scholarly journals Consequentializing Moral Dilemmas

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jussi Suikkanen

The aim of the consequentializing project is to show that, for every plausible ethical theory, there is a version of consequentialism that is extensionally equivalent to it. One challenge this project faces is that there are common-sense ethical theories that posit moral dilemmas. There has been some speculation about how the consequentializers should react to these theories, but so far there has not been a systematic treatment of the topic. In this article, I show that there are at least five ways in which we can construct versions of consequentialism that are extensionally equivalent to the ethical theories that contain moral dilemmas. I argue that all these consequentializing strategies face a dilemma: either they must posit moral dilemmas in unintuitive cases or they must rely on unsupported assumptions about value, permissions, requirements, or options. I also consider this result’s consequences for the consequentializing project.

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-289
Author(s):  
Jussi Suikkanen

The aim of the consequentializing project is to show that, for every plausible ethical theory, there is a version of consequentialism that is extensionally equivalent to it. One challenge this project faces is that there are common-sense ethical theories that posit moral dilemmas. There has been some speculation about how the consequentializers should react to these theories, but so far there has not been a systematic treatment of the topic. In this article, I show that there are at least five ways in which we can construct versions of consequentialism that are extensionally equivalent to the ethical theories that contain moral dilemmas. I argue that all these consequentializing strategies face a dilemma: either they must posit moral dilemmas in unintuitive cases or they must rely on unsupported assumptions about value, permissions, requirements, or options. I also consider this result’s consequences for the consequentializing project.


Author(s):  
James DiGiovanna

Enhancement and AI create moral dilemmas not envisaged in standard ethical theories. Some of this stems from the increased malleability of personal identity that this technology affords: an artificial being can instantly alter its memory, preferences, and moral character. If a self can, at will, jettison essential identity-giving characteristics, how are we to rely upon, befriend, or judge it? Moral problems will stem from the fact that such beings are para-persons: they meet all the standard requirements of personhood (self-awareness, agency, intentional states, second-order desires, etc.) but have an additional ability—the capacity for instant change—that disqualifies them from ordinary personal identity. In order to rescue some responsibility assignments for para-persons, a fine-grained analysis of responsibility-bearing parts of selves and the persistence conditions of these parts is proposed and recommended also for standard persons who undergo extreme change.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gordon

AbstractWhen libertarian political philosophy attracted wide public notice in the 1970s, a common view was that the distinctive individual rights advocated in libertarian theory required grounding in a theory of ethics. Recently, this view has come under challenge. It has been argued that resort to such grounding in ethical theory is unneeded. An appeal to common sense intuitions suffices to justify libertarianism. First, a brief account of libertarianism will be presented. Then, some examples of the older, pro-grounding position will be discussed. Then, the principal defense of the newer view, Michael Huemer’s The Problem of Political Authority, will be examined. This discussion constitutes the substance of the present paper. The principal contention of the present article will be that the argument to libertarianism from intuitions does not succeed. In conclusion, it will be suggested that a return to the earlier, grounding view is indicated for philosophers who wish to defend libertarianism.


2013 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Timmermann

Abstract: This paper explores the possibility of moral conflict in Kant’s ethics. An analysis of the only explicit discussion of the topic in his published writings confirms that there is no room for genuine moral dilemmas. Conflict is limited to nonconclusive ‘grounds’ of obligation. They arise only in the sphere of ethical duty and, though defeasible, ought to be construed as the result of valid arguments an agent correctly judges to apply in the situation at hand. While it is difficult to determine in theory what makes some of them stronger than others, these ‘grounds’ can account for practical residue in conflict cases and for a plausible form of agent regret. The principle that ‘ought implies can’ survives intact.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-217
Author(s):  
David Sidorsky

The search for moral objectivity has been constant throughout the history of philosophy, although interpretations of the nature and scope of objectivity have varied. One aim of the pursuit of moral objectivity has been the demonstration of what may be termed its epistemological thesis, that is, the claim that the truth of assertions of the goodness or rightness of moral acts is as legitimate, reliable, or valid as the truth of assertions involving other forms of human knowledge, such as common sense, practical expertise, science, or mathematics. Another aim of the quest for moral objectivity may be termed its pragmatic formulation; this refers to the development of a method or procedure that will mediate among conflicting moral views in order to realize a convergence or justified agreement about warranted or true moral conclusions. In the ethical theories of Aristotle, David Hume, and John Dewey, theories that represent three of the four variants of ethical naturalism (defined below) that are surveyed in this essay, the epistemological thesis and the pragmatic formulation are integrated or combined. The distinction between these two elements is significant for the present essay, however, since I want to show that linguistic naturalism, the fourth variant I shall examine, has provided a demonstration of the epistemological thesis about moral knowledge, even if the pragmatic formulation has not been successfully realized.


