scholarly journals A Dilemma for the Scientific Realist

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Howard Sankey
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Evidential Basis ◽  
Apparent Conflict

This note poses a dilemma for scientific realism which stems from the apparent conflict between science and common sense. On the one hand, we may accept scientific realism and agree that there is a conflict between science and common sense. If we do this, we remove the evidential basis for science and have no reason to accept science in the first place. On the other hand, we may accept scientific realism and endorse common sense. If we do this, we must reject the conflict between science and common sense. The dilemma is to be resolved by distinguishing between basic common sense and widely held beliefs. Basic common sense survives the advance of science and may serve as the evidential basis for science.

Scientific realism and antirealism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Fine
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Empirical Adequacy ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Dual Character ◽  
Objects Of Knowledge ◽  
The One ◽  
Independent Existence

Traditionally, scientific realism asserts that the objects of scientific knowledge exist independently of the minds or acts of scientists and that scientific theories are true of that objective (mind-independent) world. The reference to knowledge points to the dual character of scientific realism. On the one hand it is a metaphysical (specifically, an ontological) doctrine, claiming the independent existence of certain entities. On the other hand it is an epistemological doctrine asserting that we can know what individuals exist and that we can find out the truth of the theories or laws that govern them. Opposed to scientific realism (hereafter just ‘realism’) are a variety of antirealisms, including phenomenalism and empiricism. Recently two others, instrumentalism and constructivism, have posed special challenges to realism. Instrumentalism regards the objects of knowledge pragmatically, as tools for various human purposes, and so takes reliability (or empirical adequacy) rather than truth as scientifically central. A version of this, fictionalism, contests the existence of many of the objects favoured by the realist and regards them as merely expedient means to useful ends. Constructivism maintains that scientific knowledge is socially constituted, that ‘facts’ are made by us. Thus it challenges the objectivity of knowledge, as the realist understands objectivity, and the independent existence that realism is after. Conventionalism, holding that the truths of science ultimately rest on man-made conventions, is allied to constructivism. Realism and antirealism propose competing interpretations of science as a whole. They even differ over what requires explanation, with realism demanding that more be explained and antirealism less.

scholarly journals Practical Realism: Against Standard Scientific Realism and Anti-Realism

2013 ◽  
pp. 7-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rein Vihalemm
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Karl Marx ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
The One

In this paper, the elaboration of the concept of practical realist philosophy of science which began in the author's previous papers is continued. It is argued that practical realism is opposed to standard scientific realism, on the one hand, and antirealism, on the other. Standard scientific realism is challengeable due to its abstract character, as being isolated from practice. It is based on a metaphysical-ontological presupposition which raises the problem of the God's Eye point of view (as it was called by Hilary Putnam). Joseph Rouse's conception of science as practice, Sami Pihlström's pragmatic realism, and even Ilkka Niiniluoto's critical scientific realism are interpreted as practical realist conceptions. Pihlström suggests that the contemporary scientific realist should be prepared to accept the pragmatically naturalized Kantian transcendental perspective on realism. It is argued, however, that this realistically naturalized Kantianism can be nothing more than practical realism, as originated by Karl Marx.

The Promoting and the Financing of the Suez Canal

1956 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 361-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Baer
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
World History ◽  
Suez Canal ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
Professional Fields

This timely account of the hunching of the Suez Canal project reveals both sides of the coin of innovation. It is, on the one hand, a study of the character and methods of one of the most famous innovators of the nineteenth century. Ferdinand DeLesseps was not a politician, a financier, an engineer, a promoter (in the common sense of the word), or a businessman. Yet he succeeded brilliantly in a venture requiring consummate mastery of all these professional fields. On the other hand is revealed the waterway itself — vital to one civilization, useless and neglected in another, and then of transcendent importance as world history marched on. Realization of the grand scheme envisaged by the Pharaohs came at last when economic and political factors momentarily aligned in a pattern of opportunity for a unique set of entrepreneurial qualifications.

scholarly journals Reichenbach: scientific realist and logical empricist?

