Compte rendu de Claudio Cormick, Opacidad y relativismo. La situacionalidad del conocimiento en tensión entre Merleau-Ponty y Foucault

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 441-447
Author(s):  
Martín Miguel Buceta ◽  
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Compte Rendu ◽  
The One

In Opacidad y relativismo. La situacionalidad del conocimiento en tensión entre Merleau-Ponty y Foucault, Claudio Cormick introduces Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s and Michel Foucault’s philosophies as attempts to face two possible obstacles for human knowledge : on the one hand, the opacity of consciousness with regard to the foundations of its own positions; on the other, the relative, non-absolute character of our claims to truth, inasmuch as they are formulated within concrete social and historical conditions.

Hugh of St Victor, Dominicus Gundissalinus and the Place of the Mechanical Arts in Medieval Architectures of Knowledge

2021 ◽  
Vol 153 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-318
Author(s):  
Alexander Fidora ◽  
Nicola Polloni
Keyword(s):  
Middle Ages ◽  
Thirteenth Century ◽  
Liberal Arts ◽  
Natural Philosophy ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
The Arts ◽  
The One ◽  
Mechanical Arts

This contribution engages with the problematic position of the mechanical arts within medieval systems of knowledge. Superseding the secondary position assigned to the mechanical arts in the Early Middle Ages, the solutions proposed by Hugh of St Victor and Gundissalinus were highly influential during the thirteenth century. While Hugh’s integration of the mechanical arts into his system of knowledge betrays their still ancillary position as regards consideration of the liberal arts, Gundissalinus’s theory proposes two main novelties. On the one hand, he sets the mechanical arts alongside alchemy and the arts of prognostication and magic. On the other, however, using the theory put forward by Avicenna, he subordinates these “natural sciences” to natural philosophy itself, thereby establishing a broader architecture of knowledge hierarchically ordered. Our contribution examines the implications of such developments and their reception afforded at Paris during the thirteenth century, emphasising the relevance that the solutions offered by Gundissalinus enjoyed in terms of the ensuing discussions concerning the structure of human knowledge.

The historical possibility and necessity of (Ilyenkov’s) anti-innatism

2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 683-702 ◽  
Author(s):  
Siyaves Azeri
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Capitalist Mode ◽  
Philosophical System ◽  
Social Mind ◽  
The One ◽  
Mode Of Production

An important aspect of Evald Ilyenkov’s theory of social mind is anti-innatism. Anti-innatism is not only the necessary logical outcome of Ilyenkov’s overall philosophical system and in particular of his anti-reductionism, but also it is a socio-historically possible and necessary consequence of the capitalist mode of production, which amounts to the formation of a gap between socially formed human knowledge and growth of the productive powers, on the one hand, and value-producing labour, on the other.

Colloquium 3 Likely and Necessary: The Poetics of Aristotle and the Problem of Literary Leeway

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-87
Author(s):  
Jean-Marc Narbonne
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Creative Activity ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
The Way

Abstract Taking as a starting point a crucial passage of Aristotle’s Poetics where poetical technique is declared to be different from all other disciplines in human knowledge (25, 1460b8–15), I try to determine in what sense and up to what point poetry can be seen as an autonomous or sui generis creative activity. On this path, I come across the so-called “likely and necessary” rule mentioned many times in Aristotle’s essay, which might be seen as a limitation of the poet’s literary freedom. I then endeavour to show that this rule of consistency does not preclude the many means by which the poet can astonish his or her audience, bring them into error, introduce exaggerations and embellishments on the one hand (and viciousness and repulsiveness on the other), have the characters change their conduct along the way, etc. For Aristotle, the poetic art—and artistic activities in general—is concerned not with what in fact is or what should be (especially ethically), but simply with what might be. Accordingly, one can see him as historically the very first theorist fiction, not only because he states that poetry relates freely to the possible, but also because he explains why poetry is justified in doing so.

Absolutism and Relativism in Philosophy and Politics

1948 ◽  
Vol 42 (5) ◽  
pp. 906-914 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Kelsen
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Absolute Truth ◽  
Relative Truth ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
Is Theory ◽  
The One ◽  
Object Of Knowledge

