The African Court of Justice and Human Rights: A Judicial Curate’s Egg

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 383-449 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gino J Naldi ◽  
Konstantinos D. Magliveras

The present article analyzes the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, the proposed “main judicial organ of the African Union”. The African Court of Justice and Human Rights is meant to replace the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights and would therefore constitute a unique international judicial body combining the jurisdiction of the judicial organ of an intergovernmental organization with the jurisdiction of a regional human rights court. It shares features of the International Court of Justice and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In a highly contentious move detrimental to the role of the International Criminal Court, it is currently proposed to extend its jurisdiction over international crimes, the definition of which goes much further than that currently accepted by the international community, raising the prospect of conflicting obligations. The Court’s governing instruments are too ambitious and contain some significant flaws and the case for doing away with the now operational African Court of Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights seems unconvincing. Even though the Court has not yet been established, its structure and mandate do pose many challenging questions that deserve to be thoroughly investigated by drawing comparisons with the existing similar judicial organs in other international organizations.

Author(s):  
Darryl Robinson

SummaryIn the last decade, the human rights accountability movement has made remarkable inroads into the classical law of immunities. The developments strike a new equilibrium between the need to promote accountability and the need to protect international discourse. These developments form a coherent picture if one looks to the underlying rationales of these areas of law. Immunities ratione materiae, enjoyed by current and former officials, protect official functions on behalf of a state. The landmark Pinochet decision affirmed that official functions could not include the commission of international crimes condemned by international law. Conversely, immunity ratione personae flows from a different rationale. This form of immunity protects only certain high officials representing their state and only during office and facilitates official visits by precluding arrest on any grounds. The International Court of Justice Yerodia decision and other developments confirm that this immunity remains absolute, irrespective of the conduct alleged. However, even this absolute immunity may be relinquished through Security Council enforcement action or acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.


2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 385-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manisuli Ssenyonjo

On 9 January 2012 the African Union (AU) stated that it ‘shall oppose any ill-considered, self-serving decisions of the ICC [International Criminal Court] as well as any pretensions or double standards that become evident from the investigations, prosecutions and decisions by the ICC relating to situations in Africa’. These relate to the United Nations [UN] Security Council referrals (in Darfur/Sudan and Libya) and the Prosecutor’s investigations proprio motu (in Kenya). This article considers the rise of the AU opposition to the ICC investigations and prosecutions in Africa directed against current African State leaders focusing on three issues. First, whether customary international law creates an exception to Head of State immunity when international courts, such as the ICC, seek a Head of State’s arrest for the commission of international crimes. Second, whether the International Court of Justice can decide on immunity of State officials sought by the ICC. Third, whether the AU should empower the African Court of Justice and Human Rights with the jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for international crimes committed in Africa.


2021 ◽  
pp. 375-389
Author(s):  
Živorad Rašević

The paper analyses the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the lawsuit of Qatar against the United Arab Emirates on the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and its contribution to the development of anti-discrimination law. The motives and procedural actions of the parties, the reasoning of the Court, and the consequences of the judgment are analysed, using legal, social, and philosophical methodologies. The research results in findings that the Court did not take into account the practice of human rights monitoring bodies. Instead, the Court teleologically interpreted the Convention and found that the substantive scope of the Convention does not cover nationality as a protected ground. This judgment does not give rise to optimism regarding further articulation and systematization of anti-discrimination law. Parochialism will certainly continue to prevail in the definition of the concept, protected grounds and relations, and purposes of protection against discrimination. Nevertheless, this judgment is useful in a few aspects: for the assessment of procedural prospects in the future similar proceedings, for understanding the scope of the Convention, and, in particular, for the understanding of various meanings of the notion of nationality within different contexts.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 513-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS

AbstractThe Special Tribunal for Lebanon is the latest international criminal tribunal to be established by the United Nations. Similar in many respects to the earlier institutions – for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone – it stands alone in the fact that its subject-matter jurisdiction does not contain any international crimes. It is thus international in some respects, but it is arguably not an international criminal tribunal in the sense that was intended by the International Court of Justice in the Yerodia case. The drafting history of the Statute of the Special Tribunal is examined with a view to determining whether the new court should treat sovereign immunity in the same manner as the other three UN criminal tribunals.


Author(s):  
Nicholas J. Diamond ◽  
Kabir A. N. Duggal

Abstract Individuals have long occupied a precarious position within international law. Historically, conceived as the relation between states, international law rarely saw a need to consider individual claims; it was, instead, the role of states to bring claims on behalf of their nationals. As international law has become increasingly fragmented, however, globalization has thrust the individual onto the international legal plane. Within this landscape, we briefly consider individuals’ claims across three separate international regimes: (i) the International Court of Justice, (ii) investment treaties, and (iii) the World Trade Organization. We find that barriers for individuals’ recognition as rights holders persist across each. First, jurisdictional barriers remain fundamentally problematic for recognizing individuals’ claims. Second, the longstanding focus on treaty interpretation techniques has yielded little, if any, demonstrable impact on recognizing individuals’ rights. Third, mere reliance on reflecting human rights values, rather than specific and concrete structural reforms, has proven incompatible with realizing individuals’ rights within these three systems. Individuals qua rights holders have, rather acutely, recently experienced deeply troubling human rights violations on several fronts. Fundamentally, international law must protect human rights. This moment invites us to consider the systems on the international legal plane for individuals to seek such remedy and what barriers must be addressed to further such efforts.


Author(s):  
Sievers Loraine ◽  
Daws Sam

This chapter explores the partnerships between the Security Council and other international entities. In particular, the Council shares a progressive and multi-faceted relationship with the General Assembly, which possesses certain similar but distinct powers from that of the Council and establishes the broad outlines for how these two bodies interact with each other. The Security Council also works in tandem with the Economic and Social Council; the Trusteeship Council; the International Court of Justice; the agencies, funds, and programmes of the United Nations; the International Atomic Energy Agency; the International Criminal Court; special courts, tribunals, and investigative panels; and regional and subregional organizations, such as the African Union, the European Union, among others.


Author(s):  
M. Antonovych

The article deals with the definition of the concept of intent to commit genocide in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in the document “Elements of Crimes” adopted by the International Criminal Court, as well as in decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, International Criminal Court and in practice of the International Court of Justice. The author reveals constitutive elements of the concept of intent to commit genocide: intent to be engaged in the conduct which would cause destructive consequences for a national, ethnic, religious or racial group as such; intent to reach these consequences; or awareness that they will occur as a result of this conduct in the ordinary course of events. The author indicates slightly different approaches of the international criminal tribunals and courts to knowledge of the consequences as a result of destruction of a group. It is stated that the intent should not necessarily be fixed in documents or formulated in public oral speeches, but may also be certified by facts and circumstances of a crime. The author analyzes different circumstances which may evidence the intent to commit genocide. Special attention is paid to differentiation between individual and collective intent to commit genocide. The author examines the intent to commit genocide in the Holodomor organized against the Ukrainian national and ethnic group.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 79-82
Author(s):  
Maria Flores

I first became involved with international law while I was at university. After graduating, I decided to teach public international law. As an undergraduate, I particularly enjoyed this branch of study. I was attracted to it because it helped me to understand the problems, challenges, and breakthroughs in the field of international relations on a global scale. Therefore, after facing a competitive entry process, I joined the international law department of the Universidad de la República. It was a small department, but the university had produced some well-known scholars like Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, who became a judge at the International Court of Justice, and Hector Gross Espiell, who served as a judge at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.


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