NATO's Northern Front: Developments and Prospects

1982 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 193-205
Author(s):  
Dov S. Zakheim

Beginning in the mid-1970s, a number of observers of the so-called Nordic balance began to draw attention to the growing imbalance in NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities in the region. The U.S.-Norwegian prestocking arrangement was one NATO response to the limited warning time for a Soviet move to cut off the North Cape area. Whereas Norway, in conjunction with the United States, is currently in the midst of a major effort to restore the credibility of its northernmost defenses, Denmark has been amongst the most reluctant of Alliance members to increase its level of defense spending. Furthermore, Greenland's home rule represents another complication. Given Greenland's clear determination to go its own way in international economic affairs, it is important to assess whether it might do the same on defense matters. Greenland's importance to NATO is often overlooked but cannot be overstated. Finland's neutrality and Sweden's more forceful armed neutrality permit NATO to adopt a posture which does not impose upon Denmark and Norway the burden of hosting foreign troops upon their soil.

2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-166
Author(s):  
Maxim A. Suchkov

The North Caucasus is a most significant but a least understood problem in contemporary U.S.-Russia relations. The United States as one of the prime pace-setters in the region shaped its own attitude towards Russia’s most volatile region. Over more than twenty years, Washington experienced at least three major stages in its “Caucasus strategy”, and each stage had its impact on the North Caucasus. Since the beginning, the two states stuck to conflicting narratives of developments in the region. With time, some of the assessments were re-evaluated, but some continue to impede cooperation on key security issues. The present article explores these phenomena and examines what implications major events like the 9/11 attacks, the Caucasus Emirate enlistment among top terrorist organisations, the Boston marathon bombings, etc. had for the U.S.-Russia joint efforts in fighting terrorism. It also assesses areas of potential disagreement in the North Caucasus between the two countries.


Author(s):  
Richard D. Mahoney

How did the U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement come about? The officially named “U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement” was the stepchild of a rancorous hemispheric divorce between the United States and five Latin American governments over the proposal to extend the North American Free Trade Agreement...


2000 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Alesina

Current surpluses in the U.S. have been achieved by a combination of a strong economy, low interest rates, and sharp cuts in defense spending. These surpluses follow a period (the 1980s) of rather exceptional budget deficit. This paper investigates the origin, size, and expected future patterns of the U.S. budget balance. It discusses how different political forces may generate alternative fiscal scenarios for the U.S. in the next decade.


2008 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Mastanduno

There is striking consistency in the international economic behavior of the United States across the bipolar and unipolar eras. The United States has been simultaneously a system maker and privilege taker, and its ability to play that dual role has required the willing collaboration of foreign partners. U.S. influence over those partners, however, has changed in important ways. During the cold war the United States dominated international economic adjustment struggles. Its ability to prevail in those struggles after the cold war has been significantly compromised. The United States, notwithstanding its preponderant power, no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed, and the very success of the U.S.-centered world economy has opened a greater range of international and domestic economic options for America's supporters. In the unipolar era the United States may continue to act its own way, but it can no longer count on getting its own way.


2011 ◽  
Vol 139 (5) ◽  
pp. 1305-1322 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard E. Orville ◽  
Gary R. Huffines ◽  
William R. Burrows ◽  
Kenneth L. Cummins

Cloud-to-ground (CG) lightning data have been analyzed for the years 2001–09 for North America, which includes Alaska, Canada, and the lower 48 U.S. states. Flashes recorded within the North American Lightning Detection Network (NALDN) are examined. No corrections for detection efficiency variability are made over the 9 yr of the dataset or over the large geographical area comprising North America. There were network changes in the NALDN during the 9 yr, but these changes have not been corrected for nor have the recorded data been altered in any way with the exception that all positive lightning reports with peak currents less than 15 kA have been deleted. Thus, the reader should be aware that secular changes are not just climatological in nature. All data were analyzed with a spatial resolution of 20 km. The analyses presented in this work provide a synoptic view of the interannual variability of lightning observations in North America, including the impacts of physical changes in the network during the 9 yr of study. These data complement and extend previous analyses that evaluate the U.S. NLDN during periods of upgrade. The total (negative and positive) flashes for ground flash density, the percentage of positive lightning, and the positive flash density have been analyzed. Furthermore, the negative and positive first stroke peak currents and the flash multiplicity have been examined. The highest flash densities in Canada are along the U.S.–Canadian border (1–2 flashes per square kilometer) and in the United States along the Gulf of Mexico coast from Texas through Florida (exceeding 14 flashes per square kilometer in Florida). The Gulf Stream is “outlined” by higher flash densities off the east coast of the United States. Maximum annual positive flash densities in Canada range primarily from 0.01 to 0.3 flashes per square kilometer, and in the United States to over 0.5 flashes per square kilometer in the Midwest and in the states of Louisiana and Mississippi. The annual percentage of positive lightning to ground varies from less than 2% over Florida to values exceeding 25% off the West Coast, Alaska, and the Yukon. A localized maximum in the percentage of positive lightning in the NALDN occurs in Manitoba and western Ontario, just north of North Dakota and Minnesota. When averaged over North America, first stroke negative median peak currents range from 19.8 kA in 2001 to 16.0 kA in 2009 and for all years, average 16.1 kA. First stroke positive median peak currents range from a high of 29.0 kA in 2008 and 2009 to a low of 23.3 kA in 2003 with a median of 25.7 kA for all years. There is a relatively sharp transition from low to high median negative peak currents along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts of the United States. No sharp transitions are observed for the median positive peak currents. Relatively lower positive peak currents occur throughout the southeastern United States. The highest values of mean negative multiplicity exceed 3.0 strokes per flash in the NALDN with some variation over the 9 yr. Lower values of mean negative multiplicity occur in the western United States. Positive flash mean multiplicity is slightly higher than 1.1, with the highest values of 1.7 observed in the southwestern states. As has been noted in prior research, CG lightning has significant variations from storm to storm as well as between geographical regions and/or seasons and, consequently, a single distribution for any lightning parameter, such as multiplicity or peak current, may not be sufficient to represent or describe the parameter.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-205
Author(s):  
James Jungbok Lee

