Militias in Civil Wars

2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (5) ◽  
pp. 755-769 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corinna Jentzsch ◽  
Stathis N. Kalyvas ◽  
Livia Isabella Schubiger
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Political Violence ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Local Population ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Integrated Study

Militias are an empirical phenomenon that has been overlooked by current research on civil war. Yet, it is a phenomenon that is crucial for understanding political violence, civil war, post-conflict politics, and authoritarianism. Militias or paramilitaries are armed groups that operate alongside regular security forces or work independently of the state to shield the local population from insurgents. We review existing uses of the term, explore the range of empirical manifestations of militias, and highlight recent findings, including those supplied by the articles in this special issue. We focus on areas where the recognition of the importance of militias challenges and complements current theories of civil war. We conclude by introducing a research agenda advocating the integrated study of militias and rebel groups.

Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009)

2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
DARA KAY COHEN
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Sierra Leone ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
Cross National

Why do some armed groups commit massive wartime rape, whereas others never do? Using an original dataset, I describe the substantial variation in rape by armed actors during recent civil wars and test a series of competing causal explanations. I find evidence that the recruitment mechanism is associated with the occurrence of wartime rape. Specifically, the findings support an argument about wartime rape as a method of socialization, in which armed groups that recruit by force—through abduction or pressganging—use rape to create unit cohesion. State weakness and insurgent contraband funding are also associated with increased wartime rape by rebel groups. I examine observable implications of the argument in a brief case study of the Sierra Leone civil war. The results challenge common explanations for wartime rape, with important implications for scholars and policy makers.

Socialization and violence

2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 592-605 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey T Checkel
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Group Dynamics ◽  
Democratic Republic Of Congo ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Socialization Theory ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Us ◽  
Urban Gangs

This article sets the stage for a special issue exploring group-level dynamics and their role in producing violence. My analytic focus is socialization, or the process through which actors adopt the norms and rules of a given community. I argue that it is key to understanding violence in many settings, including civil war, national militaries, post-conflict societies and urban gangs. While socialization theory has a long history in the social sciences, I do not simply pull it off the shelf, but instead rethink core features of it. Operating in a theory-building mode and drawing upon insights from other disciplines, I highlight its layered and multiple nature, the role of instrumental calculation in it and several relevant mechanisms – from persuasion, to organized rituals, to sexual violence, to violent display. Equally important, I theorize instances where socialization is resisted, as well as the (varying) staying power of norms and practices in an individual who leaves the group. Empirically, the special issue explores the link between socialization and violence in paramilitary patrols in Guatemala; vigilantes in the Bosnian civil war; gangs in post-conflict Nicaragua; rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Sierra Leone and Uganda; post-conflict peacekeepers; and the US and Israeli military. By documenting this link, we contribute to an emerging research program on group dynamics and conflict.

Stick Then Carrot: When Do Governments Give Amnesty during Civil War?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley-Ann Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Government

Abstract Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as a signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty is a rational policy choice. Governments should give amnesties when they are winning: the risk of misinterpreted signals is lessened, costs are low, rebel groups are weakened, and so amnesty can be used instrumentally to encourage defection or division among foot soldiers or as an incentive to leaders. Therefore, the government capitalizes on its military advantage and offers amnesty in a “stick then carrot” tactic. Using a database of amnesties during conflicts from 1990 to 2011, the article shows that governments are more likely to give amnesties following high rebel deaths. The use of amnesty during conflict is nuanced and context is important when understanding strategic choices.

