Czech Litigation on Systematic Detention of Asylum Seekers: Ripple Effects across Europe

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 284-307
Author(s):  
Madalina Moraru ◽  
Linda Janků
Keyword(s):  
Social Factors ◽  
Asylum Seekers ◽  
Refugee Crisis ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Ripple Effects ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

Abstract This article investigates the development of national litigation against the Czech Republic’s governmental policy to detain asylum seekers under the Dublin III Regulation, as a means to address the so-called refugee crisis. The outcome of this litigation has been the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Al Chodor case, which has been praised for enhancing domestic standards of protection of asylum seekers and returnees’ right to liberty across the EU. The article demonstrates that this preliminary ruling has been a catalyst for domestic legislative and jurisprudential reforms across the EU, improving to a certain extent the protection of the right to liberty of asylum seekers. However, it is argued that in the Czech Republic the case has not initiated a change in the legislation, nor has it reduced the systematic use of asylum detention. The article identifies some important legal, political and social factors from within and beyond courtrooms that have contributed to this ambiguous outcome of the Czech litigation. It concludes by identifying circumstances that need to be taken into account when using the preliminary reference procedure as a tool for strategic litigation.

The preliminary ruling procedure at the court of justice of the European Union and transformation of European anti-discrimination law

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (3) ◽  
pp. 66-72
Author(s):  
Elena Sorokina
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Essential Feature ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Judicial Cooperation ◽  
Member States ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
The Eu

The preliminary ruling procedure is an essential feature of the EU legal system, which is a unique cooperation tool as part of the dialogue between the Court of Justice of the EU and national courts of the Member States. Its main purpose is to ensure uniform interpretation and application of the provisions of EU law with all Member States and to preserve the uniformity of the European legal system. The continuous use by national courts of the Member States of the mechanism of preliminary ruling and constructive inter-judicial cooperation, the Court of Justice has developed an extremely extensive case law on the prohibition of discrimination and with the result to introduce substantial changes in European anti-discrimination law.The preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice have shown its inclination to expand notions of what constitutes discrimination and in most cases the Court prompt by the desire to interpret the provisions of European law so as to ensure the full effectiveness of the law, as well as a willingness to promote and strengthen protection against discrimination in Europe. While the protection against discrimination on some grounds is stronger than others, however, the preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice are important contribution to the transformation of anti-discrimination law, promote change in the national legislation of the Member States and provide the more effective protection of human rights in general.

scholarly journals Support Schemes in Renewable Energy: Commentary to Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 13 September 2017, ENEA S.A. v. Prezes Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-183
Author(s):  
Nevin Alija
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Renewable Energy ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Environmentally Friendly ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Financial Penalty ◽  
The Eu

In its September 13th 2017 decision,1 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided on a request for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of Poland (Sąd Najwyższy) in proceedings between ENEA S.A. (ENEA) and the president of the Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki (Office for the regulation of energy, URE) on the imposition by the latter of a financial penalty on ENEA for breach of its obligation to supply electricity produced by cogeneration. The judgment of the Court of Justice follows many decisions of the European Commission and judgments of the EU courts assessing the involvement of State resources in support schemes in energy, particularly with the aim of switching towards more environmentally friendly sources. This case reaffirms that support schemes may, in certain circumstances, fall outside the scope of the EU State aid rules.

scholarly journals Fact or Fiction? Case C-616/17 and the Compatibility of the EU Authorisation Procedure for Pesticides with the Precautionary Principle

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 481-497
Author(s):  
Sophia PAULINI
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Precautionary Principle ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Sufficient Information ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Precautionary Principle ◽  
Legal Standard ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Eu

