Freedom of Religion and Criminal Law: A Legal Appraisal. From the Principle of Separation of Church and State to the Principle of Pluralist Democracy?

ICL Journal ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul De Hert ◽  
Stefan Somers

AbstractThe scope of the fundamental right to freedom of religion has been broadly dis­cussed in recent jurisprudence and doctrine. Doctrine has however paid little attention to the role of constitutionalism and its principles such as this of the separation of church and state and the division of power. These principles are often not mentioned as such in inter­national human rights treaties. Does this mean that they are irrelevant in human rights adjudication?This article addresses the proper function of constitutionalism in human rights jurisprudence and in settling religious conflicts more in general. The Lautsi judgment of the European Court of Human Rights is used as a trigger to look at the relationship between religion, constitutionalism and human rights, and at the legitimacy of supranational courts. The article argues that international human rights jurisprudence must take national consti­tutionalism and its principles into account when dealing with the freedom of religion, even when those principles are not explicitly enshrined in human rights treaties. For this the use of the margin of appreciation seems to be appropriate.


2013 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 491-512 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Grimley

In trying to trace the development of church-state relations in Britain since 1961, one encounters the difficulty that conceptions of both ‘church’ and ‘state’ have changed radically in the half-century since then. This is most obviously true of the state. The British state in 1961 was (outside Stormont-governed Northern Ireland) a unitary state governed from London. It still had colonies, and substantial overseas military commitments. One of its Houses of Parliament had until three years before been (a few bishops and law-lords apart) completely hereditary. The prime minister controlled all senior appointments in the established Church of England, and Parliament had the final say on its worship and doctrine. The criminal law still embodied Christian teaching on issues of personal morality.


2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 81-90
Author(s):  
Ivan Matic

The subject of this paper will be the analysis of the question of religious toleration in the political thought of seventeenth century English philosopher John Locke. The first part of the paper will discuss the foundational principles of Locke?s political thought, particularly his contract theory. The second part will be dedicated to situating his positions on freedom of religion within the domain of that theory, accentuating the moment of separation between church and state. The final part will analyze the implications of religious toleration, as well as its limits, upon which Locke?s criterion of freedom of religion will be critically examined.


Poetics Today ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-460
Author(s):  
Darja Filippova

This article discusses the performance events “Do Not Believe Your Eyes” (2000) and “Ally/Foe” (2010) by Russian artist Oleg Mavromatti in the framework of a single durational event that critiques the sacralization of public space in Russia. The public reception of the performances is mediated by attitudes toward Russian Criminal Law Article 282, the so-called law against religious offenses, in a sociopolitical climate where Orthodoxy is conflated with state patriotism. Through the appropriation of the colloquially resonant behavioral paradigm of the holy fool, the author analyzes how Mavromatti’s performance event critiques the concept of “judgment” (by an Orthodox state and by an Orthodox public) from within a culturally resonant religious tradition. The artist’s intervention calls for a secular separation of church and state, but by doing so from within a religious tradition, it illuminates the function of the postsecular as a mode of engagement in contemporary Russian culture.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 182-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Gianfreda

Religious offences in Italy, as in many European countries, have a long and complex history that is intertwined with the events in the history of the relationship between church and state and the institutional and constitutional framework of a nation.This article is divided into three parts. The first part aims to offer some historical remarks concerning the rules on the contempt of religion and blasphemy in Italian criminal law from the end of the 19th century to the present day. The second part focuses on changes to the law on vilification introduced in 2006 and the third part deals with the recent developments in blasphemy law in the context of sport.The article shows that, on the one hand, reforms of the offences grouped under vilification of religion are anachronistic and do not stand up against the religious freedom of individuals, yet on the other, despite the traditional rules for the protection of religion being considered obsolete, they are applied in new areas of law, for example sport, and are used to curb bad manners and bad behaviour. The relationship between the new functions of these criminal rules and the traditional ones, however, remains uncertain and fluctuating, and reveals a moralistic approach to religious offences.


Author(s):  
Radley Henrico

In democratic pluralistic and secular societies, freedom of religion is a fundamental right to be enjoyed by all individuals and religious organisations. A unique feature of this human right is the extent to which it is premised on a personal belief. The latter can be "bizarre, illogical or irrational", but nevertheless deserving of protection in the interests of freedom of religion. However, when the expression of a religious belief or practice transgresses the civil or criminal law it must be dealt with in the relevant legislative framework to hold the transgressor liable. Measures taken by the state to regulate religious bodies in terms of a general supervisory council or umbrella body are an unreasonable and unjustifiable interference with freedom of religion, and hence unconstitutional. I am of the view that the right to freedom of religion depends for its constitutional validity – and viability – on there being no interference (or regulation) by the state except in instances as provided for in terms of relevant legislation.    


Author(s):  
Paul Guyer

This chapter compares the two philosophers’ great arguments for separation of church and state. Mendelssohn’s argument is contained in Part I of his 1783 Jerusalem. He holds that the state and any church employ two different means to the same end, human happiness, and that the state’s coercive methods have no place in religious practice. His argument is based on the religious premise that God is pleased only by the free rather than forced convictions of humans. Kant does not treat the separation of church and state in his 1793 Religion at all, because for him religious liberty is an immediate consequence of every human’s innate right to freedom, which is both the objective but also the limit of all state power. Religious liberty can therefore be treated from a purely political point of view, as Kant does in his 1797 Doctrine of Right.


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