E pluribus unum Shrugged: Ayn Rand Against American Conservatism and Libertarianism

The past decade has witnessed a renewed interest in the works of twentieth-century Objectivist philosopher Ayn Rand. Political events ranging from the rise of the Tea Party to the 2016 election of Donald J. Trump have only helped to spur this resurgence, further evident in film adaptations and reissues of her popular literary novels. Political pundits abound have, in turn, deemed the return of Ayn Rand as a victory for libertarian thought and the Republican Party, more broadly. However, in this paper I contest such a theoretical synergy and complicate the Rand/Republican Party interplay by suggesting that it rests on false grounds. Drawing from Rand’s Objectivism, I argue that modern-day Republican Party politics, specifically conservative and libertarian strains of thought, fail on epistemological grounds. The philosophical writings of the Russian-born, turned-American philosopher therefore are not only incompatible, but function as a forceful critique against the governing platform of the Republican Party in preparation for the 2022 midterm elections.

E pluribus unum Shrugged: Ayn Rand Against American Conservatism and Libertarianism

The past decade has witnessed a renewed interest in the works of twentieth-century Objectivist philosopher Ayn Rand. Political events ranging from the rise of the Tea Party to the 2016 election of Donald J. Trump have only helped to spur this resurgence, further evident in film adaptations and reissues of her popular literary novels. Political pundits abound have, in turn, deemed the return of Ayn Rand as a victory for libertarian thought and the Republican Party, more broadly. However, in this paper I contest such a theoretical synergy and complicate the Rand/Republican Party interplay by suggesting that it rests on false grounds. Drawing from Rand’s Objectivism, I argue that modern-day Republican Party politics, specifically conservative and libertarian strains of thought, fail on epistemological grounds. The philosophical writings of the Russian-born, turned-American philosopher therefore are not only incompatible, but function as a forceful critique against the governing platform of the Republican Party in preparation for the 2022 midterm elections.

Do we need an anti-oligarchic constitution?

Camila Vergara’s Systemic Corruption is an extraordinarily rich, provocative and original work of political theory, which makes several compelling interventions in the normative literature. It develops a forceful critique of overly narrow definitions of corruption, insisting that a more ‘systemic’ conception is required in order to grasp the scale of oligarchic domination in contemporary democracies. It also points out the limitations of the ‘proceduralist’ model of contestation adopted by neo-republicans, and outlines a persuasive conception of the people as a partisan actor with specific interests to defend. Yet Vergara’s alternative vision of how popular power might be institutionalized is less convincing. Though she rightly insists on the importance of organized countervailing power and plebeian solidarity, the system of nested local assemblies that she proposes is not well-suited to foster the development of either.

Karl Polanyi in Vienna

In this article I discuss Polanyi’s intellectual formation in early twentieth-century Budapest and in 1920s Vienna, focusing in particular upon his relationship to Guild Socialist and Marxist theory and to Austrian Social Democracy. It was a period in which Marxism was evolving rapidly, and Polanyi was too. In his twenties, he reacted forcefully against what he saw as the evolutionary and deterministic traits of Marxist philosophy. In his thirties, his relationship to Marxism underwent a ‘double movement’: his long-held doubts about Marxism crystallised into an forceful critique, swiftly followed by a sympathetic dialogue with the ideas and politics of Austro-Marxism, the ‘Rousseauian’ commitments of which were not unlike his own. I examine Polanyi’s relationship with Marxism in each of these phases, and explore the affinities between Guild Socialism and Austro-Marxism. The final section introduces the distinctly un-Polanyian analysis of Austrian Social Democracy offered by Polanyi’s wife, Ilona Duczynska.

Jazz Bands, Camping Trips and Decommodification: G.A.Cohen On Community

This paper studies G. A. Cohen’s account of community, in the context of his forceful critique of (Rawlsian) liberalism. I begin by discussing the two general forms of Cohen’s conception of community, justificatory community and communal reciprocity, contrasting them with Marx’s. I argue, first, that Cohen offers a compelling critique of liberalism, which successfully brings to the fore a difficulty liberals have making sense of, indeed attaching value to, community. I then argue that Cohen’s novel account of community is in deep and problematic tension with his own theory of justice. Finally, I try to show, against liberals of most persuasions, that the second form of fraternity, which warrants the diminution or eradication of fear and greed from human relationships, is incompatible with commodification, i.e. with markets for human labor power. I thus try to vindicate Cohen’s view that ‘every market, even a socialist market, is a system of predation’. Dans cet article j’étudie la conception de la fraternité dans l’oeuvre de G.A. Cohen, dans le cadre de sa critique du libéralisme Rawlsien. Il y a deux formes générales de la fraternité chez Cohen: la “communauté justificative” et la “réciprocité communale”. Je soutiens que Cohen offre une critique convaincante du libéralisme, en montrant que des libéraux ont du mal à donner du sens à la notion de la fraternité. Puis j’essaie de montrer que la notion même de lafraternité chez Cohen est en tension profonde avec sa propre théorie de justice. Enfin, je soutiens que la seconde forme de fraternité chez Cohen, qui justifie l’élimination de la peur et de l’avidité des relations humaines, est incompatible avec la marchandisation, autrement dit, la réciprocité communale est incompatible avec un marché du travail. Je donc essaie de faire valoir le point de vue de Cohen, selon lequel “tous les marchés, même un marché socialiste, sont des systèmes de prédation”.

Intentionality and Economics

In his recent book, Economics – Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns, Alexander Rosenberg has offered a forceful critique of the scientific pretensions of economics. I am encouraged to note that in his JEL review, Wade Hands (1993) singles out Rosenberg's ‘important discussion of intentionality’ as one of the most significant aspects of the book. Encouraged, because this was exactly my impression, and Hands's judgment confirmed my intention to respond to Rosenberg's argument. I hope, however, to be able to disappoint Hands's expectation that this aspect of Rosenberg's work ‘will be least challenged by economists’!

Religion's ‘Foundation in Reason’: The Common Sense of Hume's Natural History

David Hume’s critique of religion reveals what seems to be a vacillation in his commitment to an argument-based paradigm of legitimate believing. On the one hand, Hume assumes such a traditional (argumentbased) model of rational justification of beliefs in order to point to the weakness of some classical arguments for religious belief (e.g., the design argument), to chastise the believer for extrapolating to a conclusion which outstrips its evidential warrant. On the other hand, Hume, ‘mitigated’ or naturalist skeptic that he is, at other times rejects an argumentbased paradigm of certainty and truth, and so sees as irrelevant the traditional or ‘regular’ model of rational justification; he places a premium on instinctive belief, as both unavoidable and (usually) more reliable than reasoning. On this view, a forceful critique of religion would have to fault it, not for failing to meet criteria of rational argument (failing to proportion belief to the evidence), but (as Hume sometimes seems to) for failing to be the right sort of instinct.