Author(s):  
Mark Fedyk

This chapter rearticulates many of the major ideas and arguments in the proceeding chapters. But it also connects one of the primary conclusions of the book up with a debate in ethics over what the structure and form of ethical theories should look like. The proceeding chapters show that one possible form that an ethical theory can take is a loose confederacies of different models and frameworks that apply to different levels of social and psychological organization.


Author(s):  
T B Mepham

Few people question the basis of their moral viewpoints, yet if science is to be applied ethically it is necessary to subject these viewpoints to rational analysis. The paper provides an overview of prominent ethical theories (deontological and consequentalist) and their impact on novel and prospective animal biotechnologies. These theories are applied to the principles of: autonomy, justice, nonmaleficence and beneficence in relation to the interests of animals, the environment and humans.Deontological approaches include ‘rights’-based theories (often derived intuitively or from scriptural sources) and ‘contractualist’ theories, dependent on an ‘unwritten contract’ between rational beings to ensure fairness. For consequentialists (eg utilitarians), it is the outcome of actions that determines their ethical value. Few people, consciously or unconsciously, consistently employ a single ethical theory, but there is often much concordance between actions based on the different theories. Except for some intuitionists, ethicists emphasise the role of rationality in ethical theory; for even though intuition is an important element, many consider that universalizability of ethical theories entails the establishment of a ‘reflective equilibrium’


Utilitas ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
PEKKA VÄYRYNEN

Let the Guidance Constraint be the following norm for evaluating ethical theories: Other things being at least roughly equal, ethical theories are better to the extent that they provide adequate moral guidance. I offer an account of why ethical theories are subject to the Guidance Constraint, if indeed they are. We can explain central facts about adequate moral guidance, and their relevance to ethical theory, by appealing to certain forms of autonomy and fairness. This explanation is better than explanations that feature versions of the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In closing, I address the objection that my account is questionable because it makes ethical theories subject not merely to purely theoretical but also to morally substantive norms.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-91
Author(s):  
Miloš Marković ◽  
Božo Bokan

AbstractThis study tested an instrument entitled “Physical Culture and Ethics” which consisted of 44 statements to which subjects responded on a Likert-type five-point scale. The statements reflected the ethical theories of Aristotle (14 statements), Kant (14 statements) and Mill (16 statements).The hypothetical model of ethical theories was verified on a sample of 163 students at the Faculty of Sport and Physical Education in Belgrade (119 male students and 44 female students), attending all years of study (n1=22, n2=34, n3=36, n4=48, n5=23). We hypothesized that students would display greater maturity in terms of education and reaffirm their positions towards ethical issues in physical culture as they progressed in their studies, and also that the male and the female students had their specific moral outlooks on the reality of physical culture.When comparing the basic statistical indicators of students’ responses to statements reflecting the ethical theories (Aristotle, Kant, Mill) against the year of study students were in (mean value and standard deviation) – certain variation in values from the first to the fifth year of study was observed, thus confirming the hypothesis.When comparing the basic statistical indicators of male and female students’ responses to statements reflecting the ethical theories (Aristotle, Kant, Mill) – female students’ results were better on all scales, and Aristotle’s ethical theory showed a statistical significance, thus confirming the second hypothesis as well.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Albert Charlton Everett ◽  
Guy Kahane

Sacrificial moral dilemmas are widely used to investigate when, how, and why people make judgments that are consistent with utilitarianism. But to what extent can responses to sacrificial dilemmas shed light on utilitarian decision making? We consider two key questions: First, how meaningful is the relationship between responses to sacrificial dilemmas and what is distinctive of a utilitarian approach to morality? Second, to what extent do findings about sacrificial dilemmas generalise to other moral contexts where there is tension between utilitarianism and common-sense intuitions? We argue that sacrificial dilemmas only capture one point of conflict between utilitarianism and common-sense morality, and new paradigms are needed to investigate other key aspects of utilitarianism, such as its radical impartiality


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