A Climate Backlash: Comparing Populist Parties’ Climate Policies in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden

2021 ◽  
pp. 107049652110277
Author(s):  
Antto Vihma ◽  
Gunilla Reischl ◽  
Astrid Nonbo Andersen

The rise of authoritarian populism has disrupted the patterns of party competition in many Western societies. Related to this development, the current debates in the United States and European Union illustrate how empirical science on climate change may become intensely politicized, and all ambitious climate policies challenged in the contemporary political landscape. We set out an analytical framework with three ideal types of political strategies for opposing climate policies: climate science denialism, climate policy nationalism, and climate policy conservativism. Empirically, the article investigates populist resistance to ambitious climate change policy in the Nordic context, where countries have sought to assume global leadership in climate politics and have considerable public support for climate action. In an analysis of the evolving positions of populist parties in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in recent elections, the article sheds light on the interconnection between populism and climate change policy.

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 119
Author(s):  
Taylor A. Murray

The contemporary models of climate change policy-making in the United States are particular to this decade. The increased role for experts and expert-led policymaking is unprecedented. However this power has been paradoxical. This paper argues that an excessive role for science in discussions of climate change has undermined the public’s role, and has thus undermined the efforts on behalf of policymakers to pass comprehensive climate change policy. Two main aspects of the excessive role for science in the formation of climate policy were found to be 1. the large influence of dissenting scientists on the debate, and 2. the alienation of the public from the discourse. Further, possible scenarios for policymaking, which better balance the roles of experts, the public, and policymakers, are discussed and frameworks for the future are outlined.


2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (7) ◽  
pp. 781-806 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin J.A. Walker ◽  
Tim Kurz ◽  
Duncan Russel

There is a growing tendency for policy makers to frame climate change action in terms of non-climate benefits, raising important empirical questions regarding the utility of such approaches. Across three studies we explore whether (and when) non-climate frames can lead to greater support for climate policy relative to climate frames. In Study 1 we framed a car-use reduction policy in relation to climate change or public health and showed that non-climate frames can stimulate greater support for climate policy. Study 2 explored frame relevance as a potential boundary condition to the efficacy of non-climate frames. Study 3 found that attempts to frame climate policy in relation to non-climate issues that affect participants personally can fail if that issue is not seen as being sufficiently relevant. We suggest that non-climate frames can be an effective tool in stimulating support for climate policy, however greater consideration of the key mechanisms is required.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 115 ◽  
pp. 80-85
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky

After four years of not simply inaction but significant retrogression in U.S. climate change policy, the Biden administration has its work cut out. As a start, it needs to undo what Trump did. The Biden administration took a step in that direction on Day 1 by rejoining the Paris Agreement. But simply restoring the pre-Trump status quo ante is not enough. The United States also needs to push for more ambitious global action. In part, this will require strengthening parties’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement; but it will also require actions by what Sue Biniaz, the former State Department climate change lawyer, likes to call the Greater Metropolitan Paris Agreement—that is, the array of other international actors that help advance the Paris Agreement's goals, including global institutions such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Montreal Protocol, and the World Bank, as well as regional organizations and non-state actors. Although the Biden administration can pursue some of these international initiatives directly through executive action, new regulatory initiatives will face an uncertain fate in the Supreme Court. So how much the Biden Administration is able to achieve will likely depend significantly on how much a nearly evenly-divided Congress is willing to support.


2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (8) ◽  
pp. 1456-1470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inken Reimer ◽  
Barbara Saerbeck

The multi-level and multi-actor character of the international climate governance regime, as well as the imminent need for action to combat climate change, stimulates the introduction of new and innovative cross-sectoral policy proposals by policy entrepreneurs. To date, academic literature has extensively studied and discussed the importance of policy entrepreneurs for agenda-setting. The role of policy entrepreneurs in providing continuous support for a new climate policy resulting in its implementation, has on the other hand, so far received only little attention. Taking the Norwegian Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation commitment as an exemplary case, this paper explores the potential of entrepreneurial engagement throughout a country’s climate policy-making process. It aims to demonstrate the importance of policy entrepreneurs beyond agenda-setting, namely for the policy formulation phase in which responsibilities for the implementation are designated to governmental bodies. We refer to this step as institutional anchoring. Following an explorative approach, this paper shows that different types of actors – non-governmental organisations and governmental actors – act as policy entrepreneurs. It demonstrates the roles and importance of policy entrepreneurs for not only gaining, but also maintaining attention on a new policy by means of coalition building and framing.


