Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Ret'd) and Anr v. Union of India and Ors

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 994-1000
Author(s):  
Menaka Guruswamy

On August 24, 2017, the Supreme Court of India issued a rare, unanimous nine-judge decision holding that the right to privacy is protected by the Constitution of India. The case is all the more noteworthy because the Court reversed its prior decisions holding that the right to privacy was not protected by the country's Constitution. It arose out of the government's creation of a national database of biometric and demographic information for every Indian. Rejecting the government's arguments, the Court found that the right to privacy applies across the gamut of “fundamental” rights including equality, dignity (Article 14), speech, expression (Article 19), life, and liberty (Article 21). The six separate and concurring judgments in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Ret'd) and Anr v. Union of India and Ors are trailblazing for their commitment to privacy as a fundamental freedom and for the judges’ use of foreign law across jurisdictions and spanning centuries.

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
pp. 291-296
Author(s):  
Anil Kumar Mohapatra

Long before India gained independence, M.K. Gandhi remarked that the availability of Sanitation facility is more important than gaining Independence for an Indian. Of late, it is now increasingly felt and realized in India that facilities like toilet, safe drinking water, accompanied by good hygienic conditions are fundamental necessities of a person. These are prerequisites of social and economic justice and genuine development. The Supreme Court of India in one judgement held that Right to life and personal liberty, should include right to privacy and human dignity etc. Despite that it has been an admitted shame that India still has the largest number of people defecating in open in the world. There are reported incidences of rape and murder of women in many places in India as women rely on open field for attending to the call of nature in morning and evening. The attempts like Community toi-let system, pay-and-use toilet system and schemes like ‘Mo Swabhiman -Mo Paikhana’ have been found to be less effective. In this connection the ‘Clean India Mission’ campaign launched by the Government of India in 2014 has been regarded as a right approach in that direction. Government of the day is actively considering the demand to convert the Right to Sanitation from a developmental right to a fundamental right. It would make the state more accountable and responsible. Against this background, the paper argues that spending huge money on that would yield good dividend in future for the country.


2019 ◽  
pp. 55-68
Author(s):  
HARSH PATHAK

The constitution and jurist characterized Article 21 as, “the procedural magna carta, protective of life and liberty”. This right has been held to be the heart of the constitution, the most organic and progressive provision in Indian constitution, the foundation of our laws. Article 21 can only be claimed when a person is deprived of his “life” or “personal liberty” by the “State” as defined in Article 12. Violation of the right by private individuals is not within the preview of it. Article 21 applies to natural persons. The right is available to every person, citizen or alien. It, however, does not entitle a foreigner the right to reside and settle in India, as mentioned in Article 19 (1) (e). Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person. The right to life is undoubtedly the most fundamental of all rights. All other rights add quality to the life in question and depend on the pre-existence of life itself for their operation. There would have been no fundamental rights worth mentioning if Article 21 had been interpreted in its original sense. This Article will examine the right to life as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court of India.


2017 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 11-25
Author(s):  
Marta De Bazelaire De Ruppierre

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF LEGAL PERSONS DURING THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S INSPECTIONSThe paper aims to discuss the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the EU institutions in competition law proceedings, showing as an example the respect for the right to privacy of undertakings during the inspections carried out by the European Commission. Although exercising the control powers of the Commission potentially collides with a number of fundamental rights expressed in the Charter, it is the analysis of Art. 7 CFR that allows to depict the evolution of the EU’s approach to privacy of legal persons, showing the accompanying judicial dialogue, or lack thereof, between the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the EU. The article short-defines the dawn raids, examines the application of Article 7 CFR to legal persons, highlighting the aspects of protection of domicile and secrecy of correspondence, compares the standards provided by ECHR and EU law, pondering also on how the CFR guarantees can be provided and effectively controlled. It also reflects on the issue whether the Court of Justice has a forerunner role in promoting fundamental rights of undertakings in matters of competition law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Najarian Peters

The right to privacy is one of the most fundamental rights in American jurisprudence. In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis conceptualized the right to privacy as the right to be let alone and inspired privacy jurisprudence that tracked their initial description. Warren and Brandeis conceptualized further that this right was not exclusively meant to protect one’s body or physical property. Privacy rights were protective of “the products and the processes of the mind” and the “inviolate personality.” Privacy was further understood to protect the ability to “live one’s life as one chooses, free from assault, intrusion or invasion except as can be justified by the clear needs of community living under a government of law.” Case law supported and extended their theorization by recognizing that privacy is essentially bound up in an individual’s ability to live a self-authored and self-curated life without unnecessary intrusions and distractions. Hence, privacy may be viewed as the right of individuals to be and become themselves. This right is well-established; however, scholars have vastly undertheorized the right to privacy as it intersects with racial discrimination and childhood. Specifically, the ways in which racial discrimination strips Black people—and therefore Black children—of privacy rights and protections, and the ways in which Black people reclaim and reshape those rights and protections remain a dynamic and fertile space, ripe for exploration yet unacknowledged by privacy law scholars. The most vulnerable members of the Black population, children, rely on their parents to protect their rights until they are capable of doing so themselves. Still, the American education system exposes Black children to racial discrimination that results in life-long injuries ranging from the psychological harms of daily racial micro-aggressions and assaults, to disproportionate exclusionary discipline and juvenile incarceration. One response to these ongoing and often traumatic incursions is a growing number of Black parents have decided to remove their children from traditional school settings. Instead, these parents provide their children with home-education in order to protect their children’s right to be and become in childhood.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-60
Author(s):  
Veljko Turanjanin

