The historical possibility and necessity of (Ilyenkov’s) anti-innatism

2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 683-702 ◽  
Author(s):  
Siyaves Azeri

An important aspect of Evald Ilyenkov’s theory of social mind is anti-innatism. Anti-innatism is not only the necessary logical outcome of Ilyenkov’s overall philosophical system and in particular of his anti-reductionism, but also it is a socio-historically possible and necessary consequence of the capitalist mode of production, which amounts to the formation of a gap between socially formed human knowledge and growth of the productive powers, on the one hand, and value-producing labour, on the other.

2021 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 833-865
Author(s):  
Vera Vratuša-Žunjić

The paper examines the actuality of Rosa Luxemburg's Reform or revolution 150 years after her birth. The main method used is the content analysis of this important polemical pamphlet placed in the context of the time/space, i.e. when and where it was written, on the one hand, and today, on the other. The main finding is that Rosa's work has remained relevant to our days since the capitalist mode of production is still characterized by internal contradictions producing barbaric consequences of exploitation and imperialist wars. These capitalist system's consequences ensure the permanent actuality of the dilemma between socialism and barbarism confronted by Rosa Luxemburg throughout her life.


2013 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Cahen

AbstractEstablishing a comparison between so-called “Latin” America and “Portuguese-speaking” Africa may well prove useful in highlighting certain major differences between those countries of America and Africa having undergone early colonization. But the main difference will not concern the hundred and fifty years between the independences of the early nineteenth and those of the late (1974-1975) twentieth century. It will lie in the very nature of the states created, on the one hand, by independences without decolonization - the colonial (Latin) states - and, on the other hand, by independence with decolonization - the decolonized (African) states: states, that is, which are differently embedded into colonialities of power. But such a comparison will also help to bring out certain common features stemming from the “longue durée” of Iberian colonizations. One such feature, despite the distance involved, is the Creole issue: the persistence and political importance of social milieus stemming from the first age of colonization. Although those old colonial elites were pre-capitalist - in the sense of not accumulating via the capitalist mode of production - they were, however, fully integrated into the merchant capitalist world-system.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 441-447
Author(s):  
Martín Miguel Buceta ◽  

In Opacidad y relativismo. La situacionalidad del conocimiento en tensión entre Merleau-Ponty y Foucault, Claudio Cormick introduces Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s and Michel Foucault’s philosophies as attempts to face two possible obstacles for human knowledge : on the one hand, the opacity of consciousness with regard to the foundations of its own positions; on the other, the relative, non-absolute character of our claims to truth, inasmuch as they are formulated within concrete social and historical conditions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-14
Author(s):  
Almas Musa Kizi Ismailova

The article analyses the main provisions of the peasant reform in Georgia, which had a further impact on the socio-economic development of the landowner peasants of Tiflis and Kutaisi provinces in the last quarter of the 19th – the early 20th centuries. On the basis of archival sources and literature, the author considers the reasons for the difficult economic situation of the Georgian landowners in the period under study. An analysis makes it possible to conclude that the socio-economic relations that had been formed in Georgia determined the contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of management. On the one hand, the peasant reform contributed to the more rapid development of the capitalist mode of production in the countryside, laying the foundation for economic development in agriculture, the introduction of commercial agriculture, the growth of agricultural productivity, and the maturation of commodity-capitalist relations. On the other hand, the main means of production were in the hands of the landlords, which led to an even greater extensive impoverishment of the landlord peasants. Thus, in Georgia, the remnants of serfdom survived even longer than in the European provinces of the Russian Empire. It is concluded that the reason for these remnants included the backwardness and relatively weak development of capitalist relations in the South Caucasus, in particular, in Georgia.


2021 ◽  
Vol 153 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-318
Author(s):  
Alexander Fidora ◽  
Nicola Polloni

This contribution engages with the problematic position of the mechanical arts within medieval systems of knowledge. Superseding the secondary position assigned to the mechanical arts in the Early Middle Ages, the solutions proposed by Hugh of St Victor and Gundissalinus were highly influential during the thirteenth century. While Hugh’s integration of the mechanical arts into his system of knowledge betrays their still ancillary position as regards consideration of the liberal arts, Gundissalinus’s theory proposes two main novelties. On the one hand, he sets the mechanical arts alongside alchemy and the arts of prognostication and magic. On the other, however, using the theory put forward by Avicenna, he subordinates these “natural sciences” to natural philosophy itself, thereby establishing a broader architecture of knowledge hierarchically ordered. Our contribution examines the implications of such developments and their reception afforded at Paris during the thirteenth century, emphasising the relevance that the solutions offered by Gundissalinus enjoyed in terms of the ensuing discussions concerning the structure of human knowledge.


