Special investigative measures: Comparison of the Serbian Criminal Procedure Code with the European Court of Human Rights Standards

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-60
Author(s):  
Veljko Turanjanin

This paper is focused on several important issues that deal with special investigation measures. The main perspective of the analysis is based on the ECtHR case law on this issue. Two issues are from primary interests: secret monitoring of communication and undercover investigator. Intensive ICT development enables various modern techniques and methods of crime investigation but also results in some new types of crime that could be committed using ICT. Expansion of the fundamental rights and their protection, especially in Europe, raised global awareness of the right to privacy and the need to protect it. Having that in mind, it seems that the main question that should be answered by legislator is: Where is the borderline between the right to privacy and the public interest to investigate or prevent crime and collect evidence? The undercover investigator falls under Article 6 of the Convention and there are different rules on the admissibility of such evidence. Serbian Criminal Procedure Law on some points is in line with ECtHR standards, but some very important provisions, as well as practice, are not.

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 11-25
Author(s):  
Marta De Bazelaire De Ruppierre

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF LEGAL PERSONS DURING THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S INSPECTIONSThe paper aims to discuss the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the EU institutions in competition law proceedings, showing as an example the respect for the right to privacy of undertakings during the inspections carried out by the European Commission. Although exercising the control powers of the Commission potentially collides with a number of fundamental rights expressed in the Charter, it is the analysis of Art. 7 CFR that allows to depict the evolution of the EU’s approach to privacy of legal persons, showing the accompanying judicial dialogue, or lack thereof, between the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the EU. The article short-defines the dawn raids, examines the application of Article 7 CFR to legal persons, highlighting the aspects of protection of domicile and secrecy of correspondence, compares the standards provided by ECHR and EU law, pondering also on how the CFR guarantees can be provided and effectively controlled. It also reflects on the issue whether the Court of Justice has a forerunner role in promoting fundamental rights of undertakings in matters of competition law.


Author(s):  
AGUSTIN GARCIA URETA

Este comentario analiza la sentencia del Tribunal de Derechos Humanos de 24 de noviembre de 2009, en relación con la prohibición de cazar zorros con perros en el Reino Unido, adoptada mediante la Hunting Act 2004. En la sentencia el Tribunal desestima las alegaciones de los demandantes, que habían sostenido la infracción de derechos básicos reconocidos en el Convenio Europeo, como la vida privada, el derecho de reunión, de propiedad o de igualdad. Iruzkin honek, Erresuma Batuan 2004an Hunting Act delakoaren bidez azeriak txakurrekin ehizatzeari buruzko debekua dela eta, Giza Eskubideen Auzitegiak emandako epaia du aztergai (2009-11-24). Auzitegiak auzi-jartzaileen alegazioak ezeztatzen ditu. Hauen arabera, debekuak Europako Hitzarmeneko oinarrizko hainbat eskubide urratuko luke, esaterako, bizitza pribatua, bilera-eskubidea, jabetza-eskubidea edo berdintasun printzipioa. This comment analyses the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 24 November 2009 concerning the hunting prohibition set out in the UK Hunting Act 2004. The Court dismissed all the allegations concerning the breach of basic rights enshrined in the Convention, i.e., the right to privacy, the freedom of peaceful assembly, the property right and non-discrimination rights.


2020 ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Najarian Peters

The right to privacy is one of the most fundamental rights in American jurisprudence. In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis conceptualized the right to privacy as the right to be let alone and inspired privacy jurisprudence that tracked their initial description. Warren and Brandeis conceptualized further that this right was not exclusively meant to protect one’s body or physical property. Privacy rights were protective of “the products and the processes of the mind” and the “inviolate personality.” Privacy was further understood to protect the ability to “live one’s life as one chooses, free from assault, intrusion or invasion except as can be justified by the clear needs of community living under a government of law.” Case law supported and extended their theorization by recognizing that privacy is essentially bound up in an individual’s ability to live a self-authored and self-curated life without unnecessary intrusions and distractions. Hence, privacy may be viewed as the right of individuals to be and become themselves. This right is well-established; however, scholars have vastly undertheorized the right to privacy as it intersects with racial discrimination and childhood. Specifically, the ways in which racial discrimination strips Black people—and therefore Black children—of privacy rights and protections, and the ways in which Black people reclaim and reshape those rights and protections remain a dynamic and fertile space, ripe for exploration yet unacknowledged by privacy law scholars. The most vulnerable members of the Black population, children, rely on their parents to protect their rights until they are capable of doing so themselves. Still, the American education system exposes Black children to racial discrimination that results in life-long injuries ranging from the psychological harms of daily racial micro-aggressions and assaults, to disproportionate exclusionary discipline and juvenile incarceration. One response to these ongoing and often traumatic incursions is a growing number of Black parents have decided to remove their children from traditional school settings. Instead, these parents provide their children with home-education in order to protect their children’s right to be and become in childhood.


