Targeting Child Soldiers: Striking a Balance between Humanity and Military Necessity

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Pack

Children are often the victims of armed conflict. One way in which international law seeks to protect them is by prohibiting their recruitment as child soldiers. Once recruited, however, the question arises as to whether they may or should be targeted and killed in the same manner as an adult in the same position. In this respect, there is relatively little discussion as to what the law is, and – aside from a 2013 think-piece by Frédéric Mégret – even less about what the law should be. This article attempts to kick-start that debate. A survey of international law confirms that child combatants and participants in hostilities may be targeted in the same manner as adults. Mégret’s proposed reform, whereby child soldiers would only be targetable while participating in hostilities, is problematic, but child soldiers should arguably be entitled to some form of additional protection. As such, this article proposes that child soldiers under the age of 12 only be targetable in self-defence, a reform which would better balance the competing considerations of humanity and military necessity.

Author(s):  
Mark Drumbl

This chapter addresses a particularly vulnerable population of children, namely, children associated with armed forces or armed groups. These children are colloquially known as child soldiers. This chapter begins by surveying the prevalence of child soldiering globally. It then sets out the considerable amount of international law that addresses children in armed conflict, in particular, the law that allocates responsibility for child soldiering and the law that sets out the responsibility of child soldiers for their conduct. The chapter identifies significant gaps between the law and the securing of positive outcomes for former child soldiers, notably when it comes to post-conflict reintegration. The protective impulse that envisions militarized youth as faultless passive victims may not always reflect how youthful fighters see themselves nor necessarily support an emancipatory and empowering vision of how international law should promote the rights of children.


2018 ◽  
pp. 223-258
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Ayres ◽  
Jeffrey S. Thurnher

Legitimacy is a critical factor in operations. States strive to maintain legitimacy of their operations for a variety of reasons. The essence of legitimacy on the battlefield is conducting operations in a manner that enables the fighting force to gain and maintain moral and legal authority. Whenever fighting takes place on a cluttered or complex battlespace, legitimacy is brought to the forefront as the potential for civilian harm is often increased. The desire for legitimacy is perhaps the main reason States voluntarily cede sovereignty to comply with international law. Adherence to the law of armed conflict is a necessary and key component of legitimacy. States, as the primary developers and adherents of international law, created the current law of armed conflict construct and are responsible for ensuring its continued viability. States understand that legitimacy and compliance with the law help shape ultimate victory in complex battlespaces. States further recognize that the law of armed conflict only functions properly when there is a delicate balance between the fundamental principles of humanity and military necessity. In recent years, however, States have been subject to attempts from external entities to tilt this balance in favor of humanitarian considerations and to reshape what are considered legitimate actions on complex battlefields. Simultaneously, States have confronted non-State actors that intentionally seek to flout international law and use it to undermine States’ abilities to respond. This chapter examines the importance of legitimacy to States and the reasons States seek to garner it through their military operations.


2012 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-201
Author(s):  
Vladan Joncic ◽  
Milos Petrovic

The fundamental question of international law of armed conflict is the question of military necessity principle in international law of armed conflict, ie. in international humanitarian law. Hearings on this issue is necessary because it is still the danger that the principle of recognition of the needs of military regulations and deceive the application of international law of armed conflict. That?s why the military needs to be seen as a permitted deviation from compliance with rules of war. Extreme, this concept has led to the emergence of the theory of the military. Its radical variant of the proceeds from the Maxims of German classical scholars of international law. The result of theoretical assumptions had the effect of limiting the acceptance of military necessity of the first codification of the day. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The heavily consider the military. In all the texts of international conventions is determined by military necessity, as a circumstance or set of circumstances which affect the duty of obeying the regulations of international law. In international law there is no general rule of military necessity as a basis or reason for justified violations of rules of international law of armed conflict. The rules of international law represent a compromise between the desire for a decoration rules of warfare and the need to ensure all the necessary tools that can lead to victory. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949. the military need to provide in terms of the principles of humanity. Set rules on military necessity in the Geneva Conventions give the right correction factor in the role of the law of armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions there is a degree of confusion in terminology, where the concept of military necessity needlessly allocated a number of synonyms. This is because the international law of armed conflict and emerged as a normative regulation of proportionality between the military needs) and general principles and humane principles.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Elliot Winter

