Monetary and Fiscal Policy in Europe: an Overview

2000 ◽  
Vol 174 ◽  
pp. 63-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray Barrell ◽  
Nigel Pain
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Price Level ◽  
Reference Value ◽  
Medium Term ◽  
Type Representation ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Monetary And Fiscal Policy

There are new monetary and fiscal frameworks in place for the countries in the Euro Area. The European Central Bank has a remit to maintain price level stability in the medium term, and it has developed a two pillar strategy, with interest rates being set in relation to a reference value of M3 and general (inflationary) conditions. We discuss an ideal type representation of this framework and examine the potential effects of a fall in the euro. Fiscal policy in Europe is now based on guidelines from the Stability and Growth Pact and we discuss the role of commitment in this framework as well

scholarly journals Das Kaninchen vor der Schlange

2001 ◽  
Vol 31 (125) ◽  
pp. 637-648
Author(s):  
Hansjörg Herr
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
World Economy ◽  
Western World ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Liberal Ideology ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Monetary And Fiscal Policy

The terrorattack hit the western world in a situation of a sharp cyclical downturn in the USA, Europe and Japan. Mainly because of increased uncertainty the downturn will be intensified by the attack. Immediately after the attack US monetary and fiscal policy became even more expansive. In Europe monetary policy reacted very reluctantly. Active fiscal policy in the Euro-area is nearly not existing as the Stability and Growth Pact as well as neo-liberal ideology prevents fiscal measures. The inactive economic policy in the Euro-area is not only dangerous for Europe but also a depressing factor for the world economy.

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions

2016 ◽  
pp. 447-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asuman Oktayer ◽  
Nagihan Oktayer
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Price Level ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
Testing Procedure ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Bounds Testing ◽  
Financial Policies ◽  
Policy Interactions ◽  
Monetary And Fiscal Policy

While the role of fiscal policy in price level determination was neglected by the conventional theory, a new point of view was adapted by the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. In the context of the new theory, monetary and fiscal policy interactions were taken into account and the role of fiscal policy was underlined. This paper investigates the monetary and fiscal policy coordination in Turkey during the period 1989.1-2012.2 and sub-periods 1989.1-2001.1 and 2001.2-2012.2. In order to reveal if financial policies are monetary dominant or fiscal dominant in aforementioned periods, bounds testing procedure is applied by using quarterly data. While the empirical test results related to the entire period of 1989.1-2012.2 and sub-period of 1989.1-2001.1 indicate fiscal policy dominant regime, the findings regarding 2001.2-2012.2 imply monetary policy dominant regime in Turkey.

scholarly journals Measuring the Effect of the Zero Lower Bound on Medium- and Longer-Term Interest Rates

2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (10) ◽  
pp. 3154-3185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric T. Swanson ◽  
John C. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Lower Bound ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Zero Lower Bound ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Macroeconomic Models ◽  
Monetary And Fiscal Policy ◽  
Effectiveness Of Monetary Policy

According to standard macroeconomic models, the zero lower bound greatly reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy and increases the efficacy of fiscal policy. However, private-sector decisions depend on the entire path of expected future short-term interest rates, not just the current short-term rate. Put differently, longer-term yields matter. We show how to measure the zero bound's effects on yields of any maturity. Indeed, 1- and 2-year Treasury yields were surprisingly unconstrained throughout 2008 to 2010, suggesting that monetary and fiscal policy were about as effective as usual during this period. Only beginning in late 2011 did these yields become more constrained. (JEL E43, E52, E62)

Interakcje polityki pieniężnej i fiskalnej a niezależność banku centralnego – przegląd możliwych podejść modelowych w badaniach empirycznych

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryszard Kokoszczyński ◽  
Joanna Mackiewicz-Łyziak
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Price Level ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Overwhelming Majority ◽  
Monetary Policies ◽  
Sustainable Policy ◽  
Monetary And Fiscal Policy ◽  
Simple Models

There are numerous theoretical and empirical studies on interactions between monetary and fiscal policy. Even if the independence of central banks affects those interactions, it has rarely been directly included in those studies. In this chapter, we present two general approaches to empirical studies on interactions between those two policies and the possibilities for inclusion of independence of central banks in their modelling. Generally, the first approach has poor theoretic background and relies on simple models describing rules for fiscal and monetary policies. Those models also include proxies for some aspects of fiscal policy. Similarly, some simple measures usually address the independence of central banks. The second approach most often roots in the fiscal theory of the price level. The overwhelming majority of presented studies report a significant impact of the central banks’ independence in the form of a more sustainable policy using the first approach.

scholarly journals Risking the Stability of EMU: the Asymmetric Application of the Stability and Growth Pact

2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bartholomew Paudyn
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rates ◽  
Price Stability ◽  
Risk Governance ◽  
The Political ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Risk And Uncertainty ◽  
The Core ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Ultimate Objective ◽  
The Stability

Fiscal profligacy poses a high risk to the credibility of Europe common monetary policy and its ultimate objective of price stability. Unfortunately, the aim of preventing fiscally responsible states from being penalized by those with lax budgetary policies via inflationary pressures and interest rates is jeopardized as members breach the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Moreover, there are major institutional inconsistencies in how states are treated under the current framework as is exemplified by the November 2003 ECONFIN crisis. What is witnessed is an antagonistic relationship between the programmatic and operational dimensions of monetary governance. Does the fact that half the members who have adopted the euro have also breached its rules signal that surveillance as regulation is being displaced as a mode of governance? It calls for a re-imaged spatial-temporal explanation of governance to adequately capture the political economy of EMU. At the core of EMU management are risk and uncertainty based modes of governing. Employing a governmentality approach, I argue that the audit is one prominent style of processing and institutionalizing risk as an aggregate future of monetary activity. By altering the administration and objects of risk governance the audit is perceived as reducing the susceptibility to failure. Hence, it has a performative function that extends beyond simply measuring deficit or debt to GDP performance and acts as a social and institutional process structuring a homogenous set of fiscal practices.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document