The European Union’s Relationship with UN Security Council Resolutions Authorising the Use of Force: a European Perspective

2005 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inger Österdahl

AbstractIn recent years the UN Security Council has entered the scene of action several times after a unilateral military intervention has already taken place. The Security Council has adopted comprehensive schemes for the reconstruction of the countries intervened in and has authorised both civil and military international presences. Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of such recent situations, and Liberia is an example from the early 1990s. This article makes the argument that, through its resolutions, the Security Council contributes to the legalisation ex post facto of the unilateral interventions, whether it wants to or not. The Security Council is caught in a trap set by those who undertake the intervention without prior Security Council authorisation.The only way the Security Council could escape the retroactive legalising effect of its resolutions would be by clearly stating in the resolution its intention not to authorise the preceding intervention. Even then, it may be that the Security Council could not escape the power of its own practice. A persistent practice of adopting reconstruction resolutions ex post facto would carry greater legal weight than the professed intention not to legalise the preceding unilateral intervention.Still, authorisation ex post facto may be better than no authorisation at all.


Author(s):  
Haidi Willmot ◽  
Ralph Mamiya

This chapter focuses on the conception and evolution of the UN Security Council mandate to protect civilians during peacekeeping operations from 1960 to the present. The chapter examines the normative and legal framework of the use of force to protect civilians in UN peacekeeping operations, with reference to Security Council resolutions and other bodies of international law such as humanitarian and human rights law. It considers Security Council practice between 1960 and 1999 and its emphasis on the concept of self-defence; Security Council practice from 1999 to 2007 regarding the inception and development of the explicit ‘protection of civilians’ mandate by the Council; Security Council practice from 2007 to 2011; and prioritization of the mandate in certain peacekeeping missions, specifically UNAMID (Sudan (Darfur)), MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo), UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire), and UNMISS (South Sudan). Finally, the chapter describes Security Council practice from 2011 onwards and draws conclusions on impact that the protection of civilians mandate in peacekeeping operations has had on the evolution of the legitimate use of force under the UN Charter.


Author(s):  
Niels Blokker

This chapter discusses developments in operations authorized by the UN Security Council in the context of the rules governing use of force in international relations. It considers three elements surrounding criticism of the carte blanche nature of Resolution 678 authorizing the use of ‘all necessary means’ against Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait. First, the authorization has no time limit; secondly, it has an extremely broad mandate; thirdly, coalition forces were asked ‘to keep the Security Council regularly informed’. The chapter examines whether the trend towards more Security Council control of authorized operations has persisted. It analyses elements of the authorization resolutions adopted by the Council between 2000 and 2012 and their implications for potential UN responsibility. It argues that operational decision-making is outsourced to implementing states or international organizations but that there are cases when the UN may be held responsible for wrongful acts committed by the authorized operation.


Author(s):  
Ben Saul

International law has struggled to regulate terrorism for over a century, beginning with efforts to cooperate in the extradition and prosecution of suspects, including through unsuccessful League of Nations efforts to define and criminalize terrorism as such. Until 2001 most international attention focused on transnational criminal cooperation against terrorism, through the development of method-specific “prosecute or extradite” treaties (concerning, for instance, violence against aircraft or ships, hostage taking, or attacks on diplomats) but without defining terrorism as a general concept or crime. It may, however, be possible to qualify some terrorist acts as war crimes or crimes against humanity. Since the 1970s, there were ambivalent efforts through the UN General Assembly to develop normative frameworks to confront terrorism per se, which often came unstuck on the controversial issues of “state terrorism” and liberation movement violence. Greater consensus was achieved by 1994 with the General Assembly’s adoption of a declaration against terrorism. There appears to exist an international consensus that terrorism per se is wrongful, even if disagreement remains about identifying precisely what constitutes terrorism. The effort to deal with terrorism as such suggests that the international community views terrorism as more than its underlying physical parts, which are already crimes in most national legal systems and under certain transnational treaties. The special wrongfulness of terrorism is perhaps signified by its intimidation of civilian populations, its coercion of governments or international organizations, and its political, religious, or ideological aspect. Terrorist violence has also sometimes raised certain problems under the law of armed conflict and the law on the use of force, as well as occasionally attracted sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. Terrorism was generally dealt with, however, through the application of general legal norms rather than through the emergence of terrorism-specific rules. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, sharper international focus was brought to bear on the legal challenges presented by terrorism and counter-terrorism in numerous specialized branches of international law (particularly in the law of state responsibility, the law on the use of force, and international humanitarian law), as well as in the institutional practices of the UN Security Council and the impacts of counter-terrorism measures on international human rights law. By 2011 the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon even declared the existence of an international customary law crime of transnational terrorism, although that decision has proven highly controversial as not supported by state practice. Efforts to negotiate a comprehensive international convention against terrorism have continued since 2000, with disagreement remaining over the scope of exceptions. There is also now increasing debate about whether a field of international anti-terrorism law is emerging.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 113-117
Author(s):  
Ian Johnstone

