The Dialectics of Objectivity

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guy Axtell
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Communities Of Inquiry

Abstract This paper develops under-recognized connections between moderate historicist methodology and character (or virtue) epistemology, and goes on to argue that their combination supports a “dialectical” conception of objectivity. Considerations stemming from underdetermination problems motivate our claim that historicism requires agent-focused rather than merely belief-focused epistemology; embracing this point helps historicists avoid the charge of relativism. Considerations stemming from the genealogy of epistemic virtue concepts motivate our claim that character epistemologies are strengthened by moderate historicism about the epistemic virtues and values at work in communities of inquiry; embracing this point helps character epistemologists avoid the charge of objectivism.

An Epistemology for Target Centred Virtue Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 297-318
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Social Factors ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Virtuous Agent ◽  
Ethical Virtue

This chapter provides an epistemology for virtue ethics—target-centred virtue epistemology, arguing that we all need the epistemic virtues rather than relying on the wisdom of a virtuous agent. It thus contrasts target-centred virtue epistemology with qualified agent virtue epistemology. Epistemic virtues are understood in terms of their epistemic targets rather than primarily in terms of virtuous epistemic motives. The chapter argues that virtue epistemology is a branch of virtue ethics, and that epistemic virtues should be understood as not isolated from ethical virtue but are instead ‘virtues proper’. It discusses too the evidential status of “moral intuitions” in relation to target-centred virtue epistemology, and deleterious social factors in the transmission of beliefs such as the network and contagion social epistemic models, in relation to personal epistemic virtue.

Extending Epistemic Virtue

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Battaly
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Extended Cognition ◽  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Virtue Responsibilism

What would happen if extended cognition (EC) and virtue-responsibilism (VR) were to meet? Are they compatible, or incompatible? Do they have projects in common? Would they, as it were, end their meeting early, or stick around but run out of things to say? Or, would they hit it off? This chapter suggests that VR and EC are not obviously incompatible, and that each might fruitfully contribute to the other. Although there has been an explosion of recent work at the intersection of virtue epistemology and EC, this work has focused almost exclusively on the reliabilist side of virtue epistemology. Little has been said about the intersection of VR and EC. This chapter takes initial steps toward filling that gap.

Epistemic Virtue of Wisdom and Evidentialism

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 196-208
Author(s):  
Kirill V. Karpov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
Primary Concern ◽  
Objective Knowledge ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Historical Case

My primary concern in this article is the connection between virtue epistemology and evidentialism. This possible connection is analyzed upon, firstly, the example of the intellectual virtue of wisdom, and, secondly, the historical case – Thomas Aquinas’ approach to virtue of wisdom as an intellectual disposition (habitus). I argue that it is possible to offer such an interpretation of ‘intellectual virtue’ that aligns with the peripatetic tradition broadly understood (to which the epistemology of virtues ascends), and on the basis of which an evidentialist theory of justification is offered. In the first part of the paper, I briefly present the main interpretations of virtue epistemology and evidentialism in the light of externalism/internalism debate. In the second part I discuss Aquinas’ understanding of intellectual virtue as a disposition (habitus). The main concern here are virtues of theoretical habitus – wisdom and (scientific) knowledge. I show that habitus in this case is understood in two ways: as an ability, inherent to human beings, and as objective knowledge. Thus, there are two understandings of wisdom – as a virtue and knowledge (scientia). Finally, in the concluding parts of the paper, I outline possible ways of solving presented in the first part challenges to evidentialism and internalism.

