What German Responsibility Means

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-24
Author(s):  
Hanns W. Maull

“Responsibility” has long been a key political concept in German foreign policy since 1949. It reflects the shadow cast by Germany over Europe during the first half of the last century, and therefore implies a determination to pursue, at home and abroad, policies that are diametrically opposed to those pursued by Berlin under Emperor Wilhelm ii and Nazi Germany. In today’s context, German foreign policy “responsibility” has to deal with the breakdown of the pan-European order of Paris. The article argues that Berlin against this background should assume a leadership role within the osce along three major lines: new initiatives to launch co-operative security policies; long-term energy co-operation; and co-operative efforts to enhance the very fragile foundations of governance throughout Eastern Europe.

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 421-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Bagger

The ‘Review2014’ project was announced by Frank-Walter Steinmeier on 17 December 2013, the very day of his return to the German Foreign Ministry for a second term as Foreign Minister after his first term from 2005-2009. He presented the project’s conclusions under the heading ‘Crisis, Order, Europe’ on 25 February 2015, to the ministry’s staff and the wider public (see online at http: //www.review2014.de). A more detailed Action Plan aims to implement a set of specific institutional and procedural changes by summer 2016. The more ambitious goal of changes to the German Foreign Ministry’s culture will require a long-term effort.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 69-83
Author(s):  
Tomasz Kamiński ◽  
Marcin Frenkel

Russian intervention in Donbas and annexation of Crimea have triggered a fundamental revision of the EU policy towards Easter neighbourhood and Russia. The main goal of this paper is to develop discussion about the EU strategy towards Russia by presenting political concept named “The Giedroyc doctrine”, created by Polish intellectuals on exile, when Poland was under Soviet domination. Although created a few decades ago, some elements of this doctrine are still surprisingly relevant today and may contribute to contemporary European debate. In particular, we argue that strengthening the prosperity, stability and security in Eastern Europe is possible only when Russia transforms itself into a prosperous and democratic state. Autocratic and neo-imperial Russia undermines any major pro-Western political changes in the region. Therefore, successful transformation of Russia into stable, prosperous and democratic state should be included into the long-term vision of European politicians who intend to keep Europe secure. All political activities in the Eastern neighbourhood should be subordinated to this. It means that economic support for Ukraine and strengthening cooperation with this country should not be a goal itself. Westernization of Ukraine ought to be perceived only as a beginning of political transformation of the whole region.


Author(s):  
O. Pahiria

The article examines the place and the role of the Ukrainian question in the foreign policy of the Second Czecho-Slovak republic during the post-Munich period. The emergence of this question on the Czechoslovak diplomacy agenda in 1938-1939 was associated with the formation of autonomous Subcarpathian Ruthenia/Carpatho-Ukraine in the republic’s east, as well as with the active debate in international circles concerning Germany’s aggressive plans in Eastern Europe with the use of the Ukrainian card. Based on unknown documents from the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ archives, the article analyses Prague’s attitude towards prospects of the formation of a “Great Ukraine” on the platform of Carpatho-Ukraine. Czechoslovakian government’s position in the Ukrainian question was ambiguous and was shaped by several international factors: 1) Germany’s policy that used the Ukrainian question as a “bargaining chip” in its diplomacy; 2) the aspirations of Poland and Hungary to establish a common frontier in the Carpathians; 3) the position of Romania as Czecho-Slovakia’s key ally, which until some point was strategically interested in retaining the land corridor with Prague through Subcarpathian Ruthenia; 4) the “appeasement policy” of the West, which sought to divert Hitler’s aggression to the East with the use of the Ukrainian card. If earlier Prague looked with suspicion at the Ukrainian question as a certain threat to its territorial integrity due to the factor of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, in 1939 it perceived the Ukrainian card as a possible salvation for Czecho-Slovakia itself. At the beginning of 1939, Czernin Palace developed a few projects which suggested to use the Ukrainian question for the sake of saving the republic. This plan was backed by certain circles of British diplomacy, who had the interest to direct Germany to the East, towards Ukraine’s natural resources. Unfortunately, this period was too short to produce any long-term strategies of Prague on the Ukrainian question. Eventually, Hitler decided to deliver a different verdict to the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine by having passed it to Hungary.


Author(s):  
R. Kryvonos

The need of the scientific justification of the Ukrainian-German cooperation development in the complex globalized world requires studying the German political approaches within the framework of the European regional subsystem of international relations. The article generalizes the experience of the multilateralism use in the German foreign policy. Based on the performed analysis, it is concluded that multilateral approaches are effective in the long-term perspective and are not effective in the short run, especially in the cases of conflicts provoked by aggressive states.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Zgheib ◽  
Stephanie Lucas ◽  
Mathieu Mequinion ◽  
Odile Broux ◽  
Damien Leterme ◽  
...  

2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 73-81
Author(s):  
Karen Donfried

Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, Germany’s New Foreign Policy: Decision-Making in an Independent World (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001)Adrian Hyde-Price, Germany & European Order: Enlarging NATO and the EU (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000)Matthias Kaelberer, Money and Power in Europe: The Political Economy of European Monetary Cooperation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001)


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