scholarly journals Social dilemmas with manifest and unknown networks

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-39
Author(s):  
Armando Razo
Keyword(s):  
Social Ties ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Contexts ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Aggregate Network ◽  
Network Estimation ◽  
Distributional Impact

Scholarly consensus that social ties resolve social dilemmas is largely predicated on common knowledge of networks. But what happens when people do not know all relevant social ties? Does network uncertainty translate into worse outcomes? I address these concerns by advancing the notion of a Network Estimation Bayesian Equilibrium to examine cooperative behavior under different epistemic conditions. When networks are common knowledge, I find that all possible outcomes of an original cooperation game can be realized in equilibrium, albeit with a higher likelihood of defection for more connected players. Variable knowledge of the network also has a distributional impact. With incomplete network knowledge, it’s possible to observe reversed equilibrium behavior when more connected players actually cooperate more often than less connected ones. In fact, aggregate network uncertainty in some social contexts incentivizes more mutual cooperation than would be the case with common knowledge of all social ties.

scholarly journals Research on the Cooperative Behavior of Academic Papers Published by Chinese Educational Scholars Based on Complex Networks

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 118
Author(s):  
Bichu Li ◽  
Ziliang Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Education Policy ◽  
Vocational Education ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Matthew Effect ◽  
Quality Education ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Research Institutions ◽  
Chinese Education ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Aggregation Effect

Research on mutual cooperation among scholars or research institutions has become more and more common. Thepurpose of this paper is to explore the current status of cooperation between scholars and research institutions in thefield of Chinese education. In this paper, we use the method of the complex network to analyze the cooperativebehavior of academic papers published by Chinese educational scholars by collecting academic papers on educationleadership, education policy, quality education, and vocational education. Our conclusions show that most of theacademic papers published by Chinese educational scholars are non-cooperative. In the authors of the co-authoredpapers, there is a significant "Matthew effect", that is, some key scholars in these fields that link the collaborators.Lastly, there is no obvious aggregation effect between the authors of the co-authored papers which indicating awidespread and extensive connection between the collaborators. The above conclusions provide valuable insightsinto our understanding of the cooperative behavior of Chinese education scholars.

scholarly journals Greater effects of mutual cooperation and defection on subsequent cooperation in direct reciprocity games than generalized reciprocity games: Behavioral experiments and analysis using multilevel models

PLoS ONE ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (11) ◽  
pp. e0242607
Author(s):  
Yutaka Horita
Keyword(s):  
Multilevel Models ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
The Other ◽  
Behavioral Strategy ◽  
Behavioral Models ◽  
Behavioral Differences ◽  
Behavioral Experiments ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Shift Strategy ◽  
Better Than

Reciprocity toward a partner’s cooperation is a fundamental behavioral strategy underlying human cooperation not only in interactions with familiar persons but also with strangers. However, a strategy that takes into account not only one’s partner’s previous action but also one’s own previous action—such as a win-stay lose-shift strategy or variants of reinforcement learning—has also been considered an advantageous strategy. This study investigated empirically how behavioral models can be used to explain the variances in cooperative behavior among people. To do this, we considered games involving either direct reciprocity (an iterated prisoner’s dilemma) or generalized reciprocity (a gift-giving game). Multilevel models incorporating inter-individual behavioral differences were fitted to experimental data using Bayesian inference. The results indicate that for these two types of games, a model that considers both one’s own and one’s partner’s previous actions fits the empirical data better than the other models. In the direct reciprocity game, mutual cooperation or defection—rather than relying solely on one’s partner’s previous actions—affected the increase or decrease, respectively, in subsequent cooperation. Whereas in the generalized reciprocity game, a weaker effect of mutual cooperation or defection on subsequent cooperation was observed.

scholarly journals Cooperation Enforcement and Collusion Resistance in Repeated Public Goods Games

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 2085-2092
Author(s):  
Kai Li ◽  
Dong Hao
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Collusion Resistance ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Simple Strategy ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Multi Agent