Clinical trials and the origins of pharmaceutical fraud: Parke, Davis & Company, virtue epistemology, and the history of the fundamental antagonism

2020 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 533-558
Author(s):  
Joseph M. Gabriel ◽  
Bennett Holman
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Trials ◽  
Pharmaceutical Industry ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Medical Science ◽  
Ethical Framework ◽  
Late Nineteenth Century ◽  
Laboratory Science ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
History Of ◽  
Origin Point

This paper describes one possible origin point for fraudulent behavior within the American pharmaceutical industry. We argue that during the late nineteenth century therapeutic reformers sought to promote both laboratory science and increasingly systematized forms of clinical experiment as a new basis for therapeutic knowledge. This process was intertwined with a transformation in the ethical framework in which medical science took place, one in which monopoly status was replaced by clinical utility as the primary arbiter of pharmaceutical legitimacy. This new framework fundamentally altered the set of epistemic virtues—a phrase we draw from the philosophical field of virtue epistemology—considered necessary to conduct reliable scientific inquiry regarding drugs. In doing so, it also made possible new forms of fraud in which newly emergent epistemic virtues were violated. To make this argument, we focus on the efforts of Francis E. Stewart and George S. Davis of Parke, Davis & Company. Therapeutic reformers within the pharmaceutical industry, such as Stewart and Davis, were an important part of the broader normative and epistemic transformation we describe in that they sought to promote laboratory science and systematized clinical trials toward the twin goals of improving pharmaceutical science and promoting their own commercial interests. Yet, as we suggest, Parke, Davis & Company also serves as an example of a company that violated the very norms that Stewart and Davis helped introduce. We thus seek to describe one possible origin point for the widespread fraudulent practices that now characterize the pharmaceutical industry. We also seek to describe an origin point for why we conceptualize such practices as fraudulent in the first place.

THE VIRTUE OF CURIOSITY

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lewis Ross
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

ABSTRACTA thriving project in contemporary epistemology concerns identifying and explicating the epistemic virtues. Although there is little sustained argument for this claim, a number of prominent sources suggest that curiosity is an epistemic virtue. In this paper, I provide an account of the virtue of curiosity. After arguing that virtuous curiosity must be appropriately discerning, timely and exacting, I then situate my account in relation to two broader questions for virtue responsibilists: What sort of motivations are required for epistemic virtue? And do epistemic virtues need to be reliable? I will sketch an account on which curiosity is only virtuous when rooted in a non-instrumental appreciation of epistemic goods, before arguing that curiosity can exhibit intellectual virtue irrespective of whether one is reliable in satisfying it.

Is “Education” a Thick Epistemic Concept?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Philosophy Of Education ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Philosophical Thinking ◽  
The Relationship

Is “education” a thick epistemic concept? The answer depends on the viability of the “thick/thin” distinction, as well as the degree to which education is an epistemic concept at all. I concentrate mainly on the latter, and argue that epistemological matters are central to education and our philosophical thinking about it. Insofar, education is indeed rightly thought of as an epistemic concept. In laying out education’s epistemological dimensions, I hope to clarify the degree to which it makes sense to regard the concept as “thick.” I also discuss the relationship between philosophy of education and virtue epistemology, as well as the sense in which being educated might itself be thought to be an epistemic virtue. Finally, I urge virtue epistemologists in particular, and epistemologists generally, to turn their attention to questions of education, to further both the philosophy of education and epistemology itself.

Intellectual Responsibility and Epistemological Theism

2021 ◽  
pp. 43-55
Author(s):  
Anastasia V. Ugleva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Divine Will ◽  
Human Ability ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Intellectual Responsibility ◽  
Supreme Being

One of the most interesting and widely discussed trends in modern epistemology is the so-called intellectual ethics, normative in its essence, centered around the concept of epistemic virtue, based on the idea of metaphysical anthropology, supplemented by elements of theology. The last consists in the idea of a certain “gift” to a person from the side of the Supreme Being, which is God – and this gift lies in the epistemic virtues inherent in the individual. This subject-centered concept emphasizes the intellectual and epistemic qualities of the cognizing subject that guarantee the truth of their beliefs. However, if is God the true guarantor of their “epistemic reliability” and the possibility of thus identifying justified belief with knowledge? The reliability of the cognitive human ability is seen in the realization of virtus as “perfection in being for the good”, in this case epistemic, the only guarantee of which can only be divine will. Is it so? This article attempts to answer this question in the course of reconstruction and analysis of the epistemological-theistic approach to defining one of the key epistemic virtues of the cognizing subject – intellectual responsibility.

