Political Liberalism and Christian Political Theology: A Review of Two Works by Liberals that Can Enhance Prospects for Dialogue

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Chaplin

This review article assesses the usefulness of two substantial recent books on religion by liberal political philosophers, Cécile Laborde and Aurélia Bardon (eds), Religion in Liberal Political Philosophy, and Cécile Laborde, Liberalism’s Religion. It opens by situating these books against the landscape of UK-based work on the place of public religion in liberal democracy by both liberal political philosophers and Christian political theologians. Noting the relative paucity—by comparison with those from North America—of contributions on the theme from both quarters, it welcomes these books as providing important clarifications for political theologians of how many of the precise tensions between religion and liberal democracy might be better understood and how debate between the two disciplines might thereby be enhanced.

1993 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
D. P.

In this review article, the revisioned christology developed by the American theologian Mark Kline Taylor in the chapter ‘Christ as rough Beast’ in his book ‘Remembering Esperanza’ (1990) is discussed critically. The cultural- political theology developed by Taylor, in which he ‘moves’ from autobiographical elements to theological reflection in addressing the postmodern trilemma in North America, is explained. It is shown how Taylor, through his cultural-political hermeneutics of tradition, unfolds his christology as a fourfold christology in which Christ designates an intersubjective, socio-historical force for reconciliatory emancipation. Finally, his christological interpretation is critically compared by means of formal similarities with that of the German New Testament scholar Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976).


Author(s):  
Daniel A. Dombrowski

In this work two key theses are defended: political liberalism is a processual (rather than a static) view and process thinkers should be political liberals. Three major figures are considered (Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne) in the effort to show the superiority of political liberalism to its illiberal alternatives on the political right and left. Further, a politically liberal stance regarding nonhuman animals and the environment is articulated. It is typical for debates in political philosophy to be adrift regarding the concept of method, but from start to finish this book relies on the processual method of reflective equilibrium or dialectic at its best. This is the first extended effort to argue for both political liberalism as a process-oriented view and process philosophy/theology as a politically liberal view. It is also a timely defense of political liberalism against illiberal tendencies on both the right and the left.


Author(s):  
Carl-Henric Grenholm

The purpose of this article is to examine the contributions that might be given by Lutheran political theology to the discourse on global justice. The article offers a critical examination of three different theories of global justice within political philosophy. Contractarian theories are criticized, and a thesis is that it is plausible to argue that justice can be understood as liberation from oppression. From this perspective the article gives an analysis of an influential theory of justice within Lutheran ethics. According to this theory justice is not an equal distribution but an arrangement where the subordinate respect the authority of those in power. This theory is related to a sharp distinction between law and gospel. The main thesis of the article is that Lutheran political theology should take a different approach if it aims to give a constructive contribution to theories of justice. This means that Lutheran ethics should not be based on Creation and reason alone – it should also be based on Christology and Eschatology.


2021 ◽  
pp. 136843102098541
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Kędziora

The debate between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls concerns the question of how to do political philosophy under conditions of cultural pluralism, if the aim of political philosophy is to uncover the normative foundation of a modern liberal democracy. Rawls’s political liberalism tries to bypass the problem of pluralism, using the intellectual device of the veil of ignorance, and yet paradoxically at the same time it treats it as something given and as an arbiter of justification within the political conception of justice. Habermas argues that Rawls not only incorrectly operationalizes the moral point of view from which we discern what is just but also fails to capture the specificity of democracy which is given by internal relations between politics and law. This deprives Rawls’s political philosophy of the conceptual tools needed to articulate the normative foundation of democracy.


Author(s):  
Fernando Aranda Fraga ◽  

In 1993 John Rawls published his main and longest work since 1971, where he had published his reknowned A Theory of Justice, book that made him famous as the greatest political philosopher of the century. We are referring to Political Liberalism, a summary of his writings of the 80’s and the first half of the 90’s, where he attempts to answer the critics of his intellectual partners, communitarian philosophers. One of the key topics in this book is the issue of “public reason”, whose object is nothing else than public good, and on which the principles and proceedings of justice are to be applied. The book was so important for the political philosophy of the time that in 1997 Rawls had to go through the 1993 edition, becoming this new one the last relevant writing published before the death of the Harvard philosopher in November 2002.


