Principles of Evidence in Public International Law as Applied by Investor-State Tribunals: Burden and Standards of Proof

Author(s):  
Kabir Duggal ◽  
Wendy W. Cai

AbstractPrinciples of Evidence in Public International Law as Applied by Investor-State Tribunals explores the fundamental principles of evidence and how these principles relating to burden of proof and standards of proof are derived.By tracing the applications of major principles recognized by the International Court of Justice and applied by investor-state tribunal jurisprudence, the authors offer valuable insight into the interpretation, understanding, and nuances of indispensable principles of evidence, an area that has been ignored in both investor-state arbitration and public international law more generally. Each principle is analyzed through historical and modern lenses to provide clarity and cohesion in understanding how fundamental principles of evidence will affect evidentiary dispositions of parties in investment arbitration and public international law cases.

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 79-82
Author(s):  
Maria Flores

I first became involved with international law while I was at university. After graduating, I decided to teach public international law. As an undergraduate, I particularly enjoyed this branch of study. I was attracted to it because it helped me to understand the problems, challenges, and breakthroughs in the field of international relations on a global scale. Therefore, after facing a competitive entry process, I joined the international law department of the Universidad de la República. It was a small department, but the university had produced some well-known scholars like Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, who became a judge at the International Court of Justice, and Hector Gross Espiell, who served as a judge at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.


1999 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to examine whether the possibility of a genuine non liquet is ruled out by a so-called ‘closing rule’underlying public international law. The answer to this question largely determines the relevance of the debate on the legality and legitimacy of the pronouncement of a non liquet by an international court. This debate was recently provoked by the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons. In this opinion, the Court held that it could not definitively conclude whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was contrary to international law in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the survival of a state is at stake. Nevertheless, some authors have argued that, since international law contains a closing rule stating that the absence of a prohibition is equivalent to the existence of a permission (or vice versa), the Court had in fact decided the legality of nuclear weapons. By virtue of this closing rule, the pronouncement of a non liquet would be impossible. In our analysis, we have taken issue with this view and claim that there are no a priori reasons for the acceptance of a closing rule underlying international law. It is possible indeed that a legal system is simply indifferent towards a certain type of conduct. Moreover, even if a closing rule would be assumed, this rule would be of no help in determining the legality or illegality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons, since the Court asserted that the current state of international law and the facts at its disposal were insufficient to enable it to reach a definitive conclusion. Nothing follows from this assertion, except the assurance that international law cannot definitively settle the question of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons: to be permitted or not to be permitted, that is still the question. Hamlet's dilemma precisely.


2009 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 361-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernhard Knoll

AbstractThis contribution subjects Kosovo's declaration of independence of 2008 to a comprehensive and detailed analysis from the perspective of international law. It begins with a reflection on Kosovo's status process as it unfolded in 2006 and discusses some of the challenges that Serbia faced when it proposed that Kosovo be vested with “more than autonomy, less than independence”. The main body of the article speculates on some of the implications that Kosovo's independence may have in public international law, especially with a view to the forthcoming International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on the matter. It concludes that the resolution of Kosovo's status has to be seen in the context of a decreasing reliance on the international norm that has hitherto protected the territorial integrity of states.


Author(s):  
Fouret Julien

This chapter aims to help the new investment arbitration practitioner identify and find the main legal sources for dealing with international investment law issues. Three different topics need to be addressed in order to cover, as extensively as possible, the legal issues generally raised during an arbitration based on an international investment agreement. First, even though the stare decisis rule does not exist in international arbitration, including investment arbitration, previous rulings are often used and analyzed by arbitrators. Second, when dealing with investment arbitration, it is likely that the claim will be treaty based. Finally, and most importantly, in international investment disputes, arbitral tribunals rely on all the sources of public international law identified in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides for the Court to apply.


Author(s):  
Carlo de Stefano

Chapter II illustrates the application of attribution rules in public international law, as resulting from the early arbitral practice, the decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the awards of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal, and eventually codified by ARSIWA. Accordingly, it explains the tests for attribution of conduct of State organs (de jure and de facto) under ARSIWA Article 4, ‘State entities’ under ARSIWA Article 5, and individuals under ARSIWA Article 8. The rule of attribution of acts ultra vires under ARSIWA Article 7 is also analysed, which applies to the conduct of State organs and ‘State entities’, but not of (private) individuals.


Author(s):  
Gabriele Gagliani

The International Court of Justice, and its predecessor court, the Permanent Court of International Justice, have dealt with cultural heritage issues in a number of cases extending back over a century. Scholars’ attention to this case law appears fragmentary. This chapter intends to fill this gap and analyze the ICJ jurisprudence involving cultural heritage. Through the analysis of ICJ case law on cultural heritage and cultural heritage-related arguments resorted to by States in ICJ disputes, this chapter wishes to prove the relevance of cultural heritage issues for public international law and the key, often-underestimated role of the ICJ for international law on cultural heritage.


1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 132-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcel Brus

When Peter Kooijmans took up his position as judge in the International Court of Justice on 6 February 1997, a formal end came to a career of about 30 years of teaching public international law in the Netherlands. This is why the Leiden Journal of International Law has asked me to write a few words about the work and person of Peter Kooijmans as a teacher of public international law, a task which I accepted with great pleasure, also on behalf of other staff members who have worked with Peter Kooijmans for many years.


2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 271-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eirik Bjorge

The technique of ‘evolutive interpretation’ is well known in public international law.2It is particularly associated with treaty regimes like that of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).3The currency of this technique of interpretation has, however, been less evident ingeneralpublic international law. It is not insignificant therefore that the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in a case about navigational and related rights has now made unambiguously clear that, where the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the treaty is one of continuing duration, the parties as a general rule must be presumed to have intended those terms to have an ‘evolving meaning’.4


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