I. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,CASE CONCERNING THE DISPUTE REGARDING NAVIGATIONAL AND RELATED RIGHTS (COSTA RICA V NICARAGUA)JUDGMENT OF 13 JULY 2009

2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 271-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eirik Bjorge
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Costa Rica ◽  
International Law ◽  
General Rule ◽  
European Convention ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Over Time

The technique of ‘evolutive interpretation’ is well known in public international law.2It is particularly associated with treaty regimes like that of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).3The currency of this technique of interpretation has, however, been less evident ingeneralpublic international law. It is not insignificant therefore that the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in a case about navigational and related rights has now made unambiguously clear that, where the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the treaty is one of continuing duration, the parties as a general rule must be presumed to have intended those terms to have an ‘evolving meaning’.4

scholarly journals Remarks by Maria Flores

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 79-82
Author(s):  
Maria Flores
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Relations ◽  
International Law ◽  
Global Scale ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Small Department ◽  
The University

I first became involved with international law while I was at university. After graduating, I decided to teach public international law. As an undergraduate, I particularly enjoyed this branch of study. I was attracted to it because it helped me to understand the problems, challenges, and breakthroughs in the field of international relations on a global scale. Therefore, after facing a competitive entry process, I joined the international law department of the Universidad de la República. It was a small department, but the university had produced some well-known scholars like Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, who became a judge at the International Court of Justice, and Hector Gross Espiell, who served as a judge at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

II. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE (BELGIUM v SENEGAL) JUDGMENT OF 20 JULY 2012

2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 753-769 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Andenas ◽  
Thomas Weatherall
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Universal Jurisdiction ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Icj ◽  
Jus Cogens ◽  
Heads Of State ◽  
Peremptory Norms

This case1 marks the first pronouncement by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare) in international law. It is the second contentious case in which the ICJ has held the defendant country in breach of its obligations under a human rights convention. The ICJ both added to the corpus of norms it has formally recognized as peremptory norms (jus cogens) and also reinforced the principle that former heads of state are subject to universal jurisdiction for grave violations of international law.

II. AVENA AND OTHER MEXICAN NATIONALS {MEXICO v UNITED STATES OF AMERICA), PROVISIONAL MEASURES, ORDER OF 5 FEBRUARY 2003

2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 738-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandy Ghandhi
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Human Rights Treaties ◽  
Legal Contexts ◽  
Dispute Settlement Procedure ◽  
Rights Issues

The International Court of Justice is not a human rights court but it does hear human rights cases.1This is hardly remarkable. As Professor Ian Brownlie has pointed out ‘[h]uman rights problems occur in specific legal contexts. The issues may arise… within the framework of a standard-setting convention, or within general international law.’2Because human rights treaties normally have their own dispute settlement procedure, the situations in which the International Court of Justice is more likely to have to grapple with human rights issues lie within the realms of general international law or in non-human rights specific treaty provisions, which may, nevertheless, raise such issues. In addition, some human rights treaties, such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, contain provisions specifically referring disputes to the International Court of Justice.3Thus, it should come as no surprise that the Court has been involved in a number of cases involving human rights questions.

The Completeness of International Law and Hamlet's Dilemma

1999 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Advisory Opinion ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
Current State ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Self Defence

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to examine whether the possibility of a genuine non liquet is ruled out by a so-called ‘closing rule’underlying public international law. The answer to this question largely determines the relevance of the debate on the legality and legitimacy of the pronouncement of a non liquet by an international court. This debate was recently provoked by the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons. In this opinion, the Court held that it could not definitively conclude whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was contrary to international law in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the survival of a state is at stake. Nevertheless, some authors have argued that, since international law contains a closing rule stating that the absence of a prohibition is equivalent to the existence of a permission (or vice versa), the Court had in fact decided the legality of nuclear weapons. By virtue of this closing rule, the pronouncement of a non liquet would be impossible. In our analysis, we have taken issue with this view and claim that there are no a priori reasons for the acceptance of a closing rule underlying international law. It is possible indeed that a legal system is simply indifferent towards a certain type of conduct. Moreover, even if a closing rule would be assumed, this rule would be of no help in determining the legality or illegality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons, since the Court asserted that the current state of international law and the facts at its disposal were insufficient to enable it to reach a definitive conclusion. Nothing follows from this assertion, except the assurance that international law cannot definitively settle the question of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons: to be permitted or not to be permitted, that is still the question. Hamlet's dilemma precisely.