Author(s):  
Pedro Francés

RESUMENEste trabajo tiene como objetivo responder a las críticas al liberalismo formuladas en un reciente trabajo de Carlos Kohn. Para mostrar esto expondré, en primer lugar, por qué pienso que Kohn generaliza ilegítimamente una concepción bastante estrecha de liberalismo, relacionada con la economía. En segundo lugar señalaré los límites de esa concepción, y cómo puede definirse otra más comprehensiva, en la que enmarcaré la mayor parte del liberalismo político contemporáneo y, un tanto audazmente, el contractualismo clásico de Hobbes. En tercer lugar, trateré de mostrar que, esta versión comprehensiva es una razonable descripción de la política, que no depende lógicamente de suposiciones dudosas sobre los presupuestos y requisitos de la economía de mercado y que, por ello, escapa indemne a la crítica de KohnPALABRAS CLAVELIBERALISMO-LIBERALISMO POLÍTICO-DEMOCRACIA LIBERAL-CAPITALISMOABSTRACTThe paper aims to revise the critiques to liberalism recently formulated by Carlos Kohn. i will explain, firstly, why I think Kohn wrongly generalizes a quite thin conception of liberalism, related to the economy. Secondly, I will suggest the limitations of that conception. Instead, another, more comprehensive notion can be formulated that can encompass both contemporary political liberalism and, even audaciously, Hobbes' cassical contractualism. Thirdly, I will argue that this comprehensive notion is a reasonable description of politics. it does not depend on doubtfull assumptions over the principles of market economy. hence, it escapes Kohn's critique.KEYWORDSLIBERALISM- POLITICAL LIBERALISM-LIBERAL DEMOCRACY-CAPITALISM


Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER MCMAHON

The concept of the reasonable plays an important role in Rawls's political philosophy, but there has been little systematic investigation of this concept or of the way Rawls employs it. This article distinguishes several different forms of reasonableness and uses them to explore Rawls's political liberalism. The discussion focuses on the idea, found especially in the most recent versions of this theory, of a family of liberal conceptions of justice each of which is regarded by everyone in a polity as reasonable, even if only barely so. The idea of such a family is central to Rawls's notion of reciprocity and the view of political cooperation associated with it. This article questions whether the concept of the reasonable can play the role that Rawls intends.


Acorn ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-129
Author(s):  
Sanjay Lal ◽  
Jeff Shawn Jose ◽  
Douglas Allen ◽  
Michael Allen ◽  

In this author-meets-critics dialogue, Sanjay Lal, author of , argues that Gandhian values of nonviolence raise aspirations of liberal democracy to a higher level. Since Gandhian values of nonviolence are closely associated with religious values, liberal democracy should make public commitments to religions on a non-sectarian basis, except for unreasonable religions. Critic Jeff Shawn Jose agrees that Gandhian values can strengthen liberal democracy. However, Jose finds a contradiction in Lal’s proposal that a liberal state should support reasonable religions only. A more consistent Gandhian approach would focus on everyday interactions between citizens and groups rather than state-directed preferences. Critic Douglas Allen also welcomes Lal’s project that brings Gandhian philosophy into relation with liberal democratic theory; however, he argues that universalizing the Absolute Truth of genuine religion is more complicated than Lal acknowledges. D. Allen argues for a Gandhian approach of relative truths, which cannot be evaluated apart from contingency or context, and he offers autobiographical evidence in support of his critical suspicion of genuine religion. Critic Michael Allen argues that Lal’s metaphysical approach to public justification violates a central commitment of political liberalism not to take sides on any metaphysical basis. M. Allen argues that democratic socialism is closer to Gandhi’s approach than is liberalism. Lal responds to critics by arguing that Gandhi’s evaluation of unreasonable religions depends upon an assessment of violence, which is not as problematic as critics charge, either from a Gandhian perspective or a liberal one. Furthermore, by excluding unreasonable or violent religions from state promotion, Lal argues that he is not advocating state suppression. Finally, Lal argues that Gandhian or Kingian metaphysics are worthy of support by liberal, democratic states seeking to educate individuals regarding peaceful unity in diversity.


2007 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Bican Sahin

How can Muslim societies marked by religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity secure peace and stability? I argue that the principle of toleration provides the most appropriate environment for the peaceful coexistence of these differences, for individuals living in a polity can adopt different moral views and experience their cultural, ethnic, and other differences peacefully. Toleration is mainly a characteristic of liberal democratic regimes. However, different traditions of liberalism lead to different versions of liberal democracy. Also, not all versions of liberalism value toleration to the same degree. I argue that a liberal democracy based on “political” rather than “comprehensive” liberalism provides the broadest space for the existence of differences, for it does not present a shared way of life, but only a political framework within which individuals and groups with different worldviews can solve their common political problems. However, a liberal democracy based on comprehensive liberalism requires cultural groups and/or individuals to subscribe to fundamental liberal values (e.g., autonomy), and this stance limits its room for toleration. Thus, if liberal democracy is going to be introduced into the Muslim world to bring about peace and stability, it must be a liberal democracy based on political, rather than comprehensive, liberalism.


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