Author(s):  
Pitsou Anastasia

In this chapter, the authors negotiate the fact that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) missed the opportunity to recognize the right to abortion under specific criteria that are harmonized with the right to life and the right to privacy. It obviously remains a triumph of nationalism and of religious power over human dignity.


2007 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 181-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos

In contrast with England and Wales, where there is a discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence, exclusion in Greece is automatic. Article 177 para. 2 of the Code of Penal Procedure mandates that evidence obtained by the commission of criminal offences is not taken into consideration. In addition, article 19 para. 3 of the Constitution prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of the right to privacy. Inspired by the rigidity of these exclusionary rules, the rights-centred approach that they reflect and the context of a constitutional criminal procedure within which they apply, this article sheds light on the protection of constitutional rights as a rationale for the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence. It does so against the background of the reliability-centred exclusionary doctrine in England.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (05) ◽  
pp. 722-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin M. Pfisterer

AbstractIn recent years, the CJEU has impressively brought to bear the protection of the fundamental rights to privacy and protection of personal data as contained in the CFREU. The Court’s decisions in the Digital Rights, Schrems, Tele2, and PNR cases have reshaped the political and legal landscape in Europe and beyond. By restricting the powers of the governments of EU Member States and annulling legislative acts enacted by the EU legislator, the decisions had, and continue to have, effects well beyond the respective individual cases. Despite their strong impact on privacy and data protection across Europe, however, these landmark decisions reveal a number of flaws and inconsistencies in the conceptualization of the rights to privacy and protection of personal data as endorsed and interpreted by the CJEU. This Article identifies and discusses some of the shortcomings revealed in the recent CJEU privacy and data protection landmark decisions and proposes to the CJEU a strategy aimed at resolving these shortcomings going forward.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 994-1000
Author(s):  
Menaka Guruswamy

On August 24, 2017, the Supreme Court of India issued a rare, unanimous nine-judge decision holding that the right to privacy is protected by the Constitution of India. The case is all the more noteworthy because the Court reversed its prior decisions holding that the right to privacy was not protected by the country's Constitution. It arose out of the government's creation of a national database of biometric and demographic information for every Indian. Rejecting the government's arguments, the Court found that the right to privacy applies across the gamut of “fundamental” rights including equality, dignity (Article 14), speech, expression (Article 19), life, and liberty (Article 21). The six separate and concurring judgments in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Ret'd) and Anr v. Union of India and Ors are trailblazing for their commitment to privacy as a fundamental freedom and for the judges’ use of foreign law across jurisdictions and spanning centuries.


2020 ◽  
pp. 101-114
Author(s):  
Ivan Vukčević

The subject of this paper is a comparative analysis of the right to respect for private and family life in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the right to privacy in the Constitution of Montenegro. To this end, the paper presents relevant provisions in these documents along with a critical approach to their (in) compliance, both in the determination of specific rights and in cases of their restriction. The paper seeks to offer an answer to the question on whether this right is adequately implemented in the Constitution of Montenegro, as well as whether its different content, analyzed on the concrete example, requires direct application of international law. The author also seeks to provide information on whether insufficient harmonization of the provisions of international and national law in this area may affect more complete protection of this right. To this end, the paper analyzes one of the cases in which the European Court of Human Rights ruled on the violation of Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in relation to Montenegro. Starting from the presented subject matter, at the end of the paper, appropriate conclusions are drawn about possible directions of improvement of existing solutions and practices in which they are realized. Author primarily used normative and comparative law method together with the case-law analysis.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-44
Author(s):  
Sandra Seubert ◽  
Carlos Becker

AbstractIn times of digital pervasion of everyday life, the EU has strengthened a normative idea of European fundamental rights, especially by referring to a strong notion of privacy protection. A normative corridor is evolving with the “right to privacy” at its heart, a right that will be instrumental in shaping the European legal architecture’s future structure. In this Article we argue that the constitutional protection of privacy rights is not only of individual relevance but also of major democratic significance: it protects the integrity of the communication structures that underpin democratic self-determination. The debate on privacy protection, however, often lacks a democratic understanding of privacy and misses its public value. Following an interactionist understanding of privacy and a discourse-theoretical model of democracy, our argument puts forward a conceptual link between privacy and the idea of communicative freedom. From this perspective, the substantiation of a European fundamental right to privacy can be seen as a possible contribution to promoting European democracy in general.


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