Problems and Challenges of the echr’s Extraterritorial Application to Law-Enforcement Operations at Sea

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 445-473
Author(s):  
Marta Szuniewicz

Recently the European Court of Human Rights has been challenged with questions concerning the scope of the State’s responsibility for violations of human rights that occurred on international waters. The complaints concern the international fight on illicit drug trafficking, piracy and illegal immigration. The analysed case law provides that occurrences on international waters constitute cases of extraterritorial jurisdiction and may engage responsibility of the State under the echr in the events that take place on board a vessel flying its flag (jurisdiction de iure) and in case of occurrences that happen on board foreign vessels, if the State exercises an effective control over a ship or its crew (jurisdiction de facto). Unfortunately, the Court’s findings prove difficult to follow in a few points as the judges applied the Strasboaurg standard too strictly, irrespective of the practical challenges of maritime law-enforcement operations and existing institutions of the law of the sea.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Nedim Begović

Abstract The article analyses the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on accommodation of Islamic observances in the workplace. The author argues that the Court has not hitherto provided adequate incentives to the states party to the European Convention on Human Rights to accommodate the religious needs of Muslim employees in the workplace. Given this finding, the author proposes that the accommodation of Islam in the workplace should, as a matter of priority, be provided within a national legal framework. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, this could be achieved through an instrument of contracting agreement between the state and the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-101
Author(s):  
Dmitry Kuznetsov

When establishing human rights violations committed by the state, should it be violation of internationally protected rights or constitutional rights, the violator is obliged to compensate for the harm caused. In the meantime, neither international sources, nor national legal acts and case law answer the question whether the obligation to compensate is exhausted by the compensation awarded in accordance with a decision of an international judicial body or such a payment has punitive nature, and the state keeps the obligation to compensate the damage within the frameworks of national proceedings. Following the first part of opening remarks the second part of the article studies universal international law approach towards the state obligation to compensate for human rights violations, it reviews positions of the International Court of Justice, the model established in international customary law of international responsibility. The third part discusses the compensation mechanism of the European Court of Human Rights and a number of cases where the Russian Federation was the respondent state. The forth part considers national regulation of the Council of Europe states and case law thereof. The author argues that the established international case law in respect of awarding compensations for human rights violations is too restrictive – it does not take into account a complex nature of this phenomenon which includes both correction of the individual applicant situation (restitution of the pre-existed situation) and prevention of similar situations in the future. It is concluded that awarding the compensation by an international body primarily constitutes a measure of international responsibility whereas consideration by a national court is a more effective means of restitution of the applicants rights and that the national court shall not deny consideration of applicants claims due to the fact that they have already been awarded compensation by the international judicial body including the European Court of Human Rights.


The article is devoted to the study of such sources of electoral law in Ukraine as the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the first Protocol to the Convention and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. The legal nature of these international sources of suffrage in Ukraine is considered. Attention is drawn to the peculiarities of the wording of the right to free election in Article 3 the first Protocol to the Convention. The peculiarities of the application of the above article by the European Court of Human Rights are disclosed. The importance the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of suffrage in Ukraine is emphasized. This assertion is justified by the fact that the rules of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols are of a general and abstract nature and are interpreted and filled with real meaning in judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, which are of precedent nature. A number of legal positions of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the obligation of the state to organize and hold democratic elections, enshrined in the specific decisions of this international judicial institution, have been analyzed. In the article were covered such legal positions as: the possibility of limiting the suffrage of citizens, provided that such conditions do not interfere with the free expression of the people's opinion on the election of the legislative body; evaluation of the electoral legislation in the light of the political development of the country, taking into account national characteristics; wide discretion of the state in the choice of the electoral system, which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people, etc. There are a number of unresolved issues regarding the application of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in judicial and administrative practice in Ukraine, one of which is the possible conflict between the case-law of the Court and the rules of Ukrainian law. It is proposed to resolve this conflict at the legislative level. The conclusions focus on the peculiarities of the legal nature of these sources of suffrage in Ukraine. KEY WORDS: sources of suffrage, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, right to free elections.


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-369
Author(s):  
Veronika Fikfak

AbstractThis article studies how the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, the Court) adjusts damages for human rights violations. The article empirically analyses 13 years of ECtHR’s case law in relation to Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (torture, inhuman and degrading treatment), and 5 (arbitrary detention) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, the Convention). The goal is to understand whether the statements made by the Court about the aims pursued through just satisfaction are confirmed in practice. Through an empirical quantitative study relating to non-pecuniary damages, the article analyses the practice of the Court in awarding non-pecuniary damages for human rights violations and compares it to the competing visions of the ECtHR’s function. In particular, I am interested in determining whether just satisfaction is aimed at redressing the suffering of the victim, her circumstances and vulnerability, or whether the focus is more on the respondent state, its conduct and its past human rights record. The answers to these questions will contribute to the debate whether the ECtHR’s role is one of delivering ‘individual justice’ or whether the Court is – as an international court enforcing an international treaty – focused on the ‘state’.