This contribution analyses whether the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provides clarifications on the normative implications that the precautionary principle entails in the context of Regulation 1107/2009, laying out the EU authorisation procedure for pesticides, in its recent judgement in Case C-616/17. In this judgement, which is a response to a request for a preliminary ruling by a French criminal court on the compatibility of certain aspects of Regulation 1107/2009 with the precautionary principle, the CJEU concludes that the questions of the referring court reveal nothing capable of affecting the validity of the regulation. According to the CJEU, to ensure conformity with the precautionary principle, the EU legislature must establish a normative framework that makes available to competent authorities sufficient information to adequately assess the risks to health resulting from the pesticide in question. However, the CJEU’s substantive analysis of the compatibility of the different aspects of Regulation 1107/2009 with the precautionary principle is not conducted concretely in light of this legal standard, but constitutes a mere testing of the general adequacy of Regulation 1107/2009. Furthermore, the CJEU’s judgement examines Regulation 1107/2009 in a vacuum without considering problems that have occurred in its implementation or application.

scholarly journals Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL)

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-267
Author(s):  
Monika Zalnieriute
Keyword(s):  
Search Engine ◽  
Data Privacy ◽  
Freedom Of Information ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Data ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

In Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) held that the EU law only requires valid “right to be forgotten” de-referencing requests to be carried out by a search engine operator on search engine versions accessible in EU member states, as opposed to all versions of its search engine worldwide. While the ruling has been perceived as a “win” for Google and other interveners, such as Microsoft and the Wikimedia Foundation, who argued against worldwide de-referencing, the Court also made clear that that while the EU law does not currently require worldwide de-referencing, “it also does not prohibit such a practice” (para. 72). As a result, the CJEU found that an order by a national supervisory or judicial authority of an EU member state requiring worldwide de-referencing in accordance with its own national data protection laws would not be inconsistent with EU law where the data subject's right to privacy is adequately balanced against the right to freedom of information. By leaving the door to extraterritorial de-referencing wide open, the CJEU continues to pursue its post-Snowden hard-line stance on data privacy in a manner that is likely to transform the data privacy landscape.

Case C-233/18 Zubair Haqbin v. Federaal Agentschap Voor de Opvang van Asielzoekers (C.J.E.U.)

2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 694-707
Author(s):  
Justine N. Stefanelli
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Violent Behavior ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Eu

In its preliminary ruling in Haqbin, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) ruled for the first time on whether the EU Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33 (RCD) prohibits Member States from withdrawing material reception conditions in the event of a breach of the rules of accommodation centers, or in the context of violent behavior within those centers. In holding in the negative, the CJEU affirmed the important role played by fundamental rights in the EU's asylum system.

Taricco principles beyond Taricco

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-37
Author(s):  
Fabio Giuffrida
Keyword(s):  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Form Part ◽  
The Right ◽  
Criminal Matters ◽  
Principle Of Legality ◽  
Alleged Incompatibility ◽  
The Eu

This contribution examines whether the principles laid down in M.A.S., M.B. (‘ Taricco II’) may play a role in some forthcoming decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In Scialdone, the Court will be asked to strike a balance between the effectiveness of national legislation on VAT offences and the principle of lex mitior. The key difference between Taricco and Scialdone lies in the fact that the lex mitior principle, unlike the regulation of the statute of limitation, falls within the scope of the principle of legality at the European level. Kolev concerns instead an alleged incompatibility between Article 325 TFEU and the Bulgarian Code of Criminal Procedure. Unlike Taricco, therefore, the CJEU will have to deal with national rules that form part of procedural criminal law. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that the Court may reach a Taricco II-like conclusion (i.e. disapplication in theory, exception to the disapplication in practice), especially if the reasoning of the CJEU will rely on the importance of foreseeability and legal certainty in criminal matters. These same principles could lead the CJEU, in Menci, not to endorse the partial revirement of the European Court of Human Rights in the A. and B v. Norway ruling and, as a consequence, not to lower the EU standard of protection of the right not to be tried or punished twice for the same offence.