Fuzzy Statehood: An International Legal Perspective on Kosovo's Declaration of Independence

2009 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 361-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernhard Knoll
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Main Body ◽  
Advisory Opinion ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
International Norm ◽  
Declaration Of Independence ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Legal Perspective

AbstractThis contribution subjects Kosovo's declaration of independence of 2008 to a comprehensive and detailed analysis from the perspective of international law. It begins with a reflection on Kosovo's status process as it unfolded in 2006 and discusses some of the challenges that Serbia faced when it proposed that Kosovo be vested with “more than autonomy, less than independence”. The main body of the article speculates on some of the implications that Kosovo's independence may have in public international law, especially with a view to the forthcoming International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on the matter. It concludes that the resolution of Kosovo's status has to be seen in the context of a decreasing reliance on the international norm that has hitherto protected the territorial integrity of states.

The End of the Road for the Prince? Sixty Years after the Czechoslovak Confiscation of Liechtenstein Property

2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 441-458
Author(s):  
BART DELMARTINO
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Nazi Germany ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
The Road ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
International Court ◽  
International Obligations

In 1945 Czechoslovakia confiscated Liechtenstein property as reparation for the damage done by Nazi Germany. Private claims failed before the courts of Czechoslovakia, and international law did not provide Liechtenstein with a means of action against Czechoslovakia. When the property was on loan in Germany, a private case for recovery was declared inadmissible by the German courts, in line with Germany's international obligations. The European Court of Human Rights accepted these decisions. Liechtenstein, on the other hand, considered them to violate its sovereignty. In 2005, the International Court of Justice decided that it lacked temporal jurisdiction to rule on the issue.

Attribution in Public International Law

2020 ◽  
pp. 27-95
Author(s):  
Carlo de Stefano
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Justice ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Article 5

Chapter II illustrates the application of attribution rules in public international law, as resulting from the early arbitral practice, the decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the awards of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal, and eventually codified by ARSIWA. Accordingly, it explains the tests for attribution of conduct of State organs (de jure and de facto) under ARSIWA Article 4, ‘State entities’ under ARSIWA Article 5, and individuals under ARSIWA Article 8. The rule of attribution of acts ultra vires under ARSIWA Article 7 is also analysed, which applies to the conduct of State organs and ‘State entities’, but not of (private) individuals.

Principles of Evidence in Public International Law as Applied by Investor-State Tribunals: Burden and Standards of Proof

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-52
Author(s):  
Kabir Duggal ◽  
Wendy W. Cai
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Valuable Insight ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
Investment Arbitration ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Standards Of Proof ◽  
Insight Into

AbstractPrinciples of Evidence in Public International Law as Applied by Investor-State Tribunals explores the fundamental principles of evidence and how these principles relating to burden of proof and standards of proof are derived.By tracing the applications of major principles recognized by the International Court of Justice and applied by investor-state tribunal jurisprudence, the authors offer valuable insight into the interpretation, understanding, and nuances of indispensable principles of evidence, an area that has been ignored in both investor-state arbitration and public international law more generally. Each principle is analyzed through historical and modern lenses to provide clarity and cohesion in understanding how fundamental principles of evidence will affect evidentiary dispositions of parties in investment arbitration and public international law cases.

II. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, CASE CONCERNING AHMADOU SADIO DIALLO (REPUBLIC OF GUINEA V DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO) JUDGEMENT OF 30 NOVEMBER 2010

2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 810-819 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Andenas
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Icj ◽  
Republic Of The Congo ◽  
Opening Paragraph

This is the first time in its history, to the best of my knowledge, that the International Court of Justice has established violations of the two human rights treaties at issue, together, namely, at universal level, the 1966 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, at regional level, the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, both in the framework of the universality of human rights.This is the opening paragraph of Judge Cançado Trindade's Separate Opinion in the Diallo case. The ICJ's judgment is a remarkable decision contributing to the widening and deepening of international law and has consequences for several fundamental questions, including the role of the ICJ and international law in making human rights effective, erga omnes and jus cogens rules, customary law, evidence, and several substantive rules. In bringing the transformation of international law one step further, the Diallo judgment develops the ICJ as ‘the principal judicial organ of the United Nations’1 at the top of an open international law system. To achieve this, the Court had to overcome a series of jurisdictional and procedural hurdles.2 All the permanent judges of the ICJ agreed that Congo had violated the prohibition on arbitrary detention and expulsion and that the violations gave rise to a right of compensation. The ICJ's use of sources from other international and regional bodies as sources of authority, indicates solutions to fragmentation problems.

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