2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaka Kukavica ◽  
Veronika Fikfak

AFTER McCann and Others v the United Kingdom (Application no. 18984/91) (1995) ECHR 31, in which the European Court of Human Rights first read into Article 2 the procedural obligation of effective investigation, Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç (Application no. 24014/05), 14 April 2015, is perhaps one the most interesting decisions on the nature of the obligation to conduct an effective investigation in the Court's recent history. The Court, through its case law, has clarified that, when individuals have been killed by the state or a private party, the Contracting Parties have to undertake an investigation under Article 2, which has to be independent, adequate, prompt, and publicly scrutinised. It has been unclear, however, whether the element of independence had to meet criteria similar to those under Article 6, which guarantees a fair trial, or whether a lower standard was sufficient for an investigation to be considered effective in the context of Article 2. The Strasbourg court went back and forth on the issue (even adopting an absolutist approach in Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom (Application no. 55721/07) (2011) ECHR 1093) and it was not until Mustafa Tunç that the issue of independence under Article 2 was addressed head-on.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (6(75)) ◽  
pp. 52-59
Author(s):  
Taisa Tomlyak

The article considers the legal positions of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter - Сourt). In particular, the decision of the Сourt in cases of legality of interference with property rights was examined in the light of the provisions of Protocol № 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter Protocol №1 to the Convention). Also, the article specifies the principles that, in the opinion of the Сourt, the state must adhere to when interfering in property rights. In addition, it is established that the concept of "property" within the meaning of Part 1 of Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention has an independent meaning. That is, this concept cannot depend on its legal classification in national law and cannot be limited to ownership of things. Also, we considered a broad understanding in the practice of the Сourt "interests of society" in the application of measures of deprivation of property rights and ensuring a proportional relationship between the goal and the means used. In addition, the relationship between Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and other articles of the Convention is considered, as issues arising in connection with the use of one's "property" may also relate to other articles of the Convention. Some decisions of the Court of Human Rights and its interpretation of the concepts of "property", "property" and "property rights" are analyzed.


2021 ◽  
pp. 39-54
Author(s):  
Mónika Márton

A pandemic can provide a textbook example for the restrictions of fundamental rights and freedoms. Romania has decided to derogate from the application of the European Convention on Human Rights during the state of emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The questions discussed in this paper are whether the derogation of Romania fulfils the criteria established by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. If the answer is affirmative: does it have any effect on the inherent limitations on the freedom of expression as stated in art. 10 of ECHR?


2020 ◽  
pp. 9-32
Author(s):  
Tadeusz Jasudowicz

The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in tax matters has developed in three dimensions. Firstly, it involved Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention with reference to “the payment of taxes”, viewed, notwithstanding the State’s wide margin of appreciation, in the light of the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions. Secondly, from the perspective of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Convention, tax disputes can be covered by the guarantees of a fair trial where the proceedings and sanctions, for example, concerning tax surcharges, are qualified in their autonomous Convention meaning as a “criminal charge” against the taxpayer. Moreover, despite its traditional case-law, in the last years the Court has seemed to allow the possibility of qualifying tax disputes as concerning “civilrights and obligations” Thirdly, on the basis of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, the Court has found violations of the prohibition “to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings” in the context of dual, i.e. tax (administrative) and penal, proceedings. The author critically assesses the Court judgment in the case of A. and B. v. Norway, in which the Court did not find a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. In the Norwegian case, the distinct administrative and penal proceedings were in fact merged, since the state introduced a system of integrated legal answers to taxpayers’ behavior. According to Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, expressing a dissenting opinion, the Court in this judgment wrongly changed its stance from pro persona to pro auctoritate, possibly forgetting that it is a court of humanrights, and not a pleader of raison d’Etat. Although the Court declared that it considers the Convention “as a whole”, and seeks to ensure the consistency of the Convention system and harmony of its provisions, it might have lost sight of ties existing between them. Taxpayers are also individual humansand have a title to human rights, thus tax disputes are those of a human rights nature. Understandably, the ECHR must persist as a Court of Human Rights.


2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-132
Author(s):  
Gabrijela Mihelčić ◽  
Maša Marochini Zrinski ◽  
Renata Šantek

The authors discuss and analyse case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the right to respect for home under Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and with respect the issue of proportionality. In the paper, the proportionality category was viewed as a criterion for securing protection and as a material precondition for deciding whether the State party's interference with the right to respect for home was proportionate. The cases in which the applicant's eviction occurred after national proceedings for the enforcement of mortgages were addressed. In this context, the genesis of the proportionality category was analysed, from the cases where the Court found it necessary to examine the proportionality to the cases where the Court did not consider the proportionality test necessary.


This article considers relevant science and law enforcement practice issues of state intervention’s legitimacy in the right to peaceful property enjoyment in criminal proceedings during property seizure. These issues are considered everywhere through international instruments’ prism, particularly the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR) and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and the ECtHR case-law. Based on the ECtHR case law, the authors analyze the conditions under which the state may interfere in exercising a protected right, often called criteria for intervention. Based on the fact restrictions are permissible if they are prescribed by law, necessary in a democratic society and pursue a legitimate goal, the authors consider these conditions through the lens of national law enforcement practices of Ukrainian criminal proceedings. The authors emphasize the relevance of these criteria of the legality of individual rights restriction in criminal proceedings since when applying for property seizure, the Ukrainian legislator requires investigating judges to consider reasonableness and restriction proportionality of property rights, and apply the least onerous seizure method, not suspend or excessively restrict a person’s lawful business activities, or other consequences significantly affecting others’ interests. Due to the amendment of the Ukrainian criminal procedure legislation, the practice is slowly approaching the European Court of Human Rights practice’s European standards. However, proper systematic, logical and consistent court decisions limiting the human right to peaceful property possession remain critical. Based on the study, the authors offer a model of logical reasoning, following which the investigating judges can correctly formulate the motivational part of the decision to satisfy or deny the request for property seizure. Particular attention is paid to the reasonableness, suitability, necessity, and proportionality of the means of restricting the right to peaceful enjoyment of the property and describes each of them.


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