scholarly journals The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Force: Building Legality?

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 191-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jutta Brunnée ◽  
Stephen Toope

AbstractThe rapid rise of the responsibility to protect provides us with a unique opportunity to consider the impact of a decade or so of determined norm entrepreneurship. The responsibility to protect has not yet become a binding norm of international law, and in this article we examine what factors are holding back or promoting this development. We draw on an 'interactional' account of international law, which focuses on three inter-locking elements. First, legal norms are social norms and as such they are connected to social practice – they must be grounded in shared understandings. Second, what distinguishes law from other types of social ordering is not so much form or pedigree, as adherence to specific criteria of legality. When norm creation meets these criteria and, third, is matched with norm application that also satisfies the legality requirements, international law will have legitimacy and generate a sense of commitment among those to whom it is addressed. After highlighting key steps in the norm building process so far, from the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty to the General Assembly debate in 2009, we offer a brief sketch of our theoretical framework, and employ it to examine the trajectory of the responsibility to protect norm, concluding with an assessment of its current and potential status as binding law. Although the responsibility to protect, including its potential for the collectively authorized use of force, is increasingly supported by globally shared understandings, the norm falls short on several of the legality criteria. Furthermore, given the inconsistent practice on protective use of force, no practice of legality can be said to have evolved. Proponents of the norm face a lot of hard work ahead.

Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter examines under what circumstances States may use armed force under customary international law and Arts 2(4) and 51 UN Charter. After noting that the use of armed force is generally prohibited and only limited to self-defence, and then only if the target State is under an armed attack, we show that several States have expanded the notion of armed attack. Besides self-defence, the Security Council may authorize the use of armed force through a process of collective security. Several examples of collective security are offered, as well as the ICJ’s position on what constitutes an armed attack. In recent years, the range of actors capable of undertaking an armed attack has included terrorists. Moreover, the development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is a significant achievement.


2010 ◽  
Vol 92 (877) ◽  
pp. 235-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha T. Godec

AbstractAdopting a feminist perspective, this paper analyses the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and its impact on women in recipient states, particularly with regard to sexual violence. By analysing the phenomenon of post-conflict trafficking in Kosovo following the NATO intervention, the author presents a challenge to the ‘feminist hawks’ who have called for military intervention in situations of systematic sexual violence. It is the author's contention that such intervention would be counterproductive for women's rights and thus constitute a disproportionate response to sexual violence in terms of the international law governing the use of force.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 591-628 ◽  
Author(s):  
Farhad Malekian

To attempt to speak coherently about the philosophy of love in conjunction with the law is an eccentric undertaking for an international lawyer. This work asserts the view that “love” plays a significant jurisprudential role in both the writing and philosophical interpretation of the law. It is a powerful norm. If the law is written and interpreted with love for human beings, the position of the use of force will be modified and concede its place to the approbation of equal justice and peace based on the primary value of human integrity. The work will be a comparative discussion, as the adherence of European states to both public international law and European Union norms suggests that neither need there be an inevitable divergence between adherence to both these and to Islamic legal norms. It brings into recognition the principle that the use of armed force for any purpose is a serious violation of the jurisprudence of law and runs contrary to the inherent integrity of humankind and the canon of love for justice.


Author(s):  
Igor' Olegovich Nadtochii ◽  
Oleg Alekseevich Novikov

The subject of this research is the phenomenon of economic diplomacy as an instrument of “soft law”, which is becoming widespread in the international relations of modern multipolar world. The object of this research is the international relations and the impact of international legal norms upon formation of their peculiarities. Attention is given to the differences between “soft” and “hard” international law, as well as international and “quasi-international” law. The author explores various historical aspects of international relations, within the framework of which are implemented certain legal mechanisms and instruments. Incompletion of evolution of the phenomenon of “soft law” at the present stage is observed. The conclusion is made that the task of “soft law” in international relations lies in the use of the established international legal toolset and correction of the global world order to the benefit of a certain country of group of countries. It is noted that that key criterion that determines “soft law” as a unique instrument of international relations and international law is the nature of the means that without the extensive use of non-legal instruments. At the same time, the authors claim that in a number of cases, the emergence of legal mechanisms is the result of continuous application of “soft law”.


Author(s):  
Nicole Scicluna

This chapter explores the justness, legitimacy, and legality of war. While 1945 was a key turning point in the codification of jus ad bellum (i.e. international law on the use of force), that framework did not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, it was the product of historical political contingencies that meant that codification of the laws of war was contemporaneous, both geographically and temporally, with the solidification of the norms of sovereign nation-statehood and territorial integrity. The chapter focuses on the UN Charter regime and how it has shaped the politics of war since 1945. Importantly, the Charter establishes a general prohibition on the use of force in international relations. It also grants two exceptions to the prohibition: actions undertaken with Security Council authorization and actions taken in self-defence. Today, many of the most serious challenges to the Charter regime concern the definition and outer limits of the concept of self-defence. Another set of challenges to the Charter regime concerns the contested concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’. The chapter then looks at the development of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine.