This paper is focused on several important issues that deal with special investigation measures. The main perspective of the analysis is based on the ECtHR case law on this issue. Two issues are from primary interests: secret monitoring of communication and undercover investigator. Intensive ICT development enables various modern techniques and methods of crime investigation but also results in some new types of crime that could be committed using ICT. Expansion of the fundamental rights and their protection, especially in Europe, raised global awareness of the right to privacy and the need to protect it. Having that in mind, it seems that the main question that should be answered by legislator is: Where is the borderline between the right to privacy and the public interest to investigate or prevent crime and collect evidence? The undercover investigator falls under Article 6 of the Convention and there are different rules on the admissibility of such evidence. Serbian Criminal Procedure Law on some points is in line with ECtHR standards, but some very important provisions, as well as practice, are not.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (05) ◽  
pp. 722-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin M. Pfisterer

AbstractIn recent years, the CJEU has impressively brought to bear the protection of the fundamental rights to privacy and protection of personal data as contained in the CFREU. The Court’s decisions in the Digital Rights, Schrems, Tele2, and PNR cases have reshaped the political and legal landscape in Europe and beyond. By restricting the powers of the governments of EU Member States and annulling legislative acts enacted by the EU legislator, the decisions had, and continue to have, effects well beyond the respective individual cases. Despite their strong impact on privacy and data protection across Europe, however, these landmark decisions reveal a number of flaws and inconsistencies in the conceptualization of the rights to privacy and protection of personal data as endorsed and interpreted by the CJEU. This Article identifies and discusses some of the shortcomings revealed in the recent CJEU privacy and data protection landmark decisions and proposes to the CJEU a strategy aimed at resolving these shortcomings going forward.


2017 ◽  
pp. 104-112
Author(s):  
B. Sandeepa Bhat

The human right violations in police’s actions (or inaction) are in the headlines, quite often in India. The fundamental freedoms guaranteedunder the Indian Constitution are often ignored during the course of such police actions, which the Judiciary in India has tried to regulate in many cases. The Supreme Court of India has laid down norms for many areas including custodial death, inhuman treatment in prisons, continued detentions in the prison after the completion of a term of imprisonment, fake encounters, unwarranted breach of the right to privacy of individuals and registering of fraudulent cases. Despite the continued efforts of the Indian Judiciary, the incidents of human right violations by the police have not abated due to two main reasons: a) the strong political influence of the police and b) theignorance of the public, who still fear the police more than anyone else. This paper addresses the topic at hand in three parts. In the first part, the paper analyses the trendsetting judicial verdicts against the violation of human rights by police in India, especially in light of the Constitutional provisions. The second part addresses the problems that are still faced despite the judicial activism in the field and elaborates on the reasons for the continuation of problems. The final part of the paper addresses thesteps that can be taken for strengthening the police reforms to prevent human right violations. It also looks into the need for necessary responses from other stakeholders in the field.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-44
Author(s):  
Sandra Seubert ◽  
Carlos Becker

AbstractIn times of digital pervasion of everyday life, the EU has strengthened a normative idea of European fundamental rights, especially by referring to a strong notion of privacy protection. A normative corridor is evolving with the “right to privacy” at its heart, a right that will be instrumental in shaping the European legal architecture’s future structure. In this Article we argue that the constitutional protection of privacy rights is not only of individual relevance but also of major democratic significance: it protects the integrity of the communication structures that underpin democratic self-determination. The debate on privacy protection, however, often lacks a democratic understanding of privacy and misses its public value. Following an interactionist understanding of privacy and a discourse-theoretical model of democracy, our argument puts forward a conceptual link between privacy and the idea of communicative freedom. From this perspective, the substantiation of a European fundamental right to privacy can be seen as a possible contribution to promoting European democracy in general.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
R.L.D. Pool ◽  
B.H.M. Custers

In an attempt to strengthen the position of the police to fight cybercrime, the Dutch government proposed new legislation giving police agencies new investigative powers on the Internet. This proposed legislation is controversial as it allows police agencies to hack into computers and install spyware. This paper examines the background and contents of the proposed legislation and tries to answer the question to what extent these new investigative powers may result in infringements of the right to privacy and other fundamental rights of citizens, and whether these infringements are justified. The framework for this evaluation, mainly based on the European Convention on Human Rights, focuses on the legitimacy and necessity of the proposed investigative powers. The most important considerations are that new investigative powers are introduced while existing powers are not used adequately and that there are serious doubts as to whether these new investigative powers will be effective.


2014 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Orla Lynskey

AbstractArticle 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights sets out a right to data protection which sits alongside, and in addition to, the established right to privacy in the Charter. The Charter's inclusion of an independent right to data protection differentiates it from other international human rights documents which treat data protection as a subset of the right to privacy. Its introduction and its relationship with the established right to privacy merit an explanation. This paper explores the relationship between the rights to data protection and privacy. It demonstrates that, to date, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has consistently conflated the two rights. However, based on a comparison between the scope of the two rights as well as the protection they offer to individuals whose personal data are processed, it claims that the two rights are distinct. It argues that the right to data protection provides individuals with more rights over more types of data than the right to privacy. It suggests that the enhanced control over personal data provided by the right to data protection serves two purposes: first, it proactively promotes individual personality rights which are threatened by personal data processing and, second, it reduces the power and information asymmetries between individuals and those who process their data. For these reasons, this paper suggests that there ought to be explicit judicial recognition of the distinction between the two rights.


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