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Neuber
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Realist Approach ◽  
Language Of Science ◽  
The One ◽  
Reductionist Approach

AbstractHans Reichenbach’s position in the debate over scientific realism is remarkable. On the one hand, he endorsed the programmatic premises of logical empiricism; on the other, he explicitly employed a realist approach to conceptions such as reference, causality, and inference to the best explanation. How could that work out? It will be shown in the present paper that in Reichenbach’s view scientific realism is not, as frequently assumed, opposed to logical empiricism but rather to logical positivism. A distinction without a difference? Not at all, at least for Reichenbach. As is well known, his particular—probabilistic—variant of logical empiricism was intended to circumvent what he considered the shortcomings of the Vienna Circle’s verificationist (reductionist) approach to the language of science. In Experience and Prediction (1938), Reichenbach became most explicit in this regard. However, I shall argue that his position remained notoriously unstable in the end. It oscillated between a full-fledged scientific realist reading and an eminently pragmatist reading. Nevertheless, Reichenbach’s contribution proved instrumental in preparing subsequent efforts at reconciling logical empiricism and scientific realism.

Occam’s Razor, Dogmatism, Skepticism, and Skeptical Dogmatism

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Walker
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
External World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Common Sense View ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Occam’S Razor ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
Occam's Razor

Underdetermination arguments for skepticism maintain that our common sense view of the external world is no better, evidentially speaking, than some skeptical competitors. An important and well-known response by dogmatists, those who believe our commonsense view is justified, appeals to abduction or inference to the best explanation. The predominant version of this strategy, going back at least to Locke, invokes Occam’s razor: dogmatists claim the common sense view is simpler than any of its skeptical alternatives and so has more to recommend it, evidentially speaking. This dispute has overshadowed another possible view: skeptical dogmatism. Skeptical dogmatists hold that we are justified in believing that the common sense view is probably false. I argue that skeptical dogmatism presents some interesting complications to the dialectic between the dogmatist and the skeptic. On the one hand, even if the dogmatist’s use of Occam’s razor is sufficient to rebut skepticism, in itself it is not sufficient to refute skeptical dogmatism. On the other hand, skeptics themselves, ironically, must, given the assumptions of the paper, appeal to something like Occam’s razor in order to avoid capitulating to skeptical dogmatism.

Stories and the Self

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Krause ◽  
Markus Appel
Keyword(s):  
Meta Analysis ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Lower Degree ◽  
Contrast Effects ◽  
Self Perception ◽  
Self Perceptions ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Implicit And Explicit

Abstract. Two experiments examined the influence of stories on recipients’ self-perceptions. Extending prior theory and research, our focus was on assimilation effects (i.e., changes in self-perception in line with a protagonist’s traits) as well as on contrast effects (i.e., changes in self-perception in contrast to a protagonist’s traits). In Experiment 1 ( N = 113), implicit and explicit conscientiousness were assessed after participants read a story about either a diligent or a negligent student. Moderation analyses showed that highly transported participants and participants with lower counterarguing scores assimilate the depicted traits of a story protagonist, as indicated by explicit, self-reported conscientiousness ratings. Participants, who were more critical toward a story (i.e., higher counterarguing) and with a lower degree of transportation, showed contrast effects. In Experiment 2 ( N = 103), we manipulated transportation and counterarguing, but we could not identify an effect on participants’ self-ascribed level of conscientiousness. A mini meta-analysis across both experiments revealed significant positive overall associations between transportation and counterarguing on the one hand and story-consistent self-reported conscientiousness on the other hand.