Oil Wealth, Post-conflict Elections, and Postwar Peace Failure

2015 ◽  
Vol 61 (5) ◽  
pp. 1021-1045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Keels
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Economic Factors ◽  
Factors Associated ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Oil Revenue ◽  
Oil Wealth ◽  
New Research

New research has emerged that suggests there is a troubling relationship between elections and civil wars; primarily, elections increase the risk of civil war recurrence. I investigate this relationship further by examining the economic factors associated with the connection between postwar elections and peace failure. Specifically, how does the presence of oil wealth impact the risk posed by postwar elections. Drawing on previous findings in the democratization literature, I suggest the immobility of oil wealth dramatically increases the stakes associated with postwar elections. As postwar elites use irregular electioneering to consolidate their control of oil revenue, it increases the incentives for postwar opposition to use violence as a means to achieve their objectives. Using post-civil war data from 1945 to 2005, I demonstrate that postwar elections that occur in oil-rich economies dramatically decrease the durability of postwar peace. Once controlling for petro elections, though, I demonstrate that subsequent postwar elections actually increase the durability of postwar peace.

Thai Buddhism, Thai Buddhists and the southern conflict

2009 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan McCargo
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Political Violence ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Local Identity ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Southern Border ◽  
1960S And 1970S ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Financial Arrangements

Thailand's ‘southern border provinces’ of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat – along with four districts of neighbouring Songkhla – are the site of fiery political violence characterised by daily killings. The area was historically a Malay sultanate, and was only loosely under Thai suzerainty until the early twentieth century. During the twentieth century there was periodic resistance to Bangkok's attempts to suppress local identity and to incorporate this largely Malay-speaking, Muslim-majority area into a predominantly Buddhist nation-state. This resistance proved most intense during the 1960s and 1970s, when various armed groups (notably PULO [Patani United Liberation Organization] and BRN [Barisan Revolusi Nasional]) waged war on the Thai state, primarily targeting government officials and the security forces. In the early 1980s, the Prem Tinsulanond government brokered a deal with these armed groups and proceeded to co-opt the Malay-Muslim elite. By crafting mutually beneficial governance, security and financial arrangements, the Thai state was able largely to placate local political demands.

scholarly journals Argelia enrocada en la legislación: de la violencia política a la autocensura periodística como mal endémico

2018 ◽  
pp. 445
Author(s):  
Beatriz Alonso
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Political Violence ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Authoritarian State ◽  
Los Grupos ◽  
Medios De Comunicacion ◽  
Violencia Politica

Resumen: Los medios de comunicación en Argelia, especialmente la prensa privada nacida en los albores de la guerra civil de los años noventa, han sido sometidos bajo el yugo de la violencia política desde casi sus orígenes, tanto por parte de las fuerzas represoras de la Administración como de los grupos armados (sean o no considerados terroristas). En un Estado autoritario como el argelino, los conflictos son exámenes potentes a los que se somete a la prensa, la cual puede ayudar a cimentar la democracia si se les permite a los profesionales trabajar. Una legislación que proteja el ejercicio periodístico es fundamental para garantizar la libertad de información.Palabras clave: Argelia, prensa, legislación, violencia política, autocensura, libertad.Abstract: Media in Algeria, especially the private press was born at the dawn of the civil war of the nineties, have been subdued under the yoke of political violence almost from its origins, by the repressive forces of the Administration and the armed groups, whether or not considered terrorists. In an authoritarian state like Algeria, conflicts are powerful tests. Press can help to found democracy if journalists could work effectively. A legislation to protect the practice of journalism is essential to ensure freedom of information.Keywords: Algeria, press, legislation, political violence, self-censorship, freedom.