scholarly journals Epistemic situationism and cognitive ability

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Empirical Psychology ◽  
The Social ◽  
Deliberate Effort ◽  
Over Time

Leading virtue epistemologists defend the view that knowledge must proceed from intellectual virtue and they understand virtues either as refned character traits cultivated by the agent over time through deliberate effort, or as reliable cognitive abilities. Philosophical situationists argue that results from empirical psychology should make us doubt that we have either sort of epistemic virtue, thereby discrediting virtue epistemology’s empirical adequacy. I evaluate this situationist challenge and outline a successor to virtue epistemology: abilism . Abilism delivers all the main benefts of virtue epistemology and is as empirically adequate as any theory in philosophy or the social sciences could hope to be.

scholarly journals Diversity, Social Inquiries, and Epistemic Virtues

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan E. Adler
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Social Agents ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Social Nature ◽  
The Social

A teoria das virtudes epistêmicas (VE) sustenta que as virtudes dos agentes, tais como a imparcialidade ou a permeabilidade intelectual, ao invés de crenças específicas, devem estar no centro da avaliação epistêmica, e que os indivíduos que possuem essas virtudes estão mais bem-posicionados epistemicamente do que se não as tivessem, ou, pior ainda, do que se tivessem os vícios correspondentes: o preconceito, o dogmatismo, ou a impermeabilidade intelectual. Eu argumento que a teoria VE padece de um grave defeito, porque fracassa ao se ajustar à natureza social dos questionamentos (epistêmicos) típicos. Esse e outros defeitos relacionados a esse infectam o paralelo que os teóricos VE traçam entre virtudes epistêmicas e morais. Ao prometer o incremento na proporção de crenças verdadeiras sobre crenças falsas, ou ignorância, as virtudes epistêmicas não podem desempenhar um papel paralelo àquele que Aristóteles reserva às virtudes morais ao prometer o incremento em nossa felicidade e no bem-estar da comunidade. A minha rota para essas críticas é feita das razões sobre por que os agentes (sociais) devem buscar a obtenção de seus objetivos morais e epistêmicos diferentemente nos papéis que atribuem às virtudes. PALAVRAS-CHAVES – Virtude epistêmica. Divisão de trabalho epistêmico. Diversidade. Conhecimento. Falibilidade. Virtude moral. ABSTRACT Epistemic Virtue (EV) theory holds that virtues of agents, like impartiality or openmindedness, rather than specific beliefs, should be at the center of epistemological evaluation, and that individuals with those virtues are better positioned epistemically than if they lacked them or, worse, if they instead had the corresponding vices: prejudice, dogmatism, or close-mindedness. I argue that EV theory suffers from a serious flaw because it fails to accommodate to the social nature of typical (epistemic) inquiries. This and related flaws infect the parallel that EV theorists allege between epistemic and moral virtues. In promising to improve our ratio of true beliefs to either false beliefs or ignorance, the epistemic virtues cannot play a roll parallel to that which Aristotle claims for the moral virtues in promising to increase our happiness and the well-being of the community. The path to these criticisms I introduce by offering reasons for why (social) agents should seek to realize their epistemic and moral goals very differently in the respective roles they accord to the virtues. KEY WORDS – Epistemic virtue. Division of epistemic labor. Diversity. Knowledge. Fallibility. Moral virtue.

Moral and Epistemic Virtues: A Thomistic and Analytical Perspective

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Roger Pouivet
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Saint Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Ethics Of Belief ◽  
Rule Based ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Analytical Perspective ◽  
The Ethics Of Belief

The article elaborates on the concept of ethics, noting the contrasting definitions of morality virtue-based and rule-based ethics. It highlights the related distinction between virtue epistemology and rule epistemology, stating that the main difference lies in the appreciation of the ethics of belief by either discipline. It also discusses the claim by philosopher Linda Zagzebski that epistemology is a branch of ethics, focusing on the contrary arguments including the perspectives of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

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