Toward an Alternative Explanation for the Resource Curse: Natural Resources, Immigration, and Democratization

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 689-718 ◽  
Author(s):  
David H. Bearce ◽  
Jennifer A. Laks Hutnick

Why do many resource-rich countries maintain autocratic political regimes? The authors’ proposed answer focuses on the causal effect of labor imports, or immigration. Using the logic offered by Acemoglu and Robinson’s democratization model, the authors posit that immigration makes democratization less likely because it facilitates redistributive concessions to appease the population within an autocratic regime. This immigration argument applies directly to the political resource curse since many resource-rich countries tend to also be labor scarce, leading them to import foreign laborers. Consistent with this understanding, the authors find a statistically significant negative relationship between net immigration per capita and democratization in future periods. Their results also show that when controlling for this immigration effect, the standard resource curse variables lose significance in a democratization model. This latter result suggests that much of the so-called resource curse stems not from resource endowments per se but rather from the labor imports related to resource production.

2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 619-643
Author(s):  
Scott Pegg

AbstractSomaliland might start producing oil in 2019. Yet, it has done little to prepare for the arrival of oil revenues which could exceed its current annual budget. Although Somaliland has been largely peaceful for two decades and recently inaugurated its fifth president after holding a democratic election, it remains entirely unrecognised. Oil revenues could positively transform Somaliland's fragile political economy, but they also place it at significant risk for a political resource curse that could threaten its democracy, peace and political institutions. Oil to cash or the direct distribution of oil revenues to citizens has been posited as a solution to the political resource curse. Somaliland has many of the elements necessary to make oil to cash work in place. Several factors combine to make Somaliland both potentially receptive to oil to cash and uniquely positioned to benefit from it. Interviews with political elites demonstrate receptiveness to the idea. Sample revenue calculations from other African oil producers highlight just how such a system could work to benefit Somaliland.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ines Vilela ◽  
Pedro C. Vicente ◽  
Alexander Coutts ◽  
Alex Armand

2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 719-748 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Roberts Clark ◽  
Matt Golder ◽  
Sona N. Golder

Political scientists typically develop different models to examine distinct political phenomena such as lobbying, protests, elections and conflict. These specific models can provide important insights into a particular event, process or outcome of interest. This article takes a different tack. Rather than focus on the specificities of a given political phenomenon, this study constructs a model that captures the key elements common to most political situations. This model represents a reformulation and extension of Albert Hirschman’s famousExit, Voice and Loyaltyframework. To highlight the value that comes from focusing on the commonalities that exist across apparently disparate political phenomena, the article applies the model to several issues in the democratization literature related to modernization theory, the political resource curse, inequality, foreign aid and economic performance.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Armand ◽  
◽  
Ana Isabel Costa ◽  
Alexander Coutts ◽  
Pedro Vicente ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Viktor Koziuk

This article introduces the hypothesis that resource-rich countries display a low degree of central bank independence (CBI). This hypothesis is proven based on multivariable regression, but the influence of resource factors is not considered strong enough compared with previous inflationary experience and the characteristics of the political regime. It stresses that the impact of the commodity wealth factor on CBI choice is direct (through the share of commodity exports in total export) and indirect through the lower level of democracy in commodities countries that feature more dependent central banks. Also, this hypothesis is proven based on the grouping of countries. Such grouping shows that despite a general tendency of CBI increase in the world, a group of commodity exporting countries experiencing a substantially lower level of mean GMT-index, ECWN-index, and transparency-index resulted in lower CBI compared with groups of emerging markets and developing countries. Explaining these phenomena is rooted in features of institutional distortions in commodity economies, the specific structure of interventionist policy to overcome a "resource curse", and the specific role of the exchange rate and FX reserves in intertemporal macroeconomic policy.


2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (5) ◽  
pp. 1759-1796 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernanda Brollo ◽  
Tommaso Nannicini ◽  
Roberto Perotti ◽  
Guido Tabellini

This paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a political agency model with career concerns and endogenous entry of candidates. The data refer to Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously at given population thresholds, allowing us to implement a regression discontinuity design. The empirical evidence shows that larger transfers increase observed corruption and reduce the average education of candidates for mayor. These and other more specific empirical results are in line with the predictions of the theory. (JEL D72, D73, H77, O17, O18)


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