Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report, US Military Equipment Validation Team Trip Report to Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), Israel, December 1973, Top Secret/Sensitive, NARA.

Author(s):  
Paul J. Heer

This chapter chronicles Kennan’s and Davies’s central and successful role in formulating US policy toward China on behalf of Secretary of State Marshall during 1947-49. Their focus was on justifying gradual disengagement from US involvement in the Chinese civil war and retreat to a policy of minimum aid to the Koumintang (KMT or Nationalist) government of Chiang Kai-shek, on the grounds that Chiang’s regime was a lost cause and China was strategically expendable. The chapter discusses Kennan’s and Davies’s relative assessments of the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the prolonged debate over China policy between the State Department and the US military establishment (the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff).


The Last Card ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 153-181

This chapter traces a series of climactic meetings of the National Security Council in December of 2006. By December, Vice President Dick Cheney thought it was “pretty clear that we've got to do something different than what we've been doing. December was then devoted to sort of nailing down what that was going to be.” The president and his advisors discussed fundamental issues regarding American goals and responsibilities in Iraq and increasingly concluded that only a surge option, as part of a change in military strategy and an effort at bottom-up political reconciliation in Iraq, could salvage the American mission there. That same month, the president visited the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their meeting room to hear and address their concerns about whether an intensified military effort in Iraq might overtax the US military and even “break the force.” In December, too, public discussion about the American future in Iraq was fueled by reports from the congressionally mandated Iraq Study Group, which advocated for a regional diplomatic strategy to help quell violence in Iraq, as well as from the American Enterprise Institute, which advocated increasing US forces in Iraq and pursuing a proper counterinsurgency strategy. The impact of these external reviews on the eventual surge decision remains hotly debated; the chapter helps place these efforts within the context of the internal administration policy process and Bush's decision making.


Author(s):  
Andrew Marble

John Shalikashvili: From Boy on the Bridge to Top American General tells the captivating tale of how John Shalikashvili, a penniless, stateless World War II refugee achieved the American dream by being appointed the thirteenth chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest-ranking officer in the US military, during the Clinton administration. Through a gripping narrative covering his wartime upbringing, aristocratic family background, parental influence, immigrant experience, and betrayals by loved ones—particularly by his high school girlfriend and by his father’s affiliation with the Waffen-SS, which came to light during Shalikashvili’s confirmation process—the biography explores the themes of nature vs. nurture and the role of agency vs. luck (i.e., the influence of his own actions vs. factors beyond his control) in determining Shalikashvili’s character, leadership abilities, and career success.


Author(s):  
Oksana Manchulenko

The Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 was the most comprehensive and important defense reorganization legislation since its initial establishment in 1947. It has administrated the way the United States has organized, planned, and conducted military operations for the last thirty years. Despite this, a strong opposition movement organized primarily by Navy Secretary John F. Lehman, almost endangred the adoption of the mentioned above law. This opposition also included members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prominent Senators and Congressman, and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. A ten year retrospective of the Act’s passage at the National Defense University (NDU) in 1999 detailed its six most significant achievements. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as an individual, was designated the principal military advisor to the President and other senior officials. The Chairman was assigned new responsibilities in the areas of strategic planning, logistics, net assessments, joint doctrine, and joint programs and budgets. A Vice Chairman position, outranking the other chiefs was created to assist the Chairman and act as the Chairman in his or her absence. The Joint Staff was expanded beyond 400 members and placed directly under the control of the Chairman. The power and influence of the deployed unified commanders was also increased by providing them authority over subordinate commands in their areas of responsibility, especially regarding joint training, force organization, and force employment. Finally, the Joint Specialty Officer program was mandated. This program was designed to ensure the services assigned some of their highest quality officers to joint duty.”1 Nearly all in attendance at the 1999 NDU event concluded that passage of the legislation was a universal good. The subject of the article is the influence of international US military campaigns on the adoption of Goldwater-Nichols Act. This article tends to examine the background which led to the adoption of Goldwater Nichols Act, the opposition of the Marines and Navy against the aforementioned Act. The goal is to analyze the main changes brought in by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and their impact on the development of the US military. The phenomena concern “Joint Forces” and the increase of effective cooperation between the departments. The key provisions, which strengthened the position of the Secretary of Defense and outlined its role in the chain of command, will be evaluated. Keywords: Goldwater-Nichols Act, reorganization, conflict, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, unified commanders


2019 ◽  
pp. 9-21
Author(s):  
Andrew Marble

The chapter is set during the August 11, 1993, White House Rose Garden nomination ceremony, with President William J. Clinton nominating General John Shalikashvili to replace General Colin Powell as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest-ranking US military officer. The chapter shows how far Shalikashvili has come, how close he now was to fully achieving the American dream, that he has aristocratic blood, and his stellar reputation among policy leaders. It hints at his abilities and personality, suggests the important role that four key ancestors have played in determining his career success, and foreshadows the problem that one of them will bring to his confirmation process.


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