2009 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 53-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Goodman

AbstractAccording to a bedrock principle of international law, the rules regulating the recourse to war and the rules regulating conduct during war must be kept conceptually and legally distinct. The purported independence of the two domains – the ‘separation principle’ – remains unstable despite its historic pedigree. This essay explores recent developments that threaten to erode the separation. The author analyzes, in particular, doctrinal innovations that result in the regulation of the recourse to war through alterations of jus in bello. International and national institutions have incentivized states to pursue particular paths to war by tailoring the rules that regulate conduct in armed conflict. Some warpaths are accordingly rewarded, and others are penalized. The article then explores potential consequences, first, on state behavior involving the use of force and, second, on state behavior involving the conduct of warfare. One significant conclusion is that these recent developments channel state behavior and justifications for using force toward security-based and strategic rationales. These efforts – whether intended or not – risk suppressing ‘desirable wars’ and inspiring ‘undesirable wars.’ These recent developments also undercut humanitarian protections by undermining the mechanisms for compliance with legal norms on the battlefield.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (59) ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
Henrique Jerônimo Bezerra MARCOS ◽  
Gustavo Rabay GUERRA

ABSTRACT Objective: The paper presents a legal analysis of R2P in light of contemporary international law. It questions whether R2P is lawful as a just war (jus bellum justum) doctrine under international law, specifically under the general prohibition for the use of force pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations. The paper first analyzes the just war doctrine in light of international law; thereafter, there is a study of the legal framework for the use of force in the United Nations Charter; and, in a third step, the study of the R2P in legal light as a just war doctrine. Methodology: The research is executed through a deductive approach, its scientific objective is exploratory, and its research technique is a bibliographical and documentary survey. The methodological limit is in a legal approach of the subject from a normative perspective, focused on the legal validity of the institute under international law. Results: It is concluded from the study that R2P has legal flaws and does not stand against United Nations Charter regulation on the usage of force, notably the norm that states that the use of force in international relations is an exclusive responsibility of the United Nations Security Council. Contributions: The study shows its pertinence as an endeavor into a strictly legal analysis of a complex and highly political subject of humanitarian interventions. Keywords: Responsibility to protect; humanitarian intervention; just war doctrine; United Nations Security Council. RESUMO Objetivo: O artigo apresenta uma análise jurídica da R2P à luz do Direito Internacional contemporâneo; questiona se a R2P é juridicamente válida como uma doutrina de guerra justa (jus bellum justum) sob o Direito Internacional, especificamente à luz da proibição geral de uso da força de acordo com a Carta das Nações Unidas. Para tanto, o artigo analisa a doutrina da guerra justa à luz do Direito Internacional; em seguida, estuda o marco legal para o uso da força na Carta da ONU; e, em terceiro lugar, estuda a R2P como uma doutrina de guerra justa. Metodologia:A pesquisa é executada através de abordagem dedutiva, seu objetivo científico é exploratório e sua técnica de pesquisa é bibliográfica e documental. O limite metodologia é uma abordagem legal do seu objeto em uma perspectiva normativa com foco na validade legal do instituto à luz do Direito Internacional.Resultados: Conclui-se do estudo que a R2P tem falhas jurídicas e não se coaduna com a normativa da Carta das Nações Unidas sobre o uso da força, notadamente a norma que estabelece que o uso da força nas relações internacionais é uma responsabilidade quase exclusiva do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas. Contribuições: O estudo mostra sua pertinência por se tratar de análise estritamente legal de um assunto complexo e altamente político que são as intervenções humanitárias. Palavras-chave: Responsabilidade de proteger; intervenção humanitária; doutrina da guerra justa; Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas.


10.12737/3468 ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (5) ◽  
pp. 117-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Кира Сазонова ◽  
Kira Sazonova

The aims and goals of war have drastically changed during the recent decades. The prohibition of the use of force fixed in the Charter of the United Nations became a real challenge to many states. Nevertheless, we observe regular use of force in international relations. Though "classic" interstate wars became rather rare, the states continue to solve their political problems by exploiting the armed forces. In these circumstances it is problematic to explain the use of force from the legal point. That is why we talk so much about "preventive self-defence", "humanitarian intervention", "the responsibility to protect" and some other controversial concepts. One of the most disputable among them is a "just war" concept, which has practically not been analyzed in our domestic doctrine. However, the western school of international law is actively implementing precisely the legal dimension of the "just war" concept. Of course, the concept itself is extremely political, but the consequences of its practical implementation may have a great impact on contemporary international law, as it tries to legitimize the use of force in circumvention of the Charter of the United Nations. Because of the huge importance of the question, the analysis of the concept seems extremely actual.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Shaffer ◽  
Daniel Bodansky

AbstractWhen we speak of transnational environmental law and legal process, we are concerned with the migration and impact of legal norms, rules and models across borders. Such migration can occur through the mediation of international law and institutions, or through the impact of unilateral legal developments in one jurisdiction that affect behaviour in others. The paper discusses the importance of assessing transnational environmental law in light of the constraints facing consent-based international environmental law, examines the trade-offs between transnational and international environmental law from the perspective of legitimacy, and concludes by discussing the important but delicate relation of international law to transnational environmental law as both a check and a consolidator. International law should guard against the self-serving unilateral use of transnational environmental law, but it should do so in a way that preserves (and does not shut off) the dynamic, responsive character of the transnational environmental law process. Otherwise international law itself will be delegitimized.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-232
Author(s):  
Morgan Riley

The United Nations’ ability to coercively intervene to prevent or stop gross violations of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is weakened by its reliance on ad hoc mechanisms to secure troops. Although controversial, the deployment of private force to intervene in such circumstances is not prohibited by extant international law and may provide a pragmatic solution. Developing international legal norms can be interpreted to allow the United Nations to employ Private Military and Security Companies to protect vulnerable populations. Existing standards and guidelines for more conventional operations could be used to construct a robust framework of accountability for the United Nations, the corporations and their personnel. In turn, this could lead to the de facto international regulation of much of the global private military and security industry.


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