This article examines the reasons why the level of alliance cohesion between the United States and the Republic of Korea (rok) was suboptimal during the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis (2002–2006). Existing studies on this phenomenon primarily attribute its causes to factors like the rise of anti-Americanism in the rok and/or the increasing divergence in the two nations’ respective threat perceptions of the North Korea and their resulting policy preferences. However, these explanations are partial at best. The main finding here is that one should understand the frictions in the U.S.-rok alliance in terms of the rok’s status concerns. In particular, the rok, with a sense of entitlement to its solid middle power status, had set out to cooperate closely with the United States in seeking to answer the nuclear problem, based on the spirit of horizontal, equitable alliance relations. However, the United States failed overall to reciprocate, thereby leading the rok to boldly pursue its own set of policies at the expense of eroding alliance cohesion. These events demonstrate that (dis)respect for status concerns in international politics can make a major contribution towards facilitating (or impeding) interstate cooperation.


2005 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-440
Author(s):  
PIERRE ASSELIN

The spring 1965 deployment of U.S. ground forces to South Vietnam and initiation of sustained aerial and naval bombardments of the North by the U.S. military marked a turning point in the history of the Vietnamese Revolution. Until recently, Western scholars only vaguely understood Hanoi's attitude toward those developments and what they meant for the revolution it spearheaded. Newly available materials from Vietnam provide a clearer picture of the concerns of North Vietnamese policymakers in the period immediately before and after the American intervention. Based on such materials, this article demonstrates that, when it committed the North to a wider war with the United States, Hanoi did so reluctantly. Having made the commitment, however, it stopped at nothing to guarantee the ultimate success of its efforts.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 104-133
Author(s):  
Evanthis Hatzivassiliou

After war broke out between Arab countries and Israel in October 1973, the U.S. government asked its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to do the unthinkable: establish an agreed position on an ongoing “out-of-area” crisis. Then, on 25 October, the United States unilaterally raised the alert level of its armed forces to DEFCON III, affecting the NATO area without consulting any allies. These actions constituted a radical departure from established NATO practice and angered the Europeans. U.S. officials, for their part, were upset at what they saw as a dismal European failure to support U.S. objectives in the Middle East crisis. In subsequent months, NATO frantically searched for ways to improve consultation, especially on out-of-area issues. The outcome in 1974 was the promulgation of the Atlantic Declaration, along with a series of functional reforms in alliance consultation procedures. The crisis forced NATO to adjust to the new trends of globalization that were rapidly becoming evident.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (3) ◽  
pp. 756-764

Throughout Donald Trump's presidential campaign and into the first months of his presidency, he has warned that the United States' commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) may depend on whether its partner states increase their defense spending in line with previously adopted guidelines. While senior administration officials have reaffirmed U.S. commitments to the NATO alliance, including the North Atlantic Treaty's mutual defense obligation on several occasions, President Trump himself did not so until mid-June. Separately, the Trump administration signaled its support for NATO by supporting the admission of Montenegro as a new member state.


2019 ◽  
pp. 71-101
Author(s):  
David Scott FitzGerald

The U.S. Coast Guard intercepted more than a quarter of a million migrants, including an unknown number of refugees, between 1982 and 2015. Practices developed by the United States to stop Haitians were then copied to prevent Chinese asylum seekers from crossing the Pacific. The 1993 Sale decision by the U.S. Supreme Court to allow refoulement on the high seas still stands. The fact that there are screenings at all, whatever their serious inadequacies, is evidence of diffuse international pressure articulated through the U.S. State Department and the influence of civil society. The Canadian government flirted with maritime refoulement but was constrained by greater deference to international law and the concern that openly flouting it would potentially damage Canada’s international reputation. The United States is a world leader in defining military bases strewn across the globe as territories under its control but not its sovereignty and thus spaces where asylum seekers have limited rights.


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