Implicit in the title might be two presumptions. The first one, that there is (or should be) a single philosophy of science, is not a claim I intend—I do think one should look for a common core, in a way that allows for differences. The second presumption, that philosophy of science, as it is construed today, would be different if it were based on chemistry, is what I wish to examine. And behind that latter supposition is the notion that philosophers of science, their professionalism and good will not impugned, nevertheless are likely to construct their worldview of science based on the sciences they know best. These are usually the sciences that they studied (a) as a part of their general education, or (b) the science they came from, so to speak, if they made their transition to philosophy at some later point in their career. I have not made a rigorous examination of the education of philosophers of science. But my anecdotal feeling is that, for those who entered the profession directly, an exposure to mathematical logic is more likely than to geology or chemistry. And, for many of the philosophers of science who came to their field after an initial scientific career, their scientific expertise was likely to be in the first instance physics, after that biology, and rarely chemistry. I will argue that this matters, for chemistry is different. There are exceptions. In the English-writing community, the most striking one is Michael Polanyi, a very distinguished physical chemist. In the French philosophical community, Pierre Duhem, Emile Meyerson, Gaston Bachelard, and Hélène Metzger had professional chemical backgrounds. Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent has argued convincingly that this background shaped their philosophical outlook, in contrast with the analytic philosophers of their time. In recent times the situation may have changed. A subfield of “philosophy of chemistry” has emerged, with annual meetings and two journals (Foundations of Chemistry, Hyle). The practitioners of this field are more likely to have had substantive experience in chemistry.
In Defense of the Concept of Intrinsic Value