Enforcing cooperation among substantial agents is one of the main objectives for multi-agent systems. However, due to the existence of inherent social dilemmas in many scenarios, the free-rider problem may arise during agents’ long-run interactions and things become even severer when self-interested agents work in collusion with each other to get extra benefits. It is commonly accepted that in such social dilemmas, there exists no simple strategy for an agent whereby she can simultaneously manipulate on the utility of each of her opponents and further promote mutual cooperation among all agents. Here, we show that such strategies do exist. Under the conventional repeated public goods game, we novelly identify them and find that, when confronted with such strategies, a single opponent can maximize his utility only via global cooperation and any colluding alliance cannot get the upper hand. Since a full cooperation is individually optimal for any single opponent, a stable cooperation among all players can be achieved. Moreover, we experimentally show that these strategies can still promote cooperation even when the opponents are both self-learning and collusive.

scholarly journals Social Dilemmas in Environmental Economics and Policy Considerations: A Review

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 156-173
Author(s):  
Nicola Cerutti
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Economics ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Environmental Issues ◽  
Theoretical Work ◽  
Attitudes And Practices ◽  
Explorative Study ◽  
Environmental Economics And Policy ◽  
Decision Environments

Many crucial environmental issues lead to social dilemmas, in which the personally optimal solution, and the socially optimal solution diverge. Finding a solution to this dilemma is extremely important to allow a good and sustainable management of many exhaustible natural resources. This is especially true when the resource users need to develop collectively a set of rules or practices, and the institutions are unable to provide, or enforce, effective regulations. A few examples are forests, and fisheries, but also carbon emissions. This review presents a selected number of results coming from field observations, laboratory experiments, and theoretical work, which pinpoint some of the more crucial aspects of these decision environments. Knowing which incentives and situational aspects may motivate resource users to adopt a more or less cooperative behavior can potentially be of pivotal importance to develop effective policies and regulations. At the same time, the research we present is also of great interestfor any diagnostic or explorative study that aims to study direct resource users, and their development of cooperative attitudes and practices.

Induction of Cooperative Behavior Through Exchange of Nonverbal Information

2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (7) ◽  
pp. 904-910 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuzo Takahashi ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Work Environment ◽  
Control Experiment ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Not Given ◽  
Remote Work ◽  
Gambling Task ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Nonverbal Information ◽  
Experimental Trials ◽  
Behavioral Information

In this study, the process of inducing mutual cooperation among workers in a remote work environment (telework) was experimentally examined. The gambling task developed by Payne was used, and subjects were not given information regarding their partners’ reputations. In addition, subjects and their partners completed the task in different rooms to avoid the effects of verbal and nonverbal communication. Subjects knew only which buttons their partners pushed, i.e., their behavior in the remote work environment. The number of experimental trials was 100. We found that cooperative behavior was induced by the 33rd trial. Although subjects did not know their partners’ reputations, cooperative behavior arose as subjects saw which buttons their partners pushed. In a control experiment, the subjects competed with a computer, and the results suggested that cooperative behavior was not induced when a human subject competed with a computer. Overall, the results suggest that an exchange of nonverbal behavioral information was necessary for inducing cooperative behavior.

scholarly journals Coping with noise in social dilemmas: Group representatives fare worse than individuals because they lack trust in others’ benign intentions

2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 200-214
Author(s):  
Christopher P. Reinders Folmer ◽  
Tim Wildschut ◽  
David De Cremer ◽  
Paul A. M. van Lange
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Real Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
Intergroup Interactions ◽  
And Behavior

Research on interindividual–intergroup discontinuity has illuminated distinct patterns of cognition, motivation, and behavior in interindividual versus intergroup contexts. However, it has examined these processes in laboratory environments with perfect transparency, whereas real-life interactions are often characterized by noise (i.e., misperceptions and unintended errors). This research compared interindividual and intergroup interactions in the presence or absence of noise. In a laboratory experiment, participants played 35 rounds of a dyadic give-some dilemma, in which they acted as individuals or group representatives. Noise was manipulated, such that players’ intentions either were perfectly translated into behavior or could deviate from their intentions in certain rounds (resulting in less cooperative behavior). Noise was more detrimental to cooperation in intergroup contexts than in interindividual contexts, because (a) participants who formed benign impressions of the other player coped better with noise, and (b) participants were less likely to form such benign impressions in intergroup than interindividual interactions.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document