Radioimmunotherapy for treatment of acute myeloid leukaemia and myelodysplastic syndrome

2005 ◽  
Vol 44 (03) ◽  
pp. 107-117
Author(s):  
R. G. Meyer ◽  
W. Herr ◽  
A. Helisch ◽  
P. Bartenstein ◽  
I. Buchmann
Keyword(s):  
Acute Myeloid Leukaemia ◽  
Myeloid Leukaemia ◽  
Primary Tumour ◽  
The Other ◽  
Haematopoietic Stem Cell ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Primary Reduction ◽  
The One ◽  
Acute Myeloid

SummaryThe prognosis of patients with acute myeloid leukaemia (AML) has improved considerably by introduction of aggressive consolidation chemotherapy and haematopoietic stem cell transplantation (SCT). Nevertheless, only 20-30% of patients with AML achieve long-term diseasefree survival after SCT. The most common cause of treatment failure is relapse. Additionally, mortality rates are significantly increased by therapy-related causes such as toxicity of chemotherapy and complications of SCT. Including radioimmunotherapies in the treatment of AML and myelodyplastic syndrome (MDS) allows for the achievement of a pronounced antileukaemic effect for the reduction of relapse rates on the one hand. On the other hand, no increase of acute toxicity and later complications should be induced. These effects are important for the primary reduction of tumour cells as well as for the myeloablative conditioning before SCT.This paper provides a systematic and critical review of the currently used radionuclides and immunoconjugates for the treatment of AML and MDS and summarizes the literature on primary tumour cell reductive radioimmunotherapies on the one hand and conditioning radioimmunotherapies before SCT on the other hand.

The Salvage of Ideas: Schumpeter and the Core Problems Still Confronting Economics

2003 ◽  
pp. 15-26
Author(s):  
P. Wynarczyk
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
The Core ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

Two aspects of Schumpeter' legacy are analyzed in the article. On the one hand, he can be viewed as the custodian of the neoclassical harvest supplementing to its stock of inherited knowledge. On the other hand, the innovative character of his works is emphasized that allows to consider him a proponent of hetherodoxy. It is stressed that Schumpeter's revolutionary challenge can lead to radical changes in modern economics.

Pembaharuan Pesantren: Arah dan Implikasi

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-84
Author(s):  
Wahyudin Noor
Keyword(s):  
Rapid Development ◽  
The Other ◽  
Learning Methods ◽  
Technology Learning ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Traditional Term

Abstract Pesantren are often associated with backwardness and traditionalism in everything: facilities, technology, learning methods, and even the curriculum. For now, it seems like the traditional term for pesantren is no longer relevant enough. The pace of movement in the era of renewal marked by the rapid development of technology has demanded pesantren to make adjustments. However, on the one hand, when viewed from the direction of change, the reform efforts pursued by pesantren are not to erase the old tradition, but merely to add something new so that the old tradition and conditions can be maintained while accepting the presence of a new one. On the other hand, the reform efforts undertaken by pesantren have implications for the fact that the typical values of the pesantren are fading away. Abstrak  Pesantren seringkali diasosiasikan dengan keterbelakangan dan tradisional dalam segala hal: fasilitas, teknologi, metode pembelajaran, dan bahkan kurikulumnya. Untuk saat ini, sepertinya istilah tradisional untuk pesantren, sudah tidak lagi cukup relevan. Laju gerak pembaharuan zaman yang ditandai dengan pesatnya perkembangan teknologi telah menuntut pesantren untuk melakukan penyesuaian diri. Kendatipun demikian, di satu sisi, jika dilihat dari arah perubahan, upaya pembaharuan yang ditempuh pesantren tidaklah untuk menghapus tradisi yang lama, tetapi sekadar menambah dengan sesuatu yang baru sehingga tradisi maupun kondisi yang lama bisa dipertahankan sambil menerima kehadiran yang baru. Di sisi yang lain, upaya pembaharuan yang dilakukan pesantren ternyata berimplikasi pada kenyataan akan semakin pudarnya nilai-nilai khas yang dimiliki oleh pesantren.

The Skeptic and The Madman: The Proto‐Pragmatism of Thomas Reid

2006 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Lundestad
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
John Dewey ◽  
Charles Sanders Peirce ◽  
The Other ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Other Hand

Even though the philosophy of common sense is not justifi able as such, the assump- tion upon which it rests, namely that there are things which we are not in position to doubt is correct. The reason why Thomas Reid was unable to bring this assumption out in a justifi able manner is that his views, both on knowledge and nature, are to be considered dogmatic. American pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey on the other hand, may be seen as offering us a ‘critical’ and post-Darwinian philosophy of common sense.

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