Communicating with the European Composite Administration

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 883-906 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Reichel
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Union Citizenship ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

One of the reasons for introducing a “Union” citizenship in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty was to provide a direct channel between the citizens of the Member States and the EU. In contrast to many other international organizations, the role of the individual has been central to the European project since its inception. In its famous 1962 judgment given inVan Gend en Loos,1 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) underscored the importance of the “vigilance of individuals concerned” seeking to protect their European rights in the new legal order through judicial control.2 The right to directly vote on the representatives of the European Parliament had already been introduced in the 1970s. The citizens of the Member States were thus equipped with two classic forms of political participation even prior to the introduction of Union citizenship: law making and the legal adjudication of individual cases. Nonetheless, whether these channels are sufficient to guarantee the citizens effective democratic means to influence legislation and exercise control of EU institutions in the rather complex multilevel legal system of the EU has been continuously debated.

Civis Europeus Sum – Union Citizenship and the Influence of the Court of Justice of the European Union

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-80
Author(s):  
Verica Trstenjak
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Tax Relief ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
Union Citizenship ◽  
Free Movement Of Persons ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

Since its formation in 1950s as the economic community, the EU has created the monetary union and is increasingly evolving also into a political union – part of which is also a union or Europe of citizens. This article explores the development and the existing EU legislation and case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) on Union citizenship. The article emphasises the importance of the case law of the CJEU for the development of this concept, focusing especially on the case law pertaining to access to social security benefits in another Member State, the rights of students, tax relief, and personal rights such as the right to write a name in a certain way and the right to family life. Case law of the CJEU has, inter alia, confirmed that even economically inactive Union citizens lawfully residing in another Member State have a right to access to social benefits under the same conditions as the Member State’s own nationals. The concept of the Union citizenship is of key importance in the development of EU law, as it expands the scope of the applicability of the provisions on free movement of persons and other fundamental freedoms. New challenges and questions linked to Union citizenship are arising over time, which should also be regulated at the EU level in the future. Therefore, further development of this concept can still be expected in the EU.

The Right To Be Forgotten

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward L. Carter
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Search Engines ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Concept ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

The right to be forgotten is an emerging legal concept allowing individuals control over their online identities by demanding that Internet search engines remove certain results. The right has been supported by the European Court of Justice, some judges in Argentina, and data-protection regulators in several European countries, among others. The right is primarily grounded in notions of privacy and data protection but also relates to intellectual property, reputation, and right of publicity. Scholars and courts cite, as an intellectual if not legal root for the right to be forgotten, the legal principle that convicted criminals whose sentences are completed should not continually be publicly linked with their crimes. Critics contend that the right to be forgotten stands in conflict with freedom of expression and can lead to revisionist history. Scholars and others in the southern cone of South America, in particular, have decried the right to be forgotten because it could allow perpetrators of mass human rights abuses to cover up or obscure their atrocities. On the other hand, those in favor of the right to be forgotten say that digital technology preserves memory unnaturally and can impede forgiveness and individual progress. The right to be forgotten debate is far from resolved and poses difficult questions about access to, and control of, large amounts of digital information across national borders. Given the global nature of the Internet and the ubiquity of certain powerful search engines, the questions at issue are universal, but solutions thus far have been piecemeal. Although a 2014 decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) garnered much attention, the right to be forgotten has been largely shaped by a 1995 European Union Directive on Data Protection. In 2016, the EU adopted a new General Data Protection Regulation that will take effect in 2018 and could have a major impact because it contains an explicit right to be forgotten (also called right to erasure). The new regulation does not focus on the theoretical or philosophical justification for a right to be forgotten, and it appears likely the debate over the right in the EU and beyond will not be resolved even when the new rule takes effect.

Trade Union Liability for ‘EU-Unlawful’ Collective Action

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Malmberg
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Trade Union ◽  
Trade Unions ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Collective Actions ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
Alternative Understanding ◽  
The Eu

The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has made it clear that collective action taken by trade unions under certain circumstances might violate the freedom of services and the right of establishment under the Treaty (Articles 49 and 56 TFEU). However, the Court has not addressed the issue of which remedies are to be available against a trade union arranging such an ‘EU-unlawful’ collective action. This question was dealt with by the Swedish Labour Court (Arbetsdomstolen) in its final judgment in December 2009. The article discusses this judgment and presents an alternative understanding of the EU law requirements concerning remedies for EU-unlawful collective actions.

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