Since there exists philosophy, there exists the attempt to bring it in relation with politics; and this attempt has succeeded in so far as it is today recognized to the degree of a truism that political theory and that part of philosophy we call ethics are closely connected with each other. But it seems strange to assume—and this essay tries to verify this assumption—that there exists an external parallelism, and perhaps also an inner relationship, between politics and other parts of philosophy such as epistemology, that is, theory of knowledge, and theory of values. It is just within these two theories that the antagonism between philosophical absolutism and relativism has its seat; and this antagonism seems to be in many respects analogous to the fundamental opposition between autocracy and democracy as the representatives of political absolutism on the one hand and political relativism on the other.IPhilosophical absolutism is the metaphysical view that there is an absolute reality, i.e., a reality that exists independently of human knowledge. Hence its existence is objective and unlimited in, or beyond, space and time, to which human knowledge is restricted. Philosophical relativism, on the other hand, advocates the empirical doctrine that reality exists only within human knowledge, and that, as the object of knowledge, reality is relative to the knowing subject. The absolute, the thing in itself, is beyond human experience; it is inaccessible to human knowledge and therefore unknowable.To the assumption of absolute existence corresponds the possibility of absolute truth and absolute values, denied by philosophical relativism, which recognizes only relative truth and relative values.

scholarly journals “I AM has sent me to you:” How Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of the divine names illuminates the way in which he reconciles impassibility and compassion in God

Lumen et Vita ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Bigelow Reynolds
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Summa Theologiae ◽  
Divine Attributes ◽  
Knowledge Of God ◽  
God's Love ◽  
Hebrew Scripture ◽  
The One ◽  
The Way

Contemporary debates on divine impassibility generally offer two options: either affirm a suffering God who loves and cares, or uphold an impassible God who turns a blind eye to the cries of his people. For Thomas Aquinas, divine impassibility (along with the other divine attributes: simplicity, infinity, immutability, etc.) is not inconsonant with divine compassion. God’s unchangeable nature affirms, not undermines, God’s ability to love. This paper, acknowledging the inadequacy of these two incomplete and dichotomous categorizations, will argue that Thomas’ understanding of the divine names in the Summa Theologiae, 1a, q. 13 illuminates the way in which he reconciles impassibility and compassion in God.It is not the goal of this paper to defend either the idea that God does or does not suffer, nor to affirm or deny the doctrine of divine impassibility on a scale any larger than the work of Thomas and selected contemporary scholars who assist in the project of unpacking and analyzing his thought. It is the goal of this paper to examine in as close a way as possible how Thomas’ defense of divine impassibility can be placed in dialogue with his understanding of the way that humans know and name God, ultimately revealing the inadequacy in the polarizing assumption that an immutable God cannot love.I will begin by analyzing the structure and implications of Thomas’ defense of divine impassibility in Question 9. This will be followed by an analysis of how, in Thomas’ understanding, human knowledge of God, including God’s attribute of impassibility, affects human capacity to name God, here drawing heavily on the insights David Burrell. I will then explore the theological and scriptural implications of Thomas’ assertion that “The One Who Is” is the most appropriate name for God, ultimately arguing that an understanding of the Hebrew scripture from which this name is drawn reveals that God’s love and compassion on behalf of his suffering people is not opposed to but rather relies upon his unchanging nature.

Thomas Reid: Philosophy, Science, and the Christian Revelation

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-38
Author(s):  
Roberto Di Ceglie
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Divine Revelation ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Philosophical Reflection ◽  
Scientific Investigations ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

Two significant aspects of Thomas Reid's thought seem to be irreconcilable with one another. On the one hand, Reid constantly refers to the substantive benefits which human knowledge receives from the Christian revelation. On the other hand, he does not justify philosophical or scientific beliefs by way of appeal to God. In this essay, I argue that a closer inspection of both Reid's philosophical reflection and scientific investigations shows that the two aspects just mentioned are compatible with one another. In short, although an influence on rational investigation is somehow exerted by divine revelation, this does not limit the autonomy of reason, which is actually stimulated and promoted precisely because of a religiously rooted confidence in our rational faculties.

Stroud's Dream Argument Critique

Philosophy ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 68 (266) ◽  
pp. 473-482
Author(s):  
John O. Nelson
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
External World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Significant Feature ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
The World ◽  
Traditional Assumption ◽  
The Senses ◽  
The One ◽  
Philosophical Scepticism

In his recent work, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud proposes to carry out an in-depth critique of the attempt by philosophers to invalidate all knowledge of an external world on the basis of Descartes' dream argument. His more particular aims in this endeavour are to uncover significant features of any such scepticism and to disclose in the process fundamental aspects of ‘human knowledge’ itself. Thus, among other features of knowledge that his study discloses, he thinks, is, echoing Kant, the idea ‘that a completely general distinction between everything we get through the senses, on the one hand, and what is true or not true of the external world, on the other, would cut us off forever from knowledge of the world around us.’ And a significant feature of Cartesian dream scepticism he believes to have uncovered is that its ‘effectiveness’ rests upon the philosopher's traditional assumption of an objectively existent world that is understandable ‘from a detached “external” viewpoint.’