Author(s):  
Jean-Marc Narbonne

Abstract Taking as a starting point a crucial passage of Aristotle’s Poetics where poetical technique is declared to be different from all other disciplines in human knowledge (25, 1460b8–15), I try to determine in what sense and up to what point poetry can be seen as an autonomous or sui generis creative activity. On this path, I come across the so-called “likely and necessary” rule mentioned many times in Aristotle’s essay, which might be seen as a limitation of the poet’s literary freedom. I then endeavour to show that this rule of consistency does not preclude the many means by which the poet can astonish his or her audience, bring them into error, introduce exaggerations and embellishments on the one hand (and viciousness and repulsiveness on the other), have the characters change their conduct along the way, etc. For Aristotle, the poetic art—and artistic activities in general—is concerned not with what in fact is or what should be (especially ethically), but simply with what might be. Accordingly, one can see him as historically the very first theorist fiction, not only because he states that poetry relates freely to the possible, but also because he explains why poetry is justified in doing so.


1948 ◽  
Vol 42 (5) ◽  
pp. 906-914 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Kelsen

Since there exists philosophy, there exists the attempt to bring it in relation with politics; and this attempt has succeeded in so far as it is today recognized to the degree of a truism that political theory and that part of philosophy we call ethics are closely connected with each other. But it seems strange to assume—and this essay tries to verify this assumption—that there exists an external parallelism, and perhaps also an inner relationship, between politics and other parts of philosophy such as epistemology, that is, theory of knowledge, and theory of values. It is just within these two theories that the antagonism between philosophical absolutism and relativism has its seat; and this antagonism seems to be in many respects analogous to the fundamental opposition between autocracy and democracy as the representatives of political absolutism on the one hand and political relativism on the other.IPhilosophical absolutism is the metaphysical view that there is an absolute reality, i.e., a reality that exists independently of human knowledge. Hence its existence is objective and unlimited in, or beyond, space and time, to which human knowledge is restricted. Philosophical relativism, on the other hand, advocates the empirical doctrine that reality exists only within human knowledge, and that, as the object of knowledge, reality is relative to the knowing subject. The absolute, the thing in itself, is beyond human experience; it is inaccessible to human knowledge and therefore unknowable.To the assumption of absolute existence corresponds the possibility of absolute truth and absolute values, denied by philosophical relativism, which recognizes only relative truth and relative values.


Lumen et Vita ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Bigelow Reynolds

Contemporary debates on divine impassibility generally offer two options: either affirm a suffering God who loves and cares, or uphold an impassible God who turns a blind eye to the cries of his people. For Thomas Aquinas, divine impassibility (along with the other divine attributes: simplicity, infinity, immutability, etc.) is not inconsonant with divine compassion. God’s unchangeable nature affirms, not undermines, God’s ability to love. This paper, acknowledging the inadequacy of these two incomplete and dichotomous categorizations, will argue that Thomas’ understanding of the divine names in the Summa Theologiae, 1a, q. 13 illuminates the way in which he reconciles impassibility and compassion in God.It is not the goal of this paper to defend either the idea that God does or does not suffer, nor to affirm or deny the doctrine of divine impassibility on a scale any larger than the work of Thomas and selected contemporary scholars who assist in the project of unpacking and analyzing his thought. It is the goal of this paper to examine in as close a way as possible how Thomas’ defense of divine impassibility can be placed in dialogue with his understanding of the way that humans know and name God, ultimately revealing the inadequacy in the polarizing assumption that an immutable God cannot love.I will begin by analyzing the structure and implications of Thomas’ defense of divine impassibility in Question 9. This will be followed by an analysis of how, in Thomas’ understanding, human knowledge of God, including God’s attribute of impassibility, affects human capacity to name God, here drawing heavily on the insights David Burrell. I will then explore the theological and scriptural implications of Thomas’ assertion that “The One Who Is” is the most appropriate name for God, ultimately arguing that an understanding of the Hebrew scripture from which this name is drawn reveals that God’s love and compassion on behalf of his suffering people is not opposed to but rather relies upon his unchanging nature.


1994 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ganeshwar Chand

In his book Caste, Class and Race, Oliver Cromwell Cox took positions on the link between capitalism and racism that appear contradictory; on the one hand he argues that racial exploitation emerged with the rise of capitalism, and on the other, that advancement of capitalism would reduce racial exploitation. This article analyzes this seeming contradiction from a Marxian perspective and argues that Cox failed to seriously consider the central organizing mechanism of capitalism—competition—to discuss the relation between capitalism and racism. To analyze race relations under any mode of production, the central organizing mechanism of that mode has to occupy a focal position. A failure to take account of that fact often results in political conclusions that, like Cox's, are divorced from theoretical analysis and thus are weak and impractical.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-38
Author(s):  
Roberto Di Ceglie

Two significant aspects of Thomas Reid's thought seem to be irreconcilable with one another. On the one hand, Reid constantly refers to the substantive benefits which human knowledge receives from the Christian revelation. On the other hand, he does not justify philosophical or scientific beliefs by way of appeal to God. In this essay, I argue that a closer inspection of both Reid's philosophical reflection and scientific investigations shows that the two aspects just mentioned are compatible with one another. In short, although an influence on rational investigation is somehow exerted by divine revelation, this does not limit the autonomy of reason, which is actually stimulated and promoted precisely because of a religiously rooted confidence in our rational faculties.


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