nevertheless was brought up at very summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev and came to be linked to the resolution of economic issues between the two major powers. Ultimately the restoration of independence was decided by developments in the Soviet Union, but US policy made the Baltic question an international issue and helped resolve it peacefully.


Author(s):  
Ilkhomjon M. Saidov ◽  

The article is devoted to the participation of natives of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic in the Baltic operation of 1944. The author states that Soviet historiography did not sufficiently address the problem of participation of individual peoples of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War, and therefore their feat remained undervalued for a long time. More specifically, according to the author, 40–42% of the working age population of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic fought on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Such figure was typical only for a limited number of countries participating in the anti-fascist coalition. Analyzing the participation of Soviet Uzbekistan citizens in the battles for the Baltic States, the author shows that the 51st and 71st guards rifle divisions, which included many natives of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, were particularly distinguished. Their heroic deeds were noted by the soviet leadership – a number of Uzbek guards were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In addition, Uzbekistanis fought as part of partisan detachments – both in the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, the Western regions of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and Moldova. Many Uzbek partisans were awarded the medal “Partisan of the Patriotic War” of I and II degrees.


1989 ◽  
Vol 17 (02) ◽  
pp. 156-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrejs Penikis

On October 20, 1989 the Harriman Institute's Nationalities and Siberian Studies Program of Columbia University sponsored a panel discussion entitled, “The Baltic Republics Fifty Years After the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.” The panel, consisting of Dr. Allen Lynch, Dr. Stephan Kux, Mr. Jenik Radon and Mr. William Hough, analyzed the current situation in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as in the other republics from a variety of perspectives, and debated the motivations and appropriateness of the response of the Western powers to the growing strength of the various independence movements in the Baltic republics. The following edited transcript of those proceedings points up the complex and contentious nature of the status of the Baltic republics in the era of Gorbachev, in both the domestic (Soviet) and international contexts. Nationalist leaders within the Soviet Union debate the appropriate tactics and pace to pursue their goals. The Soviet leadership dabates the extent to which autonomy may be granted to the nationalities. Western leaders consider their options in responding to the changes in the Soviet Union, changes which necessitate an overhaul of policies nearly a half-century old as well as some “new thinking” on their parts. The discussion centered on two issues: (1) What in general has been the response of the West to nationalist movements in the USSR and how appropriate has that response been? (2) Is there any validity to claims of Baltic “exceptionalism”? The following introduction comments briefly on these issues and places them into perspective by drawing on the discussion and exploring several key points.


2021 ◽  
pp. 135918352110524
Author(s):  
Triin Jerlei

In the 1960s, tourism in the Soviet Union underwent radical changes. While previously the focus had been on showcasing the rapid modernization of the empire, this new type of tourism focused on introducing foreigners to the regional vernacular culture in the Soviet Union. As the number of tourists increased, the need for wider mass production of souvenirs emerged. This research focuses on the identity of souvenirs produced in Baltic states as a case study for identifying the existence and nature of regionalism within the Soviet system. This study found that within Baltic souvenir production, two separate types of identities manifested. Firstly, the use of national or vernacular symbols was allowed and even promoted throughout the Soviet Union. A famous slogan of the era was ‘Socialist in content, national in form’, which suggested that national form was suitable for conveying socialist ideals. These products were usually made of local materials and employed traditional national ornament. However, this research identified a secondary identity within the souvenirs manufactured in the Baltic countries, which was based on a shared ‘European past’. The symbol often chosen to convey it was the pre-Soviet Old Town, which was in all three states based on Western and Central European architectural traditions. This research suggests that this European identity validated through the use of Old Town as a recurring motif on souvenirs, distinguished Baltic states from the other regions of the Soviet Union. While most souvenirs manufactured in the Soviet Union emphasized the image of locals as the exotic ‘Other’, Baltic souvenirs inspired by Old Town conveyed the idea of familiarity to European tourists.


Slavic Review ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 640-647
Author(s):  
Andres Kasekamp

This essay examines how Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have managed to secure their independence and analyzes how they have dealt with the internal and external challenges to their state-building efforts. It compares the first period of statehood between the two world wars with the current period of independence beginning with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Among the critical external tasks they have faced were deterring former imperial powers, fostering regional cooperation and gaining a voice in international organizations. Internally, consolidating democratic systems and integration of ethnic minorities have been the two most significant challenges.


Author(s):  
Tanel Kerikmäe ◽  
Archil Chochia ◽  
Max Atallah

Integration with the European Union has been far less distressing for the three Baltic States than for numerous other accessing countries owing to their strong societal impetus to (re)join Western political, economic, and legal culture after they regained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1990. However, the accession of these states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—had several distinctive features related to constitutional background and settings, which heavily influenced problem solving between government and the EU institutions. In general, the controversial issues regarding how to solve the problems with supranational power have never been dramatic with regard to the Baltic States, which leads to the assumption that often the governments have taken rather compliant positions. The latest cases, such as the European Stabilization Mechanism, indicate the change in paradigm: the three Baltic States are more aware of the margin of appreciation and actual borderlines between policy making- and decision making. Today, in setting up an EU-related agenda, more skills than previously are needed in finding allies and choosing partners. The road the Baltic States took in joining the EU was a difficult one, nor has their role in the EU been easy. Should a small state with a big initiative be allowed to mentor other member states regarding that initiative, meaning in particular Estonia and its digital development? Another peculiar aspect of the Baltic States is their (inter)relationship with Russia. Considering themselves a bridge between East and West, the Baltics have been active in Eastern Partnership and Development Aid initiatives and have also spoken out strongly against intervention in Georgia and Ukraine. This position sometimes complicates any EU attempt to achieve consensus on foreign policy.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document