scholarly journals Coup-Proofing and Civil War

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Koga Sudduth
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
The Other ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Future ◽  
Face Threats ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Political leaders face threats to their power from within and outside the regime. Leaders can be removed via a coup d’état undertaken by militaries that are part of the state apparatus. At the same time, leaders can lose power when they confront excluded opposition groups in civil wars. The difficulty for leaders, though, is that efforts to address one threat might leave them vulnerable to the other threat due to the role of the military as an institution of violence capable of exercising coercive power. On one hand, leaders need to protect their regimes from rebels by maintaining strong militaries. Yet, militaries that are strong enough to prevail against rebel forces are also strong enough to execute a coup successfully. On the other hand, leaders who cope with coup threats by weakening their militaries’ capabilities to organize a coup also diminish the very capabilities that they need to defeat their rebel challengers. This unfortunate trade-off between protection by the military and protection from the military has been the long-standing theme in studies of civil-military relations and coup-proofing. Though most research on this subject has focused primarily on rulers’ maneuvers to balance the threats posed by the military and the threats coming from foreign adversaries, more recent scholarship has begun to explore how leaders’ efforts to cope with coup threats will influence the regime’s abilities to address the domestic threats coming from rebel groups, and vice versa. This new wave of research focuses on two related vectors. First, scholars address whether leaders who pursue coup-proofing strategies that weaken their militaries’ capabilities also increase the regime’s vulnerability to rebel threats and the future probability of civil war. Second, scholars examine how the magnitude of threats posed by rebel groups will determine leaders’ strategies toward the militaries, and how these strategies affect both the militaries’ influence over government policy and the future probability of coup onsets. These lines of research contribute to the conflict literature by examining the causal mechanisms through which civil conflict influences coup propensity and vice versa. The literatures on civil war and coups have developed independently without much consideration of each other, and systematic analyses of the linkage between them have only just began.

scholarly journals Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes

2015 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virginia Page Fortna
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
Better Than

AbstractHow effective is terrorism? This question has generated lively scholarly debate and is of obvious importance to policy-makers. However, most existing studies of terrorism are not well equipped to answer this question because they lack an appropriate comparison. This article compares the outcomes of civil wars to assess whether rebel groups that use terrorism fare better than those who eschew this tactic. I evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of terrorism relative to other tactics used in civil war. Because terrorism is not a tactic employed at random, I first briefly explore empirically which groups use terrorism. Controlling for factors that may affect both the use of terrorism and war outcomes, I find that although civil wars involving terrorism last longer than other wars, terrorist rebel groups are generally less likely to achieve their larger political objectives than are nonterrorist groups. Terrorism may be less ineffective against democracies, but even in this context, terrorists do not win.

International Recognition, Compliance Costs, and the Formalities of War

Wars of Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 38-71
Author(s):  
Tanisha M. Fazal
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
International Community ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
Compliance Costs ◽  
Interstate War ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
International Recognition ◽  
Peace Treaties

This chapter develops the main arguments of the book, focusing on how belligerents in interstate and civil war have reacted to the development of the laws of war detailed in Chapter 2. States involved in interstate war are perversely incentivized to evade the laws of war as these laws have proliferated. Thus, they are decreasingly likely to engage the formalities of war, specifically declarations of war and peace treaties. Secessionist rebel groups fighting civil wars aim to please the international community, and therefore are decreasingly likely to declare independence formally, generally likely to avoid targeting civilians, and increasingly likely to conclude peace treaties.

scholarly journals Fueling rebellion: Maritime piracy and the duration of civil war

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 128-147
Author(s):  
Brandon Prins ◽  
Anup Phayal ◽  
Ursula E Daxecker
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Causal Process ◽  
Maritime Piracy ◽  
Fighting Ability ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Conflict Duration ◽  
Resource Wealth

Extant research shows that the presence of natural resources can prolong civil wars. But research also indicates that as rebel groups become stronger, conflicts tend to shorten. These studies suggest an unclear association among the three variables—resources, rebel strength, and conflict duration. If resources increase the fighting ability of rebels, then why do they not shorten conflicts? To understand this relationship, we examine incidents of maritime piracy, which unlike other resources are more clearly exploited by rebel groups rather than states and offer new insight on how this might affect the persistence of civil war. The findings suggest that the use of piracy by weaker rebel groups shortens conflict but prolongs it when exploited by stronger rebel groups. We think our conditional analyses allow us to discern insurgencies driven at least in part by greedy rebels and therefore better illuminate the causal process by which resource wealth prolongs civil war.

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