Monica Hakimi's article probes the legal significance of an interesting phenomenon: the UN Security Council condoning the use of force, as opposed to authorizing it. She offers an innovative perspective on this little-studied dimension of how the Council contributes to the development of jus ad bellum. While I applaud much in the article, I question her characterization of what the Council is condoning in the cases she reviews. She claims these are “fact-specific decisions,” whereas I argue that the Council is endorsing controversial interpretations of the law on the use of force. This disagreement does not detract from Hakimi's observations about the policy implications of the practice, or about the Council's role as a site for deliberation and argumentation about the content of international law. But it does cast doubt on her conceptual claim that there are two distinct “regulatory forms,” which together provide the content of jus ad bellum, one particularistic and procedural, the other general and substantive. All legal claims and justifications entail the application of general standards to particular facts, either explicitly or implicitly. Most of her case studies can be explained in those terms. Thus, while the Council's practice of condoning the use of force is important to understand, the “conventional account” she derides provides a more persuasive and parsimonious explanation of that phenomenon.


Author(s):  
Penelope Nevill

This chapter examines the use of force to enforce sanctions in the absence of express authorization by the UN Security Council. After reviewing the history and background to enforcement of sanctions which primarily takes place at sea, the chapter addresses the question of what amounts to a use of force in this context, paying particular attention to whether sanctions enforcement is ‘law enforcement’ or a use of force in the sense of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter by examining the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and under the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention concerning forcible measures used or threatened by state authorities against vessels or oil rigs and platforms. The chapter concludes by assessing the legal bases for the use of force to enforce sanctions, including those imposed by the United Nations.


Author(s):  
Hanna Bourgeois

Abstract In this article, I aim to explore the interpretation and implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council mandates authorising the protection of civilians (PoC) and, in particular, the meaning of an authorisation to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians. Over the past two decades, the UN Security Council has repeatedly provided UN (mandated) peace operations with an explicit mandate to protect civilians. In doing so, it has typically authorised the use of ‘all necessary means’ to achieve the aforementioned objective. This PoC language has been subject to varying interpretations and implementations in practice and is therefore often considered ambiguous. The conclusion reached in this article is that PoC language is indeed vague, but that this is not necessarily problematic. It might even be unavoidable in light of the cascade structure in which the PoC mandate is placed and whereby the PoC mandate is interpreted and implemented at the various levels of authority, command, and control. What is problematic is that there is uncertainty and discussion about the limits to the use of force in the implementation of PoC mandates. After all, the formula to use ‘all necessary means’ cannot be regarded as a ‘blank cheque’ to use any amount of force. Therefore, I identify the upper limit to what UN (mandated) peace operations may lawfully do to protect civilians when being provided with a mandate to use ‘all necessary means’. I also detect an emerging lower limit for what UN (mandated) peace operations must lawfully do to protect civilians when being provided with such a PoC mandate.


1992 ◽  
Vol 32 (287) ◽  
pp. 183-186
Author(s):  
Aristidis S. Calogeropoulos-Stratis

Recently, a number of armed conflicts have broken out in Europe or not far away: armed conflicts between States — the Gulf War, for example, authorized by UN Security Council resolution 678 — or wars of national liberation, such as the armed conflict in Yugoslavia or the revolt in Kurdistan. Whether or not the use of force was legitimate in each of these situations, and even though the classic notion of a “just war” no longer exists, all parties to any armed conflict have a moral, legal and humanitarian obligation to abide by the laws and customs of war in the conduct of hostilities and indeed throughout the entire conflict.


2004 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 51-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Chesterman

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 has been the subject of much discussion for its impact on the use of force outside of UN Security Council authorization. Less commented upon is the fact that the so-called “Operation Iraqi Freedom” resurrected a body of international law that had been dormant through the second half of the twentieth century: the law of military occupation. Developed at a time when war itself was not illegal, this doctrine became something of an embarrassment after the UN Charter established a broad prohibition on the use of force. Nevertheless, through the 1990s the United Nations itself had become involved in operations in Kosovo that looked distinctly like military occupation. Even the most liberal reading of the instruments governing occupation law, however, finds it hard to reconcile this law with military intervention and post-conflict occupation premised on regime change. This article first surveys the law of military occupation before briefly examining the role of the UN Security Council in post-conflict administration. It then turns to the ambiguous responsibilities accorded to the United States and Britain as occupying powers in Iraq in 2003–2004.


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