Author(s):  
Gustaf Arrhenius ◽  
Mark Budolfson ◽  
Dean Spears

Choosing a policy response to climate change seems to demand a population axiology. A formal literature involving impossibility theorems has demonstrated that all possible approaches to population axiology have one or more seemingly counterintuitive implications. This leads to the worry that because axiological theory is radically unresolved, this theoretical ignorance implies serious practical ignorance about what climate policies to pursue. This chapter offers two deflationary responses to this worry. First, it may be that given the actual facts of climate change, all axiologies agree on a particular policy response. In this case, there would be a clear dominance conclusion, and the puzzles of axiology would be practically irrelevant (albeit still theoretically challenging). Second, despite the impossibility results, the authors prove the possibility of axiologies that satisfy bounded versions of all of the desiderata from the population axiology literature, which may be all that is needed for policy evaluation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aliya Hemani

At present, there is a rich and extensive body of literature that concerns itself with the climate-related policies of successive Canadian governments. A vast majority of these works rely heavily on a single determinant—societal, governmental, or external—to account for said policies. In borrowing from and adding to this scholarship, this paper demonstrates how all three determinants have interacted with one another in unique and important ways in order to inform Canadian climate policy thus far. In analyzing nearly four decades worth of major climate-related decisions made by the Canadian government, this paper is organized sequentially, into four chronological phases, each of which focuses primarily upon the given governing party. In concluding its evaluation, this paper presents two normative policy recommendations to enhance Canada’s climate agenda: increased investment in green technology and purposive, thoughtful consultation with Indigenous peoples.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9s10 ◽  
pp. 69-98
Author(s):  
Hongyi Lai

For over a decade China has been the predominant carbon emitter in the global economy. It is thus imperative for us to understand the factors behind its climate change policy in the past decades. In the article, the author surveys the evolution of China�s climate change policy during 1990�2021 and applies theories from international relations and international political economy to explain it. It is found that (neo-)realism/nationalism and liberalism, two main theories in the field, offer only a partial explanation of China�s climate policy. The most effective theory is domestic sources. In particular, leadership power consolidation and a concern with economic growth seem to dictate China�s climate policy. The findings point to the analytical utility of domestic political economy in accounting for the climate stances of nation-states. Policy suggestions for external parties to interact with China on climate change are proposed. There the importance of involving China in global action against climate change, as well as the utility of the economy and trade leverage, soft power standing, and the prevention of extreme weather are discussed.


Subject China's climate change policy after US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Significance Beijing is seen as a potential global leader on climate change following US President Donald Trump’s June 2 announcement that Washington will pull out from Paris Agreement. China, the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, has already won applause simply by promising to honour existing commitment to the international climate accord. Impacts China prefers to aid developing countries through its South-South fund, so it is unlikely to contribute to the Green Climate Fund. Concerns over competitiveness, especially in export industries, will weaken the national carbon trading scheme due to launch this year. China will negotiate energy sector deals with the United States on economic criteria rather than environmental or climate impacts.


Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (18) ◽  
pp. 4894 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saleem H. Ali ◽  
Kamila Svobodova ◽  
Jo-Anne Everingham ◽  
Mehmet Altingoz

According to the 2020 Climate Change Performance Index, Australia was ranked as the worst-performing country on climate change policy. The country has an ambivalent record of climate policy development as well as implementation, and has been criticized for its inaction. This paper considers why the country has been locked in climate policy “paralysis” through analyzing defining attributes of such a paralysis, and the tentative connections between domestic energy policies and international trade and development. We conducted a media content analysis of 222 articles and identified media narratives in three cases of energy projects in the country involving thermal coal exports, domestic renewable energy storage, and closure of a domestic coal power station. The analysis reveals that policy paralysis in Australian climate change policy can be traced back to the countervailing arguments that have been pervasive around domestic energy security, rural employment and international energy poverty. The political establishment has struggled to develop a sustainable consensus on climate change and the citizenry remains polarized. We also discuss how a “focusing event,” such as a major natural disaster can break the impasse but this is only possible if energy security at home, energy poverty abroad and employment imperatives across the board are clearly delineated, measured and prioritized.


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