Abstract Humanity and military necessity are often said to be ‘principles’ of the law of armed conflict (LOAC). However, for Dworkin, a concept must satisfy certain criteria in order to earn the status of a principle. First, principles carry different weightings to each other so that one may triumph in the event of a clash. Secondly, principles are capable of superseding positive rules so that coherence in the regime over which they preside is maintained. This article contends that neither criterion is satisfied by humanity or military necessity. Consequently, it argues that these concepts are not truly principles and that, instead, they are better viewed as ‘pillars’ of the LOAC.


1976 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 516-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Feinstein

Dean Acheson frankly reconfirmed the right of self-preservation, when he asserted, “…law simply does not deal with … questions of ultimate power—power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty…. No law can destroy the state creating the law. The survival of states is not a matter of law”. It is beyond the law.Given the existence of man's elementary loyalty to autonomous states, the necessity for using force springs from the need of states to depend fundamentally on self-help in order to guarantee their survival and welfare. This search for security in a system of politics without government, forces the state to be dependent upon military self-help.


Author(s):  
Joerg Kammerhofer

This chapter examines the resilience of the treaty, and perhaps also customary, law on self-defence since 2001. It first considers ‘resilience’ in the context of the jus ad bellum and how law can be resilient vis-à-vis changing circumstance, opinions, interpretation, and state practice. It then looks at the indicators for and against resilience by analysing post-2001 developments, paying particular attention to three areas: jurisprudence, scholarly literature in international law, and state and institutional practice. The chapter also explains what ‘resilience’ can and cannot be, and how the law and its perceptions change—or remain the same. Two avenues on the question of what is resilient are evaluated: either the norm or its interpretation (perception) change. Finally, the chapter considers a number of cases in which the International Court of Justice has made pronouncements on and partial clarifications of important aspects of the law on self-defence since 2001.


TheHandbookconsists of 32 Chapters in seven parts. Part I provides the historical background and sets out some of the contemporary challenges. Part II considers the relevant sources of international law. Part III describes the different legal regimes: land warfare, air warfare, maritime warfare, the law of occupation, the law applicable to peace operations, and the law of neutrality. Part IV introduces key concepts in international humanitarian law: weapons and the notion of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, the principle of distinction, proportionality, genocide and crimes against humanity, grave breaches and war crimes, internal armed conflict. Part V looks at key rights: the right to life, the prohibition on torture, the right to fair trial, economic, social and cultural rights, the protection of the environment, the protection of cultural property, and the human rights of the members of the armed forces. Part VI covers key issues such as: the use of force, terrorism, unlawful combatants, the application of human rights in times of armed conflict, forced migration, and issues of gender. Part VII deals with accountability issues including those related to private security companies, the need to focus on armed groups, as well as questions of state responsibility brought before national courts, and finally, the book addresses issues related to transitional justice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 303-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen

This article analyses the legal regulation of the use of force in international law in the context of three emerging Palestinian forms of struggle against Israeli occupation: the Knife Intifada, the disturbances at the border, and the launching of incendiary kites. It discusses what legal paradigms or concepts should regulate the type and level of force used in each situation – a question that is complicated by various dilemmas – and finally, appraises the Israel Defence Forces policies tailored in response. The article evaluates the applicability of two legal paradigms regulating the use of force in military operations – (i) the conduct of hostilities and (ii) law enforcement – as well as the concept of personal self-defence in international law and the escalation of force procedure. While the Knife Intifada clearly falls under the law enforcement paradigm, the disturbances at the border and the launching of incendiary kites raise more difficult legal questions. Categorising them under a paradigm of law enforcement is less straightforward, and may have undesirable ramifications for safeguarding humanitarian interests. The article argues that the use of force in the disturbances at the border and the incendiary kites cases should be regulated by the concept of self-defence and escalation of force procedure, and that the application of the self-defence concept should be adapted, mutatis mutandis, to situations of law enforcement and to situations of hostilities.


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