Frederick Gugenheim Gregory, 1893-1961

1963 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 131-153
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Complex Character ◽  
Linnean Society ◽  
Informed Opinion ◽  
The One ◽  
Extreme Responses ◽  
What Matters

In a tribute to F. G. Gregory written at the time of his retirement it was said ‘His contemporaries (at school) remember him variously as brilliant, versatile, talkative, untidy or not interested in games—but they remember him’. About the same time one of his former students wrote—in a letter of congratulation on the award of the Royal Medal—‘what matters is the company of your juniors who were influenced by you when they were students, it includes all sorts of people you met only once or twice’. The name of Gregory at once recalls in the minds of those who met him, that vivid personality whose eager and penetrating curiosity about every aspect of human knowledge made intellectual adventure appear the most exciting of pastimes. The bubbling flow of thoughts which was engendered by the mention of any topic, scientific or otherwise, could not be restrained and conversation tended to give way to a monologue which ranged from expression of highly informed opinion to the wildest of speculations. The listener might be interested, stimulated, surprised at being instructed in his own expertise, irritated or even annoyed by the exhortation he had provoked, but could never be indifferent. Everything that Gregory undertook he entered into with passionate fervour, and his extremes of behaviour elicited extreme responses from others. He inspired loyalty, affection and tolerance in some and in others antipathy, impatience, and resentment. His complex character was capable of forthright speaking amounting almost to rudeness, on the one hand, and on the other of courtesy, charm, and sincere sympathy for the difficulties of others. He was by nature a rebel who really enjoyed an argument, the more heated the better, and was quite gleeful over victory. ‘As I anticipated there was a rather vehement discussion—and I may have expressed my point of view too forcibly for a meeting of the Linnean Society.’

scholarly journals Maeterlinck et Robert Scheffer. À propos d’un compte rendu du Chemin nuptial (1895)

1969 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabrice Van de Kerckhove
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Compte Rendu ◽  
Short Text ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

En 1895, Maeterlinck publie du dernier roman de Robert Scheffer, Le Chemin nuptial, un compte rendu révélateur à bien des égards. Le texte attire, d’une part, l’attention sur l’importance méconnue du rôle joué par Scheffer au sein du réseau parisien de l’écrivain, auquel il ouvrit les portes de La Nouvelle Revue. Les distorsions que Maeterlinck impose à un récit dont il partage les références (Gautier, Poe, Swedenborg) et qu’il a en partie inspiré nous renseignent aussi sur sa position intellectuelle au moment où il s’engage, avec Georgette Leblanc, sur son propre « chemin nuptial ».AbstractMaeterlinck’s 1895 review of what would prove to be Robert Scheffer last novel, Le Chemin nuptial, is revealing in more than one way. On the one hand, this short text offers us a glimpse into Maeterlinck’s Paris network and draws our attention to the hitherto little-known role played therein by Scheffer. On the other hand, Maeterlinck’s distortions of the novel’s narrative and his use of references both writers had in common (Gautier, Poe, Swedenborg), tell us a lot about his intellectual position at a point in his life when he was about to embark on his own “bridal path” with Georgette Leblanc.

Note on Selection of Coordinate Systems for Geodynamics

1975 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 395-407
Author(s):  
S. Henriksen
Keyword(s):  
Sea Level ◽  
The Other ◽  
Coordinate Systems ◽  
Mean Sea Level ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The One ◽  
Static Systems ◽  
Selection Of

The first question to be answered, in seeking coordinate systems for geodynamics, is: what is geodynamics? The answer is, of course, that geodynamics is that part of geophysics which is concerned with movements of the Earth, as opposed to geostatics which is the physics of the stationary Earth. But as far as we know, there is no stationary Earth – epur sic monere. So geodynamics is actually coextensive with geophysics, and coordinate systems suitable for the one should be suitable for the other. At the present time, there are not many coordinate systems, if any, that can be identified with a static Earth. Certainly the only coordinate of aeronomic (atmospheric) interest is the height, and this is usually either as geodynamic height or as pressure. In oceanology, the most important coordinate is depth, and this, like heights in the atmosphere, is expressed as metric depth from mean sea level, as geodynamic depth, or as pressure. Only for the earth do we find “static” systems in use, ana even here there is real question as to whether the systems are dynamic or static. So it would seem that our answer to the question, of what kind, of coordinate systems are we seeking, must be that we are looking for the same systems as are used in geophysics, and these systems are dynamic in nature already